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“Climate change is a member of a special kind of economic activity known as global 
public goods. To solve this problem, at a minimum, all countries should  
agree to penalize carbon and other GHG emissions.”  
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Programa: Planejamento Energético 
Após a COP 21 e da adoção do Acordo de Paris em dezembro de 2015, as 
perspectivas para as políticas de precificação de carbono foram ampliadas. Durante a 
conferência, o Brasil anunciou a meta de reduzir as emissões de GEE em 37% em relação 
aos níveis de 2005 até 2025 e a intenção de reduzir 43% até 2030. Considerando o setor 
industrial, não há detalhes nem quantificações precisas. Essa lacuna pode representar uma 
oportunidade estratégica para implementar um instrumento de precificação de carbono 
(IPC), como esquemas de comércio de emissões (ETS) ou tributos sobre carbono, neste 
setor. Dessa forma, esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar desenhos institucionais para o 
IPC na indústria brasileira, visando reduzir sua vulnerabilidade interna e exposição ao 
comércio internacional. Para isso, é realizada uma análise qualitativa e quantitativa 
levando em conta as lições aprendidas a partir da revisão da experiência internacional, 
além da avaliação dos impactos doa IPCs nas políticas setoriais e a exposição subsetorial 
ao risco de vazamento de carbono a partir de diferentes metodologias. Os resultados 
mostram que diferentes desenhos institucionais são melhores ou piores dependendo de 
seu objetivo principal e do impacto a ser minimizado. Considerando a redução dos efeitos 
sobre a competitividade setorial e sobre o poder de compra das famílias como variáveis 
principais, um ETS cobrindo as emissões totais do setor, distribuído por um método de 
alocação gratuito e baseado em grandfathering parece ser uma maneira mais 
politicamente aceitável de se implementar um IPC na indústria brasileira. 
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After the COP 21 and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, the 
outlook for carbon pricing policies has been widened. During the conference, Brazil has 
announced a target to reduce its GHG emissions by 37%, compared to 2005 levels, by 
2025, and the intention to reduce 43% of such emissions by 2030. However, considering 
the industrial sector, there are neither details nor precise quantifications. This gap can 
represent a strategic opportunity to implement carbon pricing instruments (CPI), such as 
emissions trading schemes (ETS) or carbon taxes, in this sector. Therefore, this thesis 
aims to assess institutional frameworks for CPI in the Brazilian industry seeking to reduce 
its domestic vulnerability and international trade exposure. For this purpose, a qualitative 
and quantitative analysis is carried out taking into account the lessons from a review of 
the international experience, besides the assessment of the CPI impacts on sectorial 
policies and the exposure to the risk of carbon leakage scrutinized under different 
methodologies. Results show that different institutional frameworks are better or worse 
depending on main objectives and the impacts to be minimized. Considering the reduction 
of effects on sectorial competitiveness and families’ purchasing power as main drivers, 
an ETS covering total industry emissions, distributed considering a free allocation method 
and grandfathered-based seems to be a more politically-palatable way to implement a CPI 
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Climate change has been identified as one of the greatest economic and political challenges 
faced by the world economy (IPCC, 2014). This is due to the need to reconcile the global nature 
of the problem with action at regional, national and/or local levels (SCHÜTZE et al., 2017; 
WORLD BANK GROUP, 2016; KNIGHT, 2011). Impacts of climate change have increasingly 
played a central role in political, economic, social and environmental discussions, since 
countries, by signaling the transition to a low carbon economy-based development model, are 
looking for solutions and mechanisms to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that are 
technically and economically feasible (UNEP, 2017). 
With pressure on governments to urgently "decarbonise" the global economy, policy makers 
have turned to market solutions to reduce the carbon intensity of the economy (ICAP, 2018; 
PERTHUIS and TROTIGNON, 2014; SEROA DA MOTTA, 2011; HASSELKNIPPE, 2003). 
In the international discussions, for example, there is a strong debate about alternative policies 
and instruments that can be used to put a price on carbon and signal to economic agents a 
development path based on low carbon emissions (WORLD BANK et al., 2018; CPLC, 2016, 
2017). 
Carbon pricing gives flexibility to sector efforts to reduce GHG emissions, allowing mitigation 
targets to be achieved more cost-effectively. In addition to being a key component of an 
effective and efficient mix of climate policies, it also presents itself to the private sector as an 
important tool for risk management and the development of competitive advantages in a world 
in transition for decarbonization (CEBDS, 2016). 
Policy-makers have at their disposal command-and-control measures and market-based 
instruments. The later include the commercialization of GHG emissions permits (emissions 
trading schemes – ETS) and the taxation of emissions (carbon tax) (GVCES, 2013). According 
to ICAP (2018), WORLD BANK GROUP (2016), and FANKHAUSER, HEPBURN and 
PARK (2010), determining a price on carbon is fundamental to climate policy, so that different 
designs of carbon pricing instruments (CPI) are being developed by countries, taking into 
account national and regional specificities as well as the dynamics of involved sectors. 
According to experts, the most economically-efficient way to reduce GHG emissions is through 
the use of CPI (ALDY, 2016; EDENHOFER et al., 2015; METCALF and WEISBACH, 2009; 
SCHMALENSEE and STAVINS, 2015). 
2 
 
Currently, 45 national and 25 subnational1 jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon (Figure 
1). Carbon pricing initiatives already in place and scheduled for implementation would cover 
approximately 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e), roughly 20% of global 
emissions, compared to 8 GtCO2 or about 15% in 2017 (WORLD BANK et al., 2018).  
 
Note:  
Figure 1 – Summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives 
implemented, scheduled for implementation and under consideration 
Source: WORLD BANK et al. (2018) 
                                                          




According to the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018 Report (WORLD BANK et al., 
2018), carbon prices vary substantially, from less than US$1/tCO2e to a maximum of 
US$139/tCO2e. Also, governments raised approximately US$33 billion in carbon pricing 
revenues in 2017, the source of which was allowance auctions, direct payments to meet 
compliance obligations and carbon tax receipts. This represents an increase of nearly US$11 
billion compared to the US$22 billion raised in 2016. Figure 2 summarizes these numbers. 
 
Figure 2 – Carbon pricing in numbers 
Source: Adapted from WORLD BANK et al. (2018) 
 
With the conclusion of the 21th Conference of the Parties (COP 21) and the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement in December 2015, the outlook for carbon pricing policies has been widened. 
While the Agreement does not directly provide for a global carbon price, the provisions set out 
in Article 6 have the potential to increase international cooperation in favor of mitigation 
through market mechanisms (CEBDS, 2016). In this context, Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) from 88 countries – which represents 56% of global GHG emissions – 
indicate the interest in using carbon pricing to achieve their goals, as shown in Figure 3 
(WORLD BANK et al., 2018). Others also highlight the possibility of reaching emission 
reductions greater than those declared if it contains access to international market mechanisms 




Figure 3 – Status of NDC submissions 
Source: WORLD BANK et al. (2018) 
 
The way each country designs and implements carbon pricing is influenced by environmental, 
economic, social and institutional conditions. Thus, the incentive structures of a CPI vary 
widely, depending on each country's mitigation strategy. The understanding of the institutional 
and regulatory framework, therefore, is essential to the economic and distributive results from 
implementing a CPI. 
Also it is important to analyze the sectors covered by the CPI. Energy-intensive industries (EIIs) 
will continue to play a very important role in low-carbon development, however they are 
particularly exposed to impacts of carbon pricing policies, and the constraints arising from 
national climate policies thus are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, steel, cement, 
aluminum, basic chemicals and pulp and paper represent the classic sectors of industrialization 
and rising living standards (DROEGE, 2013). Products from these sectors are also an integral 
part of a low-carbon restructuring of the economy, be it in new energy technologies, in new 
buildings and insulation projects, or as light materials. On the other hand, these industries often 
represent some of the largest sources of energy consumptions and GHG emissions and are 
similarly integral in meeting emissions reduction targets. Figure 4 shows the sectorial coverage 






Note: The size of the circles reflects the volume of GHG emissions in each jurisdiction. Symbols show the sectors 
and/or fuels covered under the respective carbon pricing initiatives.  
* The coverage includes the China national ETS and seven ETS pilots. The coverage represents early unofficial 
estimates based on the announcement of China’s National Development and Reform Commission on the launch 
of the national ETS of December 2017 and takes into account the GHG emissions that will be covered under the 
national ETS and are already covered under the ETS pilots.  
** Also includes Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Carbon tax emissions are the emissions covered under 
various national carbon taxes; the scope varies per tax. 
*** ETS emissions are the emissions covered under the Tokyo CaT and Saitama ETS. 
 
Figure 4 – Carbon pricing initiatives implemented or scheduled for implementation, with sectorial 
coverage and GHG emissions covered 
Source: Adapted from WORLD BANK et al. (2018) 
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Nonetheless, industries often contest the introduction of national emissions pricing due to fierce 
competition in international markets. Moreover, uncertainties about future demand, costs, 
technological breakthroughs, and risks related to political frameworks determine firms’ 
investment decisions and other strategic parameters. However, without a carbon price to 
internalize environmental impacts there will be little incentive to reduce carbon-intensity along 
the value chain. Giving direction to structural change while avoiding economic decline, and 
maintaining diversity within and across industries in an economy, is a major challenge for 
policymakers. This thesis aims to assist the Brazilian industry's policymakers in this process. 
 
1.1. Justifications 
From this international context, Brazil has been an important player in the discussions about 
climate change and its policies (GURGEL and PALTSEV, 2017). During the 15th Conference 
of the Parties (COP 15), in Copenhagen in 2009, under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) coordination, the country assumed a pioneering 
position among developing countries in terms of commitments to mitigate climate change. It 
announced volunteer goals to decrease emissions between 36.1% and 38.9% regarding 
emissions projected for 2020. With the voluntary reduction proposal, the government intended 
to prevent the country from issuing between 975 million and 1 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide 
by 2020, compared to forecasting emissions if no action is taken (Business As Usual – BAU). 
These objectives agreed at COP 15 gained legal force, following the enactment of Law 12,187, 
of December 29, 2009, which established the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC). It 
promoted the adoption of a voluntary national commitment to reduce projected GHG emissions 
by 2020 (WORLD BANK, 2011) and was regulated by Decree 7,390, dated December 9, 2010, 
which regulates some articles of the Law and imposes emission targets for GHG by economic 
sectors (BRAZIL, 2009, 2010). In its article 5, the NPCC affirms that “the use of financial and 
economic instruments to promote mitigation and adaptation actions to climate change” will be 
encouraged, and it is highlighted in article 6 that such mechanisms are among those already 
existing in the scope of the UNFCCC, which must present environmental standards and 
measurable and verifiable targets (BRAZIL, 2009). 
More recently, the COP 21 held in Paris in 2015 was a milestone in the history of international 
politics with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (CEBDS, 2017). Driven by long-term visions 
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for development and sustainability, it aims to strengthen the global response to the challenges 
posed by climate change. To this end, it establishes the goal of limiting the increase in the 
average temperature of the planet to a level below 2°C in relation to pre-industrial levels, with 
an indication of efforts so that the limit of 1.5°C is not exceeded (BRAZIL, 2015b).  
As part of the agreement, more than 180 countries submitted their intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (iNDCs). Many of these have now become formalized as NDCs for 
all 177 countries that have ratified the agreement2. For the first time in the history of 
international negotiations on climate change, the vast majority of developing countries took 
quantified pledges to contain the growth of, or even reduce, their absolute domestic GHG 
emissions.  
Brazil has announced the target of reducing GHG emissions by 37% compared to 2005 levels 
by 2025 and the intention to reduce 43% by 2030. Several indicative mitigation strategies were 
envisioned and explicitly described in the Brazilian NDC to be achieved by 2030 (GURGEL 
and PALTSEV, 2017; MCTI, 2016a). These include (BRAZIL, 2015a,b): achieve zero illegal 
deforestation; restoring and reforesting 12 million hectares (ha) of forests; increasing the share 
of sustainable biofuels in the energy mix to 18%; achieving 45% of renewables energy sources 
in the energy mix; increasing the share of renewables in the power supply to 23%; achieving 
efficiency gains of 10% in the electricity sector; restoring 15 million ha of degraded pastures, 
and; expanding the area of integrated cropland-livestock-forestry systems by 5 million ha. 
Brazilian NDC also considers the use of market mechanisms, although there is no indication as 
to how these instruments will be used. According to the text, the country reserves its position 
on the possibility of using the mechanisms that may be established under the Paris Agreement 
(BRAZIL, 2015b). However, although NDC does not describe how or whether carbon will be 
priced in Brazil, studies to evaluate possible CPI impacts in the country have been considered 
by the federal government at least since 2011, when the country submitted its application to the 
Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), a program administered by the World Bank, whose 
main objective is to support the preparation and implementation of carbon pricing in developing 
countries (MF, 2014; CEBDS, 2016). Discussions about its design and implementation have 
reached a new level in the last years (CEBDS, 2016). 
                                                          




As mentioned before, the Brazilian NDC quantifies some specific measures, such as 
reforestation and increase in the share of bioenergy in the Brazilian energy system. However, 
regarding the industrial sector, there are neither details nor precise quantifications. Brazil’s 
NDC only mentions that “the industrial sector should promote mitigation actions based on new 
clean technologies standards, energy efficiency measures and low carbon infrastructure” 
(BRAZIL, 2015a, b).  
One can verify a vague and comprehensive nature of the Brazilian NDC, which makes it 
difficult to measure the low emission efforts to be directed to the industrial sector, as well as 
potential results of the measures adopted. On the other hand, NDC’s generality makes it 
possible to consider the various mitigation opportunities, especially when considering the 
heterogeneity of the national industry sector. 
It has a high degree of economic linkage with other sectors and is highly sensitive to 
macroeconomic policies (EPE, 2016; BARROS and GUILHOTO, 2014). In spite of the relative 
contraction of the sector in the last decades, the industry maintains its relevance to the national 
economy: in 2015, industry accounted for 15.7% of jobs in the country and 38.1% of national 
exports (CNI, 2015). 
However, there is no coherent framework of measures and policies to requalify and sustain a 
new growth cycle in the Brazilian industrial sector (CEBDS, 2016). Such a gap becomes more 
relevant in the context of the consolidation of the low carbon economy, in which new 
competitiveness variables, such as energy and carbon intensity, can create unprecedented 
pressures for the sector. Especially considering the industry sector emissions, if in recent 
decades Brazilian industry has been losing its position in the national economy, its GHG 
emissions have gained importance as deforestation have fallen in Brazil3: in 1990, the industrial 
sector was responsible for 8.5% of emissions (including fuel combustion and industrial 
processes), while in 2010 it was 22.6%, according to the Third Brazilian Inventory of 
Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals (MCTI, 2015). 
Nevertheless, a recently Brazilian study published on Nature Climate Change this year (2018) 
points out that the Brazilian government is indicating to the landholders to increase 
deforestation, putting the country’s contribution to the Paris Agreement at risk (ROCHEDO et 
                                                          
3 Participation in net CO2 emissions from Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) reduced from 
83.4% in 2005 to 42% in 2010 (MCTI, 2015). 
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al., 2018). The risk of reversals of recent trends in deforestation governance could impose a 
burden on other sectors (for instance, industrial sector) that would need to deploy not yet mature 
technologies to compensate for higher emissions from land-use change. As a result, it sheds 
light on the need to address GHG mitigation in the industrial sector. 
Thus, incentives for efficiency and processes innovations (R&D), new financing instruments, 
implementing specific regulatory instruments – such as a carbon pricing – and establishing 
technological standards are key drivers for the development of a low carbon industrial sector in 
Brazil (CEBDS, 2017, CEBDS, 2016). Nevertheless, other challenges also exist in this sector, 
such as high costs and the incipient stage of some technologies (PINTO et al., 2018; 
HENRIQUES, DANTAS and SCHAEFFER, 2010), the need for adaptability of these 
technologies to the Brazilian plants and the difficulty to obtain cheap loans and financing 
(CEBDS, 2017).  
Despite not detailing strategies for the industrial sector, the current Brazilian climate policy is 
still uncertain in terms of mechanisms and economic instruments for carbon pricing. Although 
there are a number of studies that analyze the economic impacts on the Brazilian industry from 
the implementation of CPIs, considering ETS, carbon tax or hybrid systems (GRAMKOW and 
ANGER-KRAAVI, 2018; PINTO et al., 2018; GURGEL and PALTSEV, 2017; FIESP, 2017; 
MCTI, 2016; LUCENA et al., 2016; OCTAVIANO et al., 2016; MAGALHÃES et al., 2015; 
INSTITUTO ESCOLHAS, 2015; WILLS and GROTERRA, 2015; SANTOS, 2014; CASTRO 
and SEROA DA MOTTA, 2014; WILLS, 2013; RATHMANN, 2012; SILVA and GURGEL, 
2012; WILLS and LEVEFRE, 2012; HENRIQUES et al., 2010), there is a gap with regard to 
more focused studies in analyzing these impacts considering different policy and instrument 
designs.  
In this context, it is also important to assess how such instruments would interact with other 
existing policies, such as commercial and tax policies. Given the national context, 
understanding how the different CPI configurations impact the industry is even more necessary 
at the present moment, in which the Brazilian Ministry of Finance (MF) is analyzing which 
instrument(s) will be adopted in Brazil after 2020 in the context of the PMR project. Still in this 
context, the Brazilian Market Readiness Proposal (MRP) is currently being developed and it is 
divided into some phases whose main objective is to develop sectorial studies to investigate the 
main issues involved in implementing CPI in the economic sectors/subsectors. The results of 
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these studies will guide the following activities that will evaluate the quantitative impacts of 
the instruments proposed using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.  
At the same time, it is also necessary to analyze the CPI’s impacts on sectorial GDP, 
competitiveness indicators, international trade and commercial balance, besides considering 
indirect impacts on other economic sectors, given the intersectorial connections. Theses aspects 
also configure a relevant lack in the literature and therefore should be properly analyzed. It is 
widely recognized that the problem of carbon leakage poses a major challenge for designing 
effective unilateral policies aimed at mitigating global climate change. Carbon leakage could 
be defined as the displacement of emissions from a jurisdiction to another one, due to 
asymmetrical climate policies, resulting in same, or higher, volume of global emissions 
(MARCU et al., 2014). Asymmetrical climate policies are understood as policies that impose 
carbon constraints in one jurisdiction, while other ones have less stringent, or no, carbon 
constraints. In addition, carbon leakage creates an excess burden for those countries that 
regulate emissions to the extent that relocation reduces output, employment, and taxable profits 
at home (MARTIN et al., 2014). 
Not surprisingly, carbon leakage takes the center stage whenever a new climate change 
regulation is up for debate. This could be seen in the different international experiences existing, 
for example in Europe, Australia, California, South Africa, China, Chile, Mexico, among other 
regions. Such experiences used different methodologies to analyze the possible impacts on the 
national industry, varying from indicators like carbon cost, emissions intensity, trade intensity, 
among others (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2014; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
COUNCIL, 2009; CARB, 2012; CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, 2011; DECCEE, 
2011a, 2012). Not unlike that, the assessment of carbon leakage in the Brazilian industry also 
needs to be evaluated in the context of the CPI implementation. This assessment will identify 
which sector(s) is/are most prone to carbon leakage risk, and thus mitigating policies and 
measures can be developed to reduce such impacts. 
The primary benefit of a well-designed competitiveness policy is that it would mitigate and 
potentially eliminate the competitiveness risks. Nonetheless, competitiveness policies also 
carry risks, in terms of their potential impacts on the distribution of the benefits and costs of 
carbon pricing policy, the efficiency of pricing carbon, and international relations in multilateral 
trade and climate policy contexts.  
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As a matter of fact, most carbon pricing policies include provisions to compensate regulated 
sectors for the cost of compliance (SATO et al., 2015). They could impose tariffs reflecting the 
embedded carbon emissions in imports, such that domestically produced goods and their foreign 
competitors face a common carbon price (WEISBACH, 2015; AGAN et al. 2015). Climate policy 
could direct benefits to potentially vulnerable firms, such as through free allowance allocations in 
cap-and-trade programs or targeted tax credits (GRAY and METCALF, 2015). Some northern 
European carbon tax programs have explicitly exempted energy-intensive manufacturing from their 
carbon tax (ALDY and STAVINS, 2012). Policymakers could work through multilateral 
negotiations to ensure that major trade partners undertake comparable domestic emissions 
mitigation policies. They could take such multilateral coordination a step further by linking 
domestic mitigation programs among trade partners, which could then yield a common carbon price 
for businesses operating under all linked programs.  
These policy options, however, carry their own risks. They may run afoul of current obligations 
under the World Trade Organization – WTO (TRACHTMAN, 2015). The design of such policies 
may result in a loss in social welfare and limit the ability of the government to offset potentially 
regressive impacts of pricing carbon. Competitiveness policies may also have important 
implications for ongoing international climate negotiations. Finally, the choice and design of 
competitiveness policies may entail political risks that could also weaken support for the broader 
domestic climate change policy program. 
 
1.2. Objectives 
This thesis has a general objective, which can be deployed in some specific objectives. These 
objectives are detailed below. 
 
1.2.1. General Objective 
The general objective of this thesis is to propose an institutional framework for carbon pricing 
instrument (CPI) for the Brazilian industry aiming to reduce its domestic vulnerability and 




1.2.2. Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
 Analyzing the functionality and impacts of the various CPIs given the adoption of 
different possible designs; 
 Evaluating international experiences to extract lessons learned in order to design the 
CPI in the Brazilian industry; 
 Assessing the competitiveness risks and mitigation policies to avoid carbon leakage; 
 Analyzing and comparing the methodologies and the quantitative assessment criteria to 
address domestic vulnerability and international trade exposure from the CPI adoption; 
 Understanding the Brazilian climate policy and the current national discussions about 
CPI implementation; 
 Analyzing the Brazilian industrial sector, in terms of economic characterization, 
sectorial emissions profile, and existing sectorial policies; 
 Identifying the Brazilian industrial sectors under carbon leakage risk; 
 Analyzing the Brazilian industrial sector interaction with other sectors, such as fuel, 
power sector and Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU); and 
 Proposing institutional frameworks for the Brazilian industry CPI. 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
In order to achieve these objectives, this thesis is structured as follows. This current chapter 
(Chapter 1) introduces the topic, presenting its justification, relevance, general and specific 
objectives, besides the thesis structure. Chapter 2 focuses its analysis on defining and designing 
climate policies and their instruments, also assessing lessons learned from the main 
international experiences, and addressing competitiveness risks and mitigation policies for 
carbon leakage. Chapter 3 evaluates the Brazilian climate policy and concentrates its 
assessments on the industrial sector, focusing on the economic characterization, emissions 
profile and existing sectorial policies. Chapter 4 performs both a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis in order to assess the interactions between sectorial polices and different CPI designs, 
besides evaluating the international methodologies and criteria to address domestic 
vulnerability and international trade exposure of industry. This chapter also applies these 
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methodologies and indicators in the Brazilian industry sector with the purpose to identify the 
most exposed subsectors to carbon leakage. Chapter 5 aims to propose institutional frameworks 
for the Brazilian industry’s CPI, defining and comparing the different alternatives, besides 
proposing a particular configuration for CPI in the Brazilian industry. Finally, chapter 6 
presents the main conclusions, recommendations, limitations of the thesis and perspectives for 
future researches. References and three annexes are also presented. Figure 5 visually 







Figure 5 – Thesis structure 




2. Climate Policy, Carbon Pricing Instruments and Industry Competitiveness  
Different instruments have been developed and used to reduce the impacts of climate change. 
When analyzing the international experience, there is a growing adoption of economic 
instruments at its most diverse levels (national, state, city, etc.), among which we can highlight 
the use of a carbon tax, a carbon market or even hybrid mechanisms. However, numerous issues 
emerge regarding economic and political impacts in terms of eventual loss of competitiveness 
and the need to develop policies to mitigate such impacts. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one aims to define and discuss the main 
economic instruments of climate policy, assessing their associated opportunities and 
challanges. The second one holds a brief debate on the main international experiences, aiming 
to highlight the most relevant lessons learned. The third one examines risks to competitiveness, 
as well as identifing and evaluating the mitigation policies of carbon leakage. 
 
2.1. Definition and Design of Climate Policies and their Instruments 
Considering the (monetary) internalization of externalities via market as the main object in the 
study of environmental and climate policies, ALIER and SCHULÜPMAN (1998) mention two 
fundamental aspects that must be taken into account: how to value external costs and which 
environmental policy instruments should be used to achieve the optimal level of pollution 
(social optimum). In this sense, the classic environmental policy instruments can be classified 
either as command-and-control (mandatory) or market (incentives) instruments, mainly based 
on economic instruments. The main differences between them are their cost-effectiveness, costs 
associated with monitoring, equity and distribution, flexibility and level of information required 
(WORLD BANK et al., 2018; SEROA DA MOTTA, 2011; IPCC, 1996, PERMAN et al., 1996; 
PEARCE e TURNER, 1989). 
Economic instruments are characterized as cost-effective when compared to command-and-
control instruments, since they reach the environmental goal at the lowest social cost, given by 
the equalization of the marginal abatement cost among the different firms (ICAP, 2018, 
CRAMPTON et al., 2017, NARASSIMHAN et al., 2017). Economic instruments affect the 
costs and benefits of activities, influencing the decision-making process, improving 
environmental quality (RATHMANN, 2012). Compared to command-and-control mechanisms 
– like technological, efficieny and emissions standards – economic instruments provide 
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flexibility to pollutants to choose the best economic alternative to achieve the objectives of 
improving environmental quality and their timing (PERMAN et al., 1996, THOMAS and 
CALLAN, 2010). 
There are some market instruments, among them we can highlight carbon pricing mechanisms. 
They are based on the polluter pays principle, which defines responsibility and establishes a 
cost for GHG emissions, internalizing the negative externality. This principle can be 
implemented through fiscal policies – for instance, by a carbon tax – or by establishing a carbon 
market or a pollution trading system, better known as emission trading schemes (ETS). 
By assigning a price to GHG emissions through a carbon tax, an ETS or even a hybrid 
mechanism, firms are encouraged to change their production processes in order to reduce their 
emissions per unit of output. These policies also affect consumer decisions, because rising 
prices of carbon-intensive goods encourage changes in consumption patterns toward less 
carbon-intensive goods. 
Each carbon pricing mechanism has strengths and weaknesses; each one of them works well in 
some respects and fails in others. For these reasons, each CPI will be briefly described, 
presenting their major features in terms of opportunities and challenges when designing 
mechanisms for implementing carbon policy. 
 
2.1.1. Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) 
This instrument originated from the analysis of economist J. H. Dales, who attributed the 
existence of externalities to the absence or mis-definition of property rights over goods. This 
discussion refers to the classic Coase Theorem (1960), which states that, in perfect competition, 
with no or negligible transaction costs, economic agents, through bilateral negotiation and 
without State intervention, arrive at the efficient solution of the elimination of the social 
externality problem, regardless of the initial distribution of property rights (PEARCE and 
TURNER, 1989; PERMAN et al., 1996). 
According to DALES (1968), property rights must be exclusive and transferable in order to allow 
mercantile exchange. It is, therefore, a way of internalizing the externality, whose roots can be 
traced back to poor property rights. Thus, the author seeks to define such rights to allow their 
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exchange between agents, resulting in the definition of an equilibrium price that fulfills every 
requirement for a great Paretian. 
They operate as follows (FAUCHEUX and NOËL, 1995): the State, or the control body, 
decides beforehand on the amount of pollution acceptable in the environment and distributes or 
puts up for sale the pollution rights in the securities market. Each holder of these securities or 
certificates shall therefore be entitled to issue a quantity of pollution corresponding to the 
amount of securities held. The difference, in case it pollutes more than the allowable 
considering the total of licenses owned, should be abated (depollute). 
In summary, this allowance market operates in the cap-and-trade format, that is, it sets a 
standard (cap), divides it into licenses, what gives every player a “right” to pollute, and then a 
sale of these licenses takes place (trade). Given this scenario, the companies will decide how to 
act in this market, according to the confrontation between the marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
and the price of the licenses (PEARCE e TURNER, 1989; FAUCHEUX e NOËL, 1995; 
PERMAN et al., 1996). 
This instrument consists of an organized market where the rights to pollute the environment are 
allowed to be bought and sold, prices vary according to the forces of supply and demand, 
allowing individuals to act in accordance with their private interests (FIELD and FIELD, 2002). 
The total number of allowances will be defined based on a safe amount of emissions that can 
be “released” into the environment. 
Allocation of licenses for marketing is a critical element of the cap-and-trade mechanism, as it 
promotes the emergence of a single market price for emissions by all market participants 
(GOULDER and SCHEIN, 2013). This issue has implications on the distributional impacts of 
the costs and benefits generated by this policy and should therefore be duly analyzed. Also, the 
choice of sectors to be regulated is directly related to the allocation method of the permits, 
which can be distributed free of charge – through the grandfathering (GF) or benchmarking 
(BM) –, auctioned, or regulated by a combination of both methods. Therefore, the question is 
to discover, in terms of efficiency, what players should receive the rights and how they should 
be distributed. Thus, this is an eminently distributive issue (PHYLIPSEN et al., 2006; OECD, 
2009; IEA, 2010; CASTRO, 2013). 
If the free allocation system is chosen, it is necessary to determine the distribution criterion of 
these allowances. Historical emissions, production level or other pre-set standard can be used 
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to define this distribution pattern (IEA, 2010). This form of distribution reduces the costs of the 
program to the regulated sectors, since they receive an asset free of charge, besides eliminating 
the costs added to the firms, without any implication in the efficiency of the program and with 
clear political advantages (BAUMOL and OATES, 1988). Traditionally, it has been the form 
adopted by the markets that begin their operations, as will be verified in the upcoming analysis 
of the international experiences (Section 2.2.). 
In the GF case, past emissions are generally used to define future needs for certificates, so that 
their proper functioning depends on consistent data. However, this system, by using historical 
emissions, ends up compensating inefficient sectors with more certificates (UK ETG, 2005; 
IEA, 2010). In addition, companies entering the market will need new allocation criteria, as 
they also consider in their strategies the free right to part of their emissions. For this reason, 
special attention should be given to the issue of reservations to incoming companies and how 
to deal with those who have closed their activities (IEA, 2010). 
In the BM free allocation system, the determination of the number of certificates is based on a 
measure of performance for a given group, usually tCO2e per quantity produced. Theoretically, 
this criterion is fairer, since it considers the efficiency of the participants. However, it shows 
great difficulty in establishing its value (UK ETG, 2005). Thus, this method is rather aligned 
with the future needs of the actors. Nevertheless, it requires equal treatment for similar facilities. 
To this end, it is necessary to determine BMs for each type of product or production process, 
which in turn can make the process more expensive and difficult due to the heterogeneity of 
products. Moreover, this choice may favor some specific technological route and require the 
regulator's technical knowledge regarding the processes, products and raw materials (UK ETG, 
2005; CASTRO, 2013). 
Certificates can also be sold by the regulator through auctions. In this system, regulated sectors 
face additional costs since the beginning of the program (BAUMOL and OATES, 1988). With 
regard to efficiency and environmental effectiveness, some authors believe that this is the most 
desired method. That is because it is the most direct way of revealing market prices, reducing 
the political pressures of specific groups, and dividing the costs of regulation between regulated 
and regulatory agents (CRAMTON and KERR, 2002, OECD, 2006), in addition to generating 
revenues that can be used by the state to mitigate the impacts of the instrument through different 
recycling methods. In this approach, it is not up to the regulator to calculate the need for each 
 
19 
participant in the program; it is the regulated agents themselves who must formulate their 
projections and their abatement costs. 
In general, free allocation methods, especially the GF, have been used due to less opposition 
from regulated institutions to this system. For CRAMTON and KERR (2002), the distribution 
via auctions reduces distortions, provides greater incentives for innovation and offers more 
flexibility in the distribution of costs. However, even though this method is theoretically more 
efficient, politically free allocation is more feasible. Another argument strongly used by the 
economic sectors that justifies the free allocation of licenses is the possibility of 
competitiveness loss in the international market and carbon leakage, given an eventual charge 
for the licenses, what would change the final price of the goods offered. In practice, it is 
observed that the free distribution, whether by GF or BM, requires from the regulator more 
information than the distribution through auctions. 
As pointed out by GOULDER and SCHEIN (2013) in the article “Carbon Taxes vs. Cap-and-
Trade: A Critical Review”, there is a concern sometimes raised against the cap-and-trade over 
free allocation, stating that it eliminates the incentive to reduce GHG emissions. According to 
the authors, the practice suggests the opposite, that is, even when licenses are granted for free, 
each additional unit of emissions carries an opportunity cost: an additional unit of pollution, or 
it reduces the number of licenses the company can sell or it increases the number of licenses 
the company must buy to keep its previous baseline. 
However, it is important to emphasize that free distribution of licenses should take into account 
future entrants into this market, so a new entrants’ reserve (NER) should be established. The 
size of the NER usually depends on the growth expectations of the various sectors. It is also 
worth noting that in case the allocation is free for new entrants, this should be based on 
benchmarking (BM), since activity levels cannot be derived from historical levels. 
In general, the initial allocation of licenses, while not affecting the efficiency conditions, 
generates distributional effects and can therefore be justified by policy objectives that have this 
purpose. Therefore, the quantity of allowances allocated free of charge affects the amount of 
such transfer. However, when analyzing the international experiences of the carbon market, it 
is observed that such markets generally start from the free allocation of the licenses and, little 
by little, auctions start having a bigger role in the distribution of emission certificates (ICAP, 
2018; WORLD BANK et al., 2018; QUIRION et al., 2012; CRAMTON and KERR, 2002). 
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From the previous discussions, some issues should be analyzed and assessed when desiging an 
ETS. These steps involve deciding the scope, setting the cap, distributing allowances, 
considering the use of offsets, deciding on temporal flexibility, addressing price predictability 
and cost containment, ensuring compliance and oversight, engaging stakeholders, considering 
linking, and defining an implementation and evaluation process. Table 1 sumarizes these key 





Table 1 – Key elements for designing an ETS  
Source: Own elaboration based on ICAP (2018) and PMR and ICAP (2016) 
Features Considerations and Assessments 
Scope Definition 
Establish sectors subject to regulation (e.g, industry, buildings, energy, transport), the GHGs included in the policy (e.g, CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, SF6), regulation 
points (upstream, where the regulation falls on the point of production/commercialization of the emission-generating fuel or downstream, in which the regulation 
is carried out on the entity or installation responsible for the emission), and the regulatory facilities. 
Cap Definition 
The cap should be established based on emissions data – historical or projected – from convered sectors. Obtaining the data can follow a top-down or bottom-
up approach. It should consider possible trade-offs between cap setting level and regulation costs. It is also necessary to define the trajectory to be followed by 
the cap that can evolve in absolute or in intensity terms. 
Allowances Allocation 
Allowances can be allocated free of charge (according to grandfathering or benchmarking criteria) or sold at auctions. The design of the instrument should also 
predict how the regulation of new entrants, closure of installations and removals of GHG emissions will take place. 
Offset Use 
If offset of sectors not covered by the ETS and/or credits from emissions reductions achieved in other jurisdictions are accepted, sectors, gases and eligible 
activities should be defined. The limit on the use of offsets should also be established and there must have a system for governance and monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV). 
Temporal Flexibility 
It is necessary to define whether the permissions of an installation that have not been used in an ETS compliance phase may be used in future periods (banking) 
or whether future phase permissions can be used in advance (borrowing), as well as the rules of that mechanism of flexibility. It is also necessary to define the 
instrument's reporting and compliance periods. 
Price Limits 
Criteria and methods should be foreseen and designed to intervene on prices if they reach very low or very high levels, rendering the instrument unworkable 
and inefficient. It is also important to choose the appropriate instrument for marketing intervention, and decide on governance framework. 
Compliance and Oversight 
The report must be managed by regulated entities. This should comprehend the definition of how the ETS registration will work and how market regulation will 
be fundamental, as well as how compliance with the regulation will be ensured.  
Stakeholder Engajament and 
Capacity-Building 
In addition to identifying the main stakeholders, their interests and concerns, it is necessary to define the strategies for engaging them. It is also important to 
define the approach to develop capacity building of the actors involved. 
Linking with Other Markets 
It is necessary to define and design the possibility of linking the ETS with other markets, be it at the regional, national or international level, considering the 
need for compatibility of the systems, as well as the definition of the partner markets and the type of interconnection to be developed. 
Implementation, Revision and 
Evaluation 
An implementation schedule should be defined taking into account the scope of well-defined reviews. It is still important to consider ways of assessing ETS 




2.1.2. Carbon Tax 
Many economists advocate a particular type of intervention through a tax on polluters in order 
to estimate the damage caused (negative externality). Arthur C. Pigou, in Economics of 
Welfare, proposed a rate as an appropriate way to equate private cost with social cost (PIGOU, 
1932). The internalization of externalities for Pigou would occur through the payment of a fee, 
whose amount would equal the difference between the social cost and the private cost 
(FAUCHEUX and NOËL, 1995). The internalization of externalities would thus be translated 
into a payment that would somehow attribute a price to the harmfulness. The price of the good 
produced would then be equal to the social marginal cost of the good (private cost plus tax). 
Imposing a tax on the externality-generating good can correct the externality. If the tax rate is 
set equal to marginal external damage (the total harm to parties other than the buyer and seller 
from one additional unit of the good), it brings that external cost into the transaction, ensuring 
that the buyer pays the full marginal social cost of the good (WILLIAMS III, 2016). Thus, the 
incentive provided by the tax ensures that the market produces the efficient level of the good 
(in the absence of any other uncorrected market failures). 
The carbon tax is the most direct form of carbon pricing, which establishes the price to be paid 
for the emission of one unit of GHG. This is usually quantified as a $ price per ton of carbon 
dioxide or CO2 equivalent. A carbon tax can be applied either to specific sectors or the entire 
economy. Once the tax base has been defined, an efficient tax rate takes into account two 
economic considerations. First, if the primary goal of the tax is to achieve a target of emissions 
reductions, the level of the tax should be aligned to the marginal cost of the reduction. Second, 
to ensure consistency across sectors, the carbon tax should reflect the specific carbon content 
of different fuels that can be used for the same purpose (heating, transportation, industrial 
processes, etc.). 
According to FIELD and FIELD (2002), the definition of the optimum rate is extremely 
complex. Thus, after conducting modeling studies to find the ideal value for the carbon tax, 
they propose that the value of this tax should be assumed and then it should be checked the 
effect caused to the environmental quality. If the environmental quality has not grown in the 
desired total, the tax must be increased; otherwise, it should be reduced. Through this process 
of trial and error (learning-by-doing) is that we will reach the optimal carbon tax. 
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WILLIAM III (2016) also affirms that, in practice, imposing a theoretically ideal tax can be 
challenging. Estimating marginal damage is difficult, particularly in cases where the harm will 
occur in the future (as with GHG emissions) or where damage varies widely across space or 
time (as with local air pollutants). In many cases, it is difficult for taxing authorities to directly 
measure emissions, and thus imposing the tax on some proxy for emissions (such as the amount 
of fuel burned) makes it much easier to enforce. In such cases, any tax will need to depart from 
the theoretical ideal, but the theory provides some general principles: set tax rates based on the 
best estimate of marginal damage, and when it is impractical to tax emissions directly, choose 
a proxy that is as close as practicable to what matters for marginal damage (PMR, 2017). Taxing 
based on those principles will most efficiently correct the negative externality from pollution. 
By itself, a carbon tax is likely to slightly slow economic growth. Fossil fuels are used 
throughout the economy, and thus taxing carbon acts as an implicit tax on all production. This 
lowers the return to factors of production such as capital and labor (either directly, though 
effects on wages and profits, or indirectly, by raising product prices and lowering real returns), 
and it discourages labor, saving, and investment. Furthermore, it is natural to think that a carbon 
tax will be quite regressive (WILLIAMS, 2016). Its most obvious effect is to raise the prices 
that consumers pay for direct energy goods: electricity, natural gas, gasoline, heating oil, etc. 
These goods represent a larger budget share in poorer households than in wealthier ones. 
However, one of the main advantages of using carbon taxes is to allow the generation of tax 
and tariff revenue – equivalent to the situation of an ETS with an auction. That is, such a policy 
is considered a double-dividend, since in addition to environmental improvement, it generates 
revenues for regulatory agencies (MAY, 2010; PEARCE e TURNER, 1989; PERMAN et al., 
1996). That revenue can be used to cut (or prevent increasing) other taxes, to reduce the budget 
deficit, to pay for public goods, to address distributional goals, or for many other purposes 
(PMR, 2017; WILLIAMS III, 2016). At the same time, interactions between environmental 
taxes and other preexisting taxes (primarily income and payroll taxes) can significantly raise 
the efficiency costs of environmental taxes (or any other excise tax or similar policy). 
The argument that the revenue-raising role of environmental taxes is a substantial additional 
reason to implement such taxes first came to prominence in the “double dividend” literature 
(OATES, 1995; REPETTO et al., 1992; PEARCE, 1991; TULLOCK, 1967). The idea is 
simple: if revenue from an environmental tax can be used to finance a cut in the tax rate for a 
preexisting distortionary tax (such as the income tax), that cut produces an efficiency gain in 
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addition to the other effects of the environmental tax. The term “double dividend” refers to the 
assertion that environmental taxes raise economic efficiency through two separate channels, 
both by correcting an externality and by raising revenue that can be used to cut other taxes. That 
second “dividend” has since come to be known as the “revenue-recycling effect” (GOULDER, 
1995), and this basic concept also envisages different ways of using the revenue: spending the 
revenue on public goods or using it to cut the budget deficit could produce similar gains in 
economic efficiency. 
In a perfect world, carbon emissions would be taxed worldwide where emissions occur 
(METCALF, 2017). Restricting our attention to carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, we 
could also tax fossil fuels upon extraction, since the emissions that will result from the use of 
those fuels are known. In the real world, carbon emissions are taxed at different rates or not 
subject to a meaningful price in different countries. This gives rise to leakage and 
competitiveness issues. Leakage refers to the shifting of production activities from countries 
that price emissions to those countries that do not. As KORTUM and WEISBACH (2017) point 
out, leakage reduces global welfare to the extent that production location decisions are distorted 
by the differential carbon pricing. It also leads to incomplete internalization of the GHG 
externality.  
KORTUM and WEISBACH (2017) also distinguish between leakage and competitiveness 
concerns. Competitiveness concerns are often raised with respect to firms in energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed (EITE) sectors. While a unilateral carbon tax without any border tax adjustments 
(BTA) reduces the competitiveness of EITE firms, the authors note that the tax increases the 
competitiveness of firms in non-energy-intensive sectors such that the overall competitiveness 
of firms in a country with a carbon tax is unaffected.  
In this sense, BTA aims to apply a carbon tax to imported carbon and rebate the tax on exported 
carbon. The use of border adjustments shifts the tax from the location of the production of the 
fossil fuels to the location of the consumption of the goods and services on the basis of the 
carbon embodied in those goods and services (PMR, 2017). Perfectly applied border 
adjustments would eliminate leakage concerns. 
Key design considerations for a carbon tax system includes choosing the appropriate price, 
emissions coverage, the point of taxation (upstream or downstream), stringency (i.e., planned 
escalation of price over time), the flexibility of the price to change in light of new information 
on marginal cost of abatement, allocation of revenue generated from the tax towards general 
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public spending or specific emissions-reducing activities, and harmonization across boundaries 
beyond the jurisdiction of the tax. Table 2 sumarizes the key elements to be considered when 





Table 2 – Key elements for designing a carbon tax 
Source: Own elaboration based on PMR (2017)  
Features Considerations and Assessments 
Scope Definition 
It corresponds to the selection of the sectors that will be regulated by the tribute, being, generally, those that consume substantially fossil fuels or that are highly 
intensive in emissions. Also it is important to decide which gases to cover and to choose the points of regulation, besides the entities to regulate and set thresholds.  
Calculation Basis  
and Tax Rate 
Generally, the aliquot is calculated based on the CO2 emissions per unit of fuel burned, using specific emission factors for each fuel, so the aliquot varies 
according to the carbon content. In addition, aliquots may vary for more or less emission-intensive sectors. Some carbon tax policies provide for gradual rate 
increase plans, allowing covered entities to adapt financially and technologically. 
It is important to determine the basis for setting the tax rate, how the rate will develop over time and to consider using modeling to predict the effects of different 
tax rates on meeting policy objectives.  
Potential Undesirable  
Effects 
Assess the risk of the tax leading to carbon leakage or producing negative distributional effects, considering the costs and benefits of adopting measures to 
mitigate risks and developing criteria to determine eligibility for assistance measures. For example, rebates and exemptions tend to be granted to sectors most 
exposed to the international market or to those already regulated by some ETS scheme. They can be transient – in order to allow companies to adapt to the new 
tribute – or permanent, avoiding the loss of competitiveness in some sectors of industry. 
Recycling Methods 
There is a number of options on how to recycle revenue from tax collection. In some cases, they turn to the population, others to the sectors most vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of taxation or the financing of environmental measures. There are cases where the revenues are directed to the state coffers and can be used 
to reduce taxes on income or applied in specific sectors such as education and/or health. It is important to calculate projected revenue from the carbon tax and 
decide whether to allow offsets. 
Legal and Institutional 
Framework 
The policy implemented needs to be transparent and concise in order to be well accepted by the sectors covered by taxation as well as by the population. 
Frequently, the introduction of a tribute implies a comprehensive reform of environmental policies and/or the tax system as a whole (Tax Reform). It is necessary 
to map the required roles and functions for administering the tax and to determine whether they can be carried out with existing capacities or require new roles 
to be defined and different capacities. Also it is important to establish clear procedures and ensure coordination of key entities, including clear and meaningful 





2.1.3. Hybrid System 
This section looks at the benefits of hybrid schemes that include elements of both quantity 
and price management. It has long been recognised there is no need to restrict policy to a 
pure price or pure quantity instrument, and that a hybrid of the two can have benefits.   
An emissions cap combined with a carbon tax can limit total emissions, and so reduce the 
risk of crossing cumulative thresholds where damage becomes very high, while ensuring 
that the price never falls below the current marginal cost of damage. Price collars 
represent a hybrid approach to carbon pricing. If the carbon price under cap-and-trade 
moves too low or too high, then the price floor or safety valve kicks in and the instrument 
effectively transforms into a tax (ALDY, 2017). 
It is thus likely to form a better approximation to the cost of damages than either a tax or 
a cap-and-trade alone, better conforming to the basic principle that carbon prices should 
approximate to the costs of damages (GRUBB, 2012).  It also allows the cap to be 
consistent with a (global) social choice about the acceptable level of risk, while 
continuing to price emissions below that threshold, so as to stimulate investment to abate 
emissions that, even if the worst of the risks are avoided, impose costly damage.  And it 
gives a clear signal about the scale of the challenge and the transformational change 
necessary to meet it. 
Therefore, it shall be pointed out that the possibility of using hybrid systems in which 
price controls are adopted within a market system in order to reduce the volatility of the 
negotiated values has become more feasible as the international experience has shown. 
An example is given by the creation of minimum and maximum price references (lower 
limit and upper limit for prices practiced in the market, as those adopted in California, in 
Quebec and in the Regional Grennhouse Gas Initiative - RGGI). Another possibility, 
adopted in the EU ETS, would be to maintain a licenses reserve that would be sold and 
purchased in order to ensure price stability (Market Stability Reserve) (CEBDS, 2016). 
The advantages of a tax may be better accomplished by a hybrid scheme than by a pure 
tax for simple pragmatic reasons.  Emissions trading schemes are already in place in many 
jurisdictions and it is likely to be easier to move to a hybrid scheme that at least gains 
some of the benefits of a tax than abolishing an ETS and replacing it completely with a 




Taxation instruments may also be adopted together with market systems to cover sectors, 
which would initially be excluded from the regulation. This configuration and 
combination of instruments have strongly been influenced by political economy factors 
in which the participation and the power of influence of the regulated agents and of the 
regulators end up determining choices dictated not only by technical questions 
 
 
2.1.4. Which CPI and Why? 
Although there is broad agreement among economists about the potential advantages of 
pricing GHG emissions, there is an intense debate as to which would be the best CPI: 
ETS or carbon tax. From a theoretical point of view, such instruments are equivalent. 
Therefore, if the regulator has perfect information, the result will be the same, both in 
terms of the amount of GHG emissions reduced and the abatement cost for both 
instruments. Thus, if the regulator were able to determine the equilibrium price or the 
optimal amount of emissions allowed, both options would lead to the social optimum 
(WEITZMAN, 1974; BAUMOL and OATES, 1988; GOULDER and SCHEIN, 2013). 
In a perfectly competitive market the use of a carbon tax would be tantamount to 
establishing an ETS, since it is considered that there is a duality between the two 
alternatives.  
It should be noted, however, that this equivalence is accepted in the case of an ETS in 
which licenses are sold, not granted free of charge (GOULDER and SCHEIN, 2013). It 
is known, however, that in practice this theoretical result is unrealistic, since there are 
other political and economic variables that impact the functioning dynamics of the CPI. 
Besides, perfect information of regulators and the absence of moral risk and adverse 
selection are also an ideal situation. 
Researchers and academics offer different perspectives on which instrument is better. For 
example, some argue that a carbon tax is more efficient than an ETS, by stating that such 
a policy can act directly on issues related to equity and distribution, through different 
forms of recycling revenues (SHU et al., 2017; POLLITT, 2015; IES-BRASIL, 2015; 
CHEN, TIMILSINA and LANDIS, 2013; WILLS, 2013; GROTTERA, 2013). In 
addition, all economic agents know the tax value that does not change quite frequently as 




MAGALHAES, DOMINGUES and HEWINGS, 2015; INSTITUTO ESCOLHAS, 2015; 
WILLS and LEFEVRE, 2012; METCALF, 2007).  
Others, however, believe that an ETS is a more interesting instrument to reduce 
emissions, since it is more cost effective and dynamically efficient (ICAP, 2018; YANG 
et al., 2017; YE et al., 2016; PERTHUS & TROTIGNON, 2015; SANTOS, 2014; 
RATHMANN, 2012; GURGEL et al., 2011; RATHMANN et al., 2010; KEOHANE, 
2009). Yet some argue that an ETS provides opportunity for non-polluters, encouraging 
efficiency gains (CHOI and LEE, 2016; WORLD BANK GROUP, 2016;   LAING et al. 
2014; CASTRO and SEROA DA MOTTA, 2013; SEROA DA MOTTA, 2011; LISE; 
SIJM and HOBBS, 2010; PALTSEV et al., 2008; STAVINS, 2007). 
The results of GOULDER and SCHEIN (2013) indicate that, if projected correctly, the 
two instruments have an equivalent potential. A similar result was found by WEISBACK 
(2009). The performance of the two instruments critically depends on the specificities of 
their design. In fact, the conception (design) of the instrument can be as important as the 
choice between the two instruments. 
The key to be analyzed in terms of instrument design is that they set the price differently 
(WORLD BANK GROUP, 2016; FANKHAUSER, 2010). Under a carbon tax, the price 
of carbon (or CO2 emissions) is defined directly by the regulatory authority. On the other 
hand, in an ETS, the amount of emissions is defined, rather than price. That is, the price 
of emissions is set indirectly: the regulatory authority determines the total allowed amount 
of emissions and then the price is established by the supply and demand of licenses in this 






Figure 6 – Functioning of an ETS and a carbon tax  
Source: Adapted from CEBDS (2016) 
 
2.2. A Brief Description and Analysis of the Main International Experiences  
The following sections describe some carbon pricing experiences and comparatively 
analyzes them. Such experiences were selected to cover the most relevant ETS and carbon 
tax implementations in the industrial sector at the supranational, national, and subnational 
levels. In addition, they represent diverse geographies and span across time, allowing the 
identification of best practices, linkage opportunities, and learning and knowledge 
spillovers from older to newer implementations.  
 
2.3.1. ETS Main Experiences 
With regard to the ETS main experiences, the following cases will be briefly analyzed: 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), California Cap-and-Trade, New 
Zealand ETS (NZ ETS), and China ETS. After that, a comparative analysis between these 
experiences will be carried out with focus on aspects related to the design of the 
instrument, such as allowance allocation, price control, carbon leakage analysis, and 





2.3.1.1. European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was one of the main policy 
tools used by the EU to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The program begun in 2005 and 
now operates in 28 EU member states, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The EU 
ETS covers about 11,000 entities accounting for 45% of EU-wide GHG emissions (1,988 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent – MMT CO2e) from multiple sectors, 
like industry, power and domestic aviation. The EU ETS has proceeded through three 
distinct trading periods, with phase three (2013–2020)4 employing an allowance cap 
reduction of 1.74% per year, a market stability reserve (MSR)5 to begin in 2019, banking 
and borrowing restricted to a year, offsets capped at 50% of total emissions reductions, a 
noncompliance penalty of €100 per ton of regulated emissions, and 50% of auction 
revenue directed towards climate and energy-related investments (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2016; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017; FRUNZA, 2013; 
MEADOWS, 2017). In this phase, sectors covered are energy intensive industries (EII), 
including power stations and other combustion plants with > 20MW thermal rated input, 
oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel, cement clinker, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, 
pulp, paper and board, aluminum, petrochemicals, ammonia, nitric, adipic, glyoxal and 
glyoxylic acid production, CO2 capture, transport in pipelines and geological storage of 
CO2 (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2017). 
Declining allowance cap rates every year and a MSR to manage liquidity are two good 
features that emerged out of EU ETS’ experiences with over-allocations during phases 1 
and 2. EU ETS is also notable for its decision to progressively increase the auctioning of 
allowances, with auctioning generating about €14 billion between 2012 and 2016 (double 
                                                          
4 The legislative framework of the EU ETS for its next trading period (phase 4) was revised in early 2018 
to enable it to achieve the EU's 2030 emission reduction targets in line with the 2030 climate and energy 
policy framework and as part of the EU's contribution to the 2015 Paris Agreement. The revision focuses 
on: strengthening the EU ETS as an investment driver by increasing the pace of annual reductions in 
allowances to 2.2% as of 2021 and reinforcing the Market Stability Reserve; continuing the free allocation 
of allowances as a safeguard for the international competitiveness of industrial sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage, while ensuring that the rules for determining free allocation are focused and reflect technological 
progress; and helping industry and the power sector to meet the innovation and investment challenges of 
the low-carbon transition via several low-carbon funding mechanisms. 
 
5 MSR is a mechanism established by the EU in 2015 to reduce the surplus of emission allowances in the 




dividend). More than 50% of the revenue has been distributed for climate and energy 
related purposes (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017). 
The persistent low price of allowances in spite of market intervention measures is a major 
concern for the EU ETS system. Over-allocation is reflected in the amount of total 
emissions reductions achieved since its inception. According to the European 
Commission, emissions have decreased by about 4.5% between 2011 and 2015 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017). Many studies estimate a 2.5 to 5% total emissions 
reduction (about 150-300 MMT CO2e) during phase 1 and a 6.3% (i.e., 260 MMT CO2e) 
from 2008–2009 in phase 2 (BROWN, HANAFI and PETSONK, 2012; HU et al., 2015). 
The biggest share of abatement, however, is attributable to the 2008 economic crisis rather 
than the EU ETS (BEL and JOSEPH, 2015). With new measures to reduce the allowance 
surplus in phase 3, the ETS is anticipated to induce greater emission reductions after 2025 
(HU et al., 2015). 
 
2.3.1.2. California Cap-and-Trade 
The California Cap-and-Trade program began in 2013 after it was granted legal authority 
through the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), requiring the state to reduce 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. During the first compliance phase (2013–2014), the 
program covered 35% of the state’s emissions (with an upstream coverage of industry, 
power, transport and buildings), several GHGs (CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, SF₆, HFCs, PFCs, and 
NF₃). In the second compliance period (2015–2017), the program regulates 85% of 
California’s emissions with free allowances for electric utilities and industrial facilities 
and 10% auctioned or fixed-price allowances for sectors such as transport, with auctioned 
allowance revenues allocated for projects related to climate change (C2ES, 2011). In 
addition, the program contains a $10 price floor with 5% escalator per year and allows 
offsets up to 8% of a firm’s emissions. Especially regarding the industrial sectors, large 
industrial facilities are covered, including cement, glass, hydrogen, iron and steel, lead, 
lime manufacturing, nitric acid, petroleum and natural gas systems, petroleum refining, 
pulp and paper manufacturing, including cogeneration facilities co-owned/operated at any 




California Cap-and-Trade program is known for its well-designed ETS containing an 
allowance price-containment reserve, which gives regulators the power to remove or add 
allowances into the market, international linkage to the Québec Cap-and-Trade program, 
free allowances to energy-intensive and trade exposed (EITE) industries to reduce 
leakage, and rigorous monitoring of allowances, offsets, and emissions reductions (C2ES 
2011). The results of the California Cap-and-Trade experience indicate that covered 
entities steadily reduced emissions, with total emissions attributable to the cap-and-trade 
program being 9% below the 2014 cap of 160 MMT CO2e. The California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) also estimates that California is on track to reach 1990 emission levels by 
2020 (CAMUZEAUX, 2015). 
This program, however, has faced legal challenges and issues with carbon leakage due to 
resource reshuffling6 by electric utilities, which has threatened the integrity of the 
program (CULLENWARD, 2014). California’s complimentary emissions reduction 
policies such as vehicle emissions standards, renewable portfolio standards, energy 
efficiency programs, and non-carbon GHG emissions reduction programs are also seen 
as undermining the proper functioning of the program. This creates potential market 
uncertainty as regulated entities may not know if the state will meet it complimentary 
policy goals and obligations in the future, and what effect that will have on allowance 
prices (DIAMANT, 2013). 
 
2.3.1.3. New Zealand ETS (NZ ETS) 
In 2008, the New Zealand ETS (NZ ETS) was introduced by legislation in order to meet 
the country’s international obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, with the objective of 
delivering emissions reduction in a cost-effective manner while increasing the long-term 
resilience of New Zealand’s economy (RICHTER and CHAMBERS, 2014). Until 2015, 
the ETS covered all sectors under a Kyoto-based target without a nationwide emissions 
cap. From 2016, the ETS imposes a nationwide emissions-intensity-based cap, upstream 
regulation in the energy sectors, voluntary opt-in for downstream users, output-based 
grandfathering of allowances to eligible EITE sectors, such as agriculture, with a linear 
phase-out of free allowances by 2030, unlimited Kyoto offsets until 2015, and a strict 
                                                          
6 CARB defined resource shuffling as “any plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions 





MRV process with audits of self-assessment and penalties for non-compliance (ICAP 
2017; LEINING and KERR, 2016). 
The NZ ETS specifies the activities that are included for each of the following sectors: 
forestry, liquid fossil fuels, stationary energy, industrial processes, synthetic greenhouse 
gases, agriculture and waste. In the industrial processes sector, certain businesses have 
obligations to report their activities and surrender New Zealand Units (NZUs) under the 
scheme. They are: iron and steel, aluminum (including carbon dioxide 
and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) emissions), clinker or burnt lime (resulting in calcination of 
limestone or calcium carbonates), glass (using soda ash), and gold (if the CO2-equivalent 
emissions per annum exceed 5000 tons) (EPA, 2018). 
NZ ETS is known for its unique “no cap” approach to reducing emissions in order to 
achieve its Kyoto obligations. The scheme allowed for unlimited purchase of international 
offsets and issued free domestic NZU to its participants in order to garner political support 
for the program. The program indicates that it is learning from its prior policy failings, as 
the ETS starting in 2016 imposes a domestic emissions cap, phases out free allowances 
by 2030, and restricts the trading of international offsets. However, although NZ ETS met 
its Kyoto obligations during the first commitment period and is expected to do so during 
the second one as well (MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 2016a,b), the 
experiment of running an ETS market with full international linkage without a domestic 
emissions cap has not resulted in significant domestic emissions reductions. BERTRAM 
and TERRY (2010) conclude that domestic emissions were reduced only by 23 MMT 
CO2e in 2008 and only by 19 MMT CO2e in 2009. BULLOCK (2012) argued that the 
integrity of the ETS has been undermined by interest groups, particularly from the 
agriculture sector, thereby delaying significant technological upgrades and emissions 
reduction in the country. Free allowances to EITE firms, the absence of a nationwide 
emissions cap, and an international offset cap until 2015 allowed many ETS participants 
to meet their obligations without significantly reducing firm level emissions. 
 
2.3.1.4. China ETS 
In 2011, the Chinese government initiated seven pilot ETS programs for CO2 emissions 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Guangdong, and Hubei) requiring the 




ETS pilots covered indirect electricity emissions within the pilot regions and emissions 
from imported electricity outside of the pilot regions (ZHANG, 2015). Nearly all of them 
allocated allowances for free, except for a small percentage of auctioning in Guangdong, 
Shenzhen, and Hubei, but the systems differed in their method of allocation (DONG, MA 
and SUN, 2016; DUAN, PANG and ZHANG, 2014). All of them accepted offsets through 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated outside the pilot regions and established 
market stabilizing mechanisms using auctions triggered by price ceilings, allowance 
reserves, buy-back of surplus allowances in the market, or a combination of these features 
(PANG and DUAN, 2016). 
Incomplete reporting practices, a lack of a legal framework to enforce compliance, and 
weak penalties are identified as some of the key challenges that emerged in the seven 
pilots (YU and LO, 2015). A survey of Chinese firms conducted in 2015 revealed that the 
carbon price failed to “stimulate companies to upgrade mitigation technologies” and that 
the majority of firms considered participation in the ETS pilots only a means of improving 
ties with governments and earning a good social reputation (YANG, LI and ZHANG, 
2016). 
However, on the 19th of December 2017, China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) announced the official launch of the anticipated national ETS. In a 
historical achievement, China recently launched the world’s largest carbon market that 
will cover eight key emitting sectors, starting with the power sector, then including the 
chemical, petrochemical, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, building materials, paper 
making, and aviation sectors (ICAP, 2018). Enterprises in these sectors that exceed the 
annual threshold of 26,000 metric tonnes of CO₂ emissions (energy consumption of more 
than 10,000 tce) are already requested by the government to report and verify their 
historical CO₂ emissions, with the aim to collect and improve data quality (ICAP, 2018). 
This data will then support the development and implementation of sound allocation 
plans. 
 
2.3.1.5. Comparative Analysis  
In terms of emissions cap, EU ETS initially employed a bottom-up approach to deciding 




to determine their respective national emission caps based on historical emissions 
benchmarks (HU et al., 2015). However, after facing a substantial over-allocation of 220 
million allowances and a resulting complete price collapse, the EU ETS decided to 
aggregate all member state emissions caps into a single EU-wide emissions cap that 
decreases at 1.74% a year (MEADOWS, 2017; SCHUMALENSEE and STAVINS, 
2015). California set top-down emissions caps based on projected emission levels 
calculated using estimates of future economic growth. In NZ ETS, the intensity-based 
nationwide cap from 2016 may lead to varying abatement costs each year as its economy 
is primarily driven by weather-dependent primary production (47% of GDP from 
agriculture). Finally, the Chinese ETS pilots vary significantly in the way they set their 
emissions targets with Guangdong choosing an absolute cap, Shanghai allocating 
allowances without announcing an emissions cap, and Shenzhen issuing both intensity 
and absolute caps for the 2013–2015 period. Reflecting the variation in economic 
conditions between the Chinese cities, between 2013 and 2015, Guangdong increased its 
emissions cap to allow for increased industrial production, Hubei decreased its cap to 
reflect new economic growth patterns, Chongqing reduced its cap by 4.13% a year, and 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Shenzhen kept their caps unchanged (XIONG et al., 
2017). 
Once the emissions cap is decided, policymakers must define the allowance allocation 
and distributional method. The EU ETS was initiated with a politically-palatable, free, 
grandfathered allowance-allocation method, based on a bottom-up reporting of historical 
emissions by firms in each member state in its first compliance period. Over time, the EU 
ETS has transitioned to a benchmarking system that calculates allowances based on a 
product’s benchmarked emissions and historical production (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 
2011). Similarly, California initially allocated allowances for free and calculated its 
allocations based on a benchmarked, three-year moving-average output for each industry 
(CARB, 2010). In the second trading period (2013–2020), California uses a mix of free 
allocations, auctioning, and fixed price allowance sales for different sectors (C2ES, 
2011). The NZ ETS gave preferential treatment to its EITE sectors (i.e., agriculture and 
land use sectors) by assigning free allowances based on grandfathered historical 
emissions, fixed until 2018, with a linear phase-out of free allowances starting in 2019 
and moving to full auctioning by 2030 (BULLOCK, 2012). Recently, the New Zealand 




meet its climate change targets and incentivize firm level emissions reductions 
(MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 2016b). Finally, the Chinese ETS pilots chose 
to allocate based on the method that best suited the region’s economic structure. Beijing 
and Tianjin pilots used a combination of historical emissions, historical carbon intensity, 
and industrial benchmarks to allocate based on the region’s historical average carbon 
intensity multiplied by an intensity decline coefficient (XIONG et al., 2017). Shanghai 
uses early action incentives to encourage early movers and employs a rolling baseline 
year so that enterprises can use the latest year’s emissions data as a benchmark to receive 
allowances if their emissions increased over 50% from 2009 to 2011 (XIONG et al., 
2017). Guangdong and Hubei pilots follow the Shanghai formula without issuing early-
action incentives, while Chongqing relies on self-declaration of emission reductions by 
entities. Shenzhen allocates 90% of allowances for free based on industrial benchmarks. 
For the manufacturing sector, Shenzhen follows a novel approach of post-allocation 
adjustment based on the difference between expected and actual firm-level emissions. 
Manufacturing firms are required to follow a strict MRV process and report their 
emissions output every year for adjustment (YE et al., 2015). Out of the seven pilots, 
Beijing, Shenzhen, and Hubei follow California’s hybrid approach of distributing 
allowances freely, through auction, and by fixed price sale. Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing pilots distribute entirely for free, while Guangdong uses a combination of free 
distribution and auction (XIONG et al., 2017). 
Considering the price control mechanisms, the EU ETS in phases 1 and 2, California in 
phase 1, and New Zealand witnessed excess allowances resulting from over-allocation. 
The EU experienced over-allocation of up to 900 million allowances and a complete price 
collapse in its first compliance period due to grandfathered permits based on member 
state reported emissions. Subsequent over-allocation in the second compliance period was 
due to the economic downturn, even in spite of a 6.5% reduction in allowances and 
auctioning of 10% of allowances (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2016). In the third 
compliance period, EU ETS created the MSR to begin operating in 2019, with the aim of 
aligning the demand and supply of allowances by placing surpluses into the MSR and 
releasing them in the event of an allowance shortage (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2017; 
HU et al., 2015). California witnessed excess market liquidity and price volatility in their 
initial compliance periods primarily due to miscalculation of future growth projections 




and created an allowance price containment reserve similar to the EU, which regulators 
can use to increase or decrease allowance liquidity in the market. Since NZ ETS came 
under an overall Kyoto emissions cap in its first compliance period, the glut of Kyoto 
offsets led to a collapse in the allowance price from $20 in May 2011 to $2 in May 2013 
(RICHTER and CHAMBERS, 2014). Unlike the California system, until 2015, the NZ 
ETS did not have a cap- or a price-based circuit breaker on the number of international 
offset credits that could be purchased by participants. In its second compliance period, 
NZ ETS responded by bringing the program under a nationwide emissions cap and 
closing access to international Kyoto offset credits (DIAZ-RAINEY and TULLOCH, 
2015). 
Carbon leakage always appears as a major concern in ETS initiatives7. In California, 
leakage has occurred as regulated entities, primarily utilities, shuffle their resources 
through out of state electricity purchases. California imports large amounts of electricity, 
roughly 33.5% in 2015 (much of it either coal or natural gas based), from other western 
states that do not have carbon pricing mechanisms (CEC, 2017). This practice allows 
regulated California utilities to switch from “dirtier” to “cleaner” electricity resources by 
rearranging ownership or contracts with out-of-state generators, and then claim the 
difference in emissions as reductions in firm-level emissions. Estimates of the potential 
leakage range from 120 to 360 MMT CO2e in total measured emission reduction under 
the cap-and-trade program, a significant amount in light California’s goal to reach 1990 
emission levels (approx. 431 MMT CO2e) by 2020 (BORENSTEIN et al., 2014; CARB, 
2017). In the case of New Zealand, carbon leakage appeared in the form of Kyoto offsets 
and HFC-23-related credits from other markets that were easily brought into the NZ ETS 
market, thereby undermining the creditability and environmental effectiveness of the 
program (DIAZ-RAINEY and TULLOCH, 2015). Although the new intensity-based 
allocation in NZ ETS may stem domestic carbon leakage, it could encourage increased 
international leakage, with emitters from other countries with stricter emission 
requirements relocating to New Zealand (BERTRAM and TERRY, 2010). 
When looking at the international linking possibility, California is notable for its 
international linkage with the Québec cap-and-trade program beginning in 2014. The two 
systems were fairly easy to link due to extensive and transparent communications 
                                                          
7 Section 4.2.1. will describe in detail the main methodologies developed for assessing the carbon leakage 




between the two governments going as far back as 2008 (BENOIT and CÔTÉ, 2015). 
California and Québec created a common electronic allowance registry to avoid gaming 
and potential double-counting. Strong verification and data accuracy safeguards were put 
in place to ensure the integrity of allowance credits, in addition to that of the offsets. To 
maintain price stability, the price floor was set at the highest minimum price of either 
region, in USD. Linking with the California system allowed Québec’s cap-and-trade 
market to increase its liquidity through increased access to allowances, with analysis 
indicating that Québec could potentially purchase between 14.4 and 18.3 million 
allowances from California, based on projected demand for allowances (CARB, 2012). 
Nevertheless, on the delinking side, DIAZ-RAINEY and TULLOCH (2015) argue that 
NZ ETS shows both the power and dangers of tacit linking to international carbon 
markets. Due to excess liquidity from international offsets, the NZ ETS had to delink 
itself from CDM and offset markets in 2015 and move towards a domestic market 
(BULLOCK, 2012). The EU ETS also delinked from the international CDM market in 
2012. In China, the idea is to link all the pilot programs into a national China ETS. 
Considering the carbon revenue management, the EU ETS generated about €14 billion 
in auctions between 2012 and 2016, with at least 50% of the revenue distributed for 
climate and energy-related purposes and retrofitting existing infrastructure (EUROPEAN 
COMISSION, 2017). The EU plans to establish two new funds: an Innovation fund to 
extend existing support for demonstration of innovative technologies, and a 
Modernization fund to facilitate investments in modernizing the power sector and 
fostering energy efficiency (MEADOWS, 2017). California raised $3.385 billion in 
revenue through 2017 and has invested revenue into high-speed rail, low carbon transit, 
low-income weatherization, and environmental conservation efforts (CCI, 2017). 





Table 3 – ETS’ Features and Comparisons  
Source: Own elaboration based on NARASSIMHAN et al. (2018), EUROPEAN COMISSION (2017), ICAP (2018), CARB (2010, 2012), C2ES (2011), MINISTRY FOR 
THE ENVIROMENT (2016a,b), EDF, MOTU and IETA (2014), ZHANG (2015), XIONG et al. (2017), SWARTZ (2016) 
Feature EU ETS California Cap-and-Trade NZ ETS China ETS 
General Information 
Jurisdiction 
28 EU-member states, plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway 
California New Zealand 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, 
Guangdong, Hubei 




1st phase (2005-2007), 2nd 
phase (2008-2012), 3rd phase 
(2013-2020), 4th phase (2021-
2030) 
1st period (2012-2014), 
2nd period (2015-2017), 3rd (2018-2020) 
Yearly Compliance periods since 
2011 
Pilot phase (2013-15).  





Directorate General for Climate 
Action 
California Air Resources 
Board  
Ministry of the Environment, 
Environmental Protection Authority, 
Ministry of Primary Industries 
Development and Reform Commissions of each region 
Offsets 
The overall use of credits 
is limited to 50% of the EU 
wide reductions over the period 
2008–2020 
Up to 8% of each entity's 
Compliance obligation 
Unlimited (domestic offsets, related 
to the forestry sector), but 
international offsets are not eligible 
Beijing: -; Tianjin: 10%; Shanghai: 5%; Chongqing: 
8%; Shenzhen: 10%; Guangdong: 10%, of which 70% 
of offsets must be located in Guangdong province; 





CO2, N2O, PFCs (individual 
states may add more GHG 
emissions) 
CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFC, PFCs, NO3 CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFC, PFCs CO2 
Entities 
Covered 
10,950 450 2,364 
Beijing: 490; Tianjin: 197; Shanghai: 191; Chongqing: 




45% 85% 51% 
Beijing: 50%; Tianjin: 45%; Shanghai: 60%; 




Power plants over 20MW 
thermal rated input, energy 
intensive industry, oil refineries, 
coke ovens, iron and steel, cement 
clinker, glass, lime, bricks, 
ceramics, pulp and paper board, 
aluminum, petrochemicals, 
Large industrial facilities (including cement 
production, glass production, hydrogen 
production, iron and steel production, lead 
production, lime manufacturing, nitric acid 
production, petroleum and natural gas systems, 
petroleum refining, pulp and paper 
manufacturing, including cogeneration facilities 
Sectors gradually phased-in, forestry 
(2008), stationary energy, industrial 
processing, liquid fossil fuels (2010), 
waste and synthetic GHGs (2013) 
Beijing: 17 manufacturing industries, commercial 
buildings, public utilities. Greater than 10,000 metric 
tonnes/CO2 per year. Heat and electricity production, 
iron, steel, nonferrous metal, petrochemicals, pulp and 
paper, glass, cement; Tianjin: Oil and gas exploration, 
buildings; Greater than 20,000 metric tonnes/CO2 per 




ammonia, nitric, adipic, glyoxal 
and glyoxylic acid production, 
CO2 capture, transport in 
pipelines, geological storage of 
CO2, flights between EU airports 
co-owned/operated at any of these facilities), 
electricity generation, electricity imports, other 
stationary combustion, and CO2 suppliers, 
suppliers of natural gas, suppliers of 
reformulated blend stock for oxygenate 
blending (RBOB) and distillate fuel oil, 
suppliers of liquid petroleum gas in California 
and suppliers of liquefied natural gas. Facilities 
≥25,000 tCO2e (metric) per data year 
for other sectors. Heat and electricity production, iron, 
steel, nonferrous metal, petrochemicals, pulp and paper, 
glass, cement; Shanghai: Textiles, commercial 
buildings, and airlines. Greater than 20,000 metric 
tonnes /CO2 per year. Heat and electricity production, 
iron, steel, nonferrous metal, petrochemicals, pulp and 
paper, glass, cement; Chongqing: Greater than 20,000 
metric tonnes /CO2 per year. Heat and electricity 
production, iron, steel, nonferrous metal, 
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, glass, cement; 
Shenzhen: 26 manufacturing industries, commercial 
buildings and transportation. Greater than 5,000 metric 
tonnes/CO2 per year. Heat and electricity production, 
iron, steel, nonferrous metal, petrochemicals, pulp and 
paper, glass, cement; Guangdong: Textiles, commercial 
buildings, and transportation. Greater than 20,000 
metric tonnes/CO2 per year. Heat and electricity 
production, iron, steel, nonferrous metal, 
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, glass, cement; Hubei: 
Automobiles. Greater than approximately 120,000 
metric tonnes/CO2 per year. Heat and electricity 
production, iron, steel, nonferrous metal, 
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, glass, cement 




Although in phase 3 auctioning is 
the default method for allocating 
emission allowances to companies 
participating in the EU ETS, some 
allowances continue to be 
allocated for free until 2020 and 
beyond. 41% of the total quantity 
of allowances will be allocated 
for free over phase 3 
Allowance allocation method is mixed between 
auction and free allocation. Electric utilities, 
industrial facilities, and natural gas distributors, 
allowances allocated freely, with a declining 
total over time. Other covered sectors, such as 
transportation, natural gas extraction, and other 
fuel sources, allowances must be purchased at 
auction or through the allowance trading 
platform 
Mixed, 90% free allocation 
for high EITE entities, 60% 
free allocation for moderately 
EITE. In 2016, industries – 
4.6 million allowances, forestry 
carbon sequestration – 8.5 million 
allowances 
Beijing: Free allocation; Tianjin: Mixed, free allocation 
(major) auction and fixed price distribution; Shanghai: 
Mixed, free allocation and auction; Chongqing: Free 
allocation; Shenzhen: Mixed, free allocation, with no 
more than 10% auction Guangdong: Mixed, 97% free 
allocation with 3% auction; Hubei: Mixed, free 
allocation with 2.4% auction 
Price Control Mechanisms 
Current 
Allowance 




$6.8 (August 2017) $13.80 (May 2017) $12.54 (June 2016) 
Beijing: $8.14 (June 2016); Tianjin: $2.88 (June 2016); 
Shanghai: $1.08 (June 2016); Chongqing: $1.52 (June 
2016); Shenzhen: $5.46 (June 2016); Guangdong: 








Banking is allowed since phase 2. 
Borrowing is restricted to within 
one-year 
Banking is allowed but the emitter is subject to 
a general holding limit. Borrowing of future 
vintage allowances is not allowed 
Banking allowed of allowance 
credits, except for those purchased 
under the fixed price option. 
Borrowing is not allowed 




Market Stability Reserve will 
begin operation in 2019, aiming at 
stabilizing market and price of 
allowances. Allowances added to 
reserve is total circulation higher 
than 833 million allowances 
Auction Reserve Price: $13.57. The auction 
reserve price increases annually by 5% plus 
inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index. Price ceiling for allowances tiered at 
$50.69, $57.04, and $63.37. Tier prices increase 
by 5% per year, plus inflation 
Fixed price ceiling of $18.67% 
allowance surrender obligation 
from 2017, increases to 83 in 2018, 
and full surrender obligation in 2019 
Regulating authority can auction extra allowances if 
average weighted price exceeds $22.75 and buy back 
allowances if price falls to $3. Guangdong: price floor 




Manufacturing sub-sectors deemed 
at high risk for carbon leakage 
receive 100% free allocation. 
Sectors not deemed to be at risk of 
leakage will draw down free 
allowance allocation from 80% in 
2013 to 30% by 2020 
Receive free allowances for transition 
assistance and to prevent leakage. Starting in 
2018, transition assistance declines. The 
amount of free allocation is determined by 
leakage risk (measured through emissions 
intensity and trade exposure) and sector-
specific benchmarks 
90% free allocation for high EITE 
entities, 60% free allocation for 
moderately EITE 






Soon to be linked with Swiss ETS 
Linked with Québec ETS in 2014 and Ontario 
cap-and-trade (2017) 
No international linkage No international linkage 






$16.45 billion (2012–16) $3.4 billion (2012–16) n/a n/a 
Revenue 
Allocation 
At least 50% of auction revenues 
must be distributed for climate and 
energy related purposes. 
25% to high-speed rail projects, 20% to 
affordable housing an sustainable communities 
program, 10% to intercity rail program, 5% to 
low carbon transit options, at least 25% of 
proceeds must be invested in projects that are 
located within and benefiting disadvantaged 
communities, at least 5% benefiting low-
income communities, at least 5% benefiting 
disadvantaged communities 
Compensation for the effect of the 
ETS on asset values in the fishing and 
forestry sectors, and prevention of 
ETS-driven loss of competitiveness 
and carbon leakage in the industrial 
sectors. Allocation in the industrial 
sectors is intensity-based 





2.3.2. Carbon Tax Main Experiences 
This section briefly describes the carbon tax systems of Australia, British Columbia, 
Norway, and Mexico, besides comparting and contrasting the design and implementation 
features, constraints, and other issues faced by these systems. Cases were selected to 
cover carbon tax policies that varied in their sectorial coverage (mainly focusing on the 
industrial sector), taxation on carbon content of the fuel instead of direct carbon 
emissions, taxation on one particular source of fuel, revenue redistribution, and the 
presence of a hybrid with cap-and-trade systems. 
 
2.3.2.1. Norway’s Carbon Tax  
Following the publication of the Brundtland report, Our Common Future, in 1987, the 
Norwegian government introduced an upstream carbon tax on oil and gas extractors, 
hydrofluorocarbons/perfluorocarbons (HFC/PFC) importers and a downstream tax on oil 
and gas suppliers. The tax system allows some sectors such as pulp and paper, fishmeal, 
domestic aviation, and shipping to pay reduced rates and other sectors covered by the EU 
ETS and external aviation to be exempt from the carbon tax. Although EU ETS sectors 
are exempt from the carbon tax, there seems to be significant overlap between the carbon 
tax and EU ETS covering the same base emissions in sectors such as electricity (58%), 
industry sector (54%), and off-road transport sector (30%) (OECD, 2015). 
Norway’s carbon tax is notable for its ambitious tax rate between $3 and $64 per ton of 
CO2e in different sectors since its introduction in 1991. Norway also taxes non-CO2 GHG 
emissions from NOx, SO2, and HFC/PFC. The government has maintained policy stability 
and clear price signals for private sector companies willing to invest in clean energy 
technologies. Since 2013, about 30% of carbon tax revenue is being earmarked into a 
special fund for climate, renewable energy and energy efficiency measures. 
In order for Norway to meet the EU target of 30% emissions reduction in non-EU ETS 
sectors by 2030, the tax rate needs to be significantly higher on motor fuels (BYE and 
BRUVOLL, 2015). The Green Tax Commission has recommended a single tax rate of 
$49 per ton CO2e for all non-EU ETS sectors (WORLD BANK et al., 2018). Stiff political 
resistance to higher carbon tax rates has made policy changes unlikely in the near future 




Environment estimated in 2014 that the country’s total emissions would have been 6-7 
million metric tonnes of CO2e higher than they were without the tax in place (PMR 2017). 
Between 1991 and 2008, total CO2 emissions in Norway only increased by 15% while 
the GDP grew 70% during the same period (SUMNER et al., 2011). However, during 
that period, CO2 emissions from petroleum and natural gas extraction increased 86%, 
while general emission growth was only 6%. With inelastic European demand for oil and 
gas extraction, which is taxed, exemptions for shipping exported oil and gas sold through 
pipelines, and a domestic energy mix already dominated by hydropower and renewables, 
the carbon tax does not seem to have created any significant domestic reduction of total 
emissions (LIN and LI, 2011). 
 
2.3.2.2. British Columbia’s Carbon Tax 
British Columbia (BC) has the longest running carbon tax policy in Canada. The 
economy-wide tax rate is $30/ton of CO2e, covering more than 70% of the region’s GHG 
emissions with sectorial exemptions for the remaining 30% of GHG emitting sources 
(MURRAY and RIVERS, 2015). 
A defining feature of the BC carbon tax is its revenue neutrality. This design decision 
won support from the business community as BC redistributed the revenues to reduce 
industrial property taxes and other corporate taxes for industries affected by the tax. 
Overall, data indicate that BC’s carbon tax has reduced emissions with few negative 
effects on the economy (MURRAY and RIVERS, 2015; METCALF, 2015). An analysis 
of several different models shows that the carbon tax reduced emissions between 5%-
15%, in absence of any additional policy when compared to a business-as-usual scenario 
(MURRAY and RIVERS, 2015). The province decreased per capita emissions by 12.9% 
by 2013 when compared to pre-carbon tax levels, more than three-and-a-half times the 
3.7% per capita decline nationwide (METCALF, 2015). As of 2015, BC has reduced 2.8 
million metric tonnes of GHG when compared to the pre-tax period, with a GDP growth 
of 1.55% (higher than the national average of 1.44%) between 2008 and 2013 
(KOMANOFF and GORDON, 2015). 
The defining feature of revenue neutrality is by itself a constraint for BC’s carbon tax 




earmarking of funds for reinvesting in emissions-reducing activities. In addition, sectorial 
exemptions and carbon tax politics can undermine popular support for the policy. 
 
2.3.2.3. Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 
The Australian government introduced a carbon pricing scheme or “carbon tax” through 
the Clean Energy Act 2011. The Australian CPM was intended to control emissions in 
the country, as well as support the growth of the economy through the development of 
clean energy technologies (BAILEY et al., 2012). It was supervised by the Climate 
Change Authority and the Clean Energy Regulator. However, although it did achieve a 
reduction in the country’s carbon emissions, the initiative faced significant challenges 
from the opposition and the public, as it resulted in increased energy prices for both 
households and industry and was finally repealed in 2014. 
Each year, selected entities were required to surrender one emission unit for every tonne 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) they produced. In the first year (2012–13), carbon 
units could be purchased from the Clean Energy Regulator for a fixed price of AUD23 
per unit, and in 2013-14, carbon units could be purchased for AUD24.15 per unit 
(FREEBAIRN, 2012). Those who did not surrender any or enough units incurred a “unit 
shortfall charge”. This charge created an incentive for companies to surrender extra units 
under the mechanism rather than pay a higher unit shortfall charge (CER, 2015). 
Following the closure of the Australian CPM, the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) has 
formed the primary market for Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs), with the Clean 
Energy Regulator entering into contracts to purchase offsets from developers active in the 
land-use and industrial sectors. The ERF operates as a competitive reverse auction 
mechanism, with confidential bids submitted to the Clean Energy Regulator, and accepted 
subject to clearing rules, which can vary by auction. The Clean Energy Regulator sets 
a benchmark price for each auction, or price ceiling, which is not disclosed to the market. 
Eligible bids are placed in a bid stack and ranked by price offered, with bids above the 
benchmark price excluded from consideration. All bids up to 25 per cent of the volume 
offered under the benchmark price are accepted, with the Regulator selecting bids above 
this point based on perceived value. Following each auction, the Clean Energy Regulator 




contract prices not released (CER, 2015). While the true price for ACCUs is made up of 
a wide spread in contract prices, the volume-weighted price is influenced by the size of 
projects contracted at different price points.  
 
2.3.2.4. Mexico Carbon Tax 
In 2013, as part of a broader fiscal reform effort, Mexico became the first Latin American 
country to establish a carbon tax with widespread support of the domestic think tanks and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (MUÑOZ, 2015). Mexico’s carbon tax builds 
on the national climate change law approved by the Mexican Congress in 2012, with the 
goal of reducing GHG emissions by 30% by 2020 and 50% by 2050 (CDC et al., 2015). 
An average tax of $3.21 per ton of CO2e is levied upstream at the production stage on the 
carbon content of the fuels (OECD, 2014), with exemptions for natural gas production 
and import, and an offset mechanism allowing the use of certified emissions reduction 
(CER) credits by eligible Mexican projects (CDC, EDF, and IETA, 2015; MEXICO IEPS 
LAW, 2015).  
Mexico’s tax rate is the lowest among OECD countries (IMF, 2015) and one of the lowest 
in the world (WORLD BANK et al., 2018). Since natural gas accounts for about 30% of 
Mexico’s energy-related CO2 emissions and is exempted, the tax only covers about two-
thirds of Mexico’s fossil fuel-related emissions (METCALF, 2015). Low prices 
combined with exemptions for natural gas act as major constraints in achieving higher 
ambition. The annual revenues expected at this rate are about $1.1 billion, representing 
less than 1% of the total federal tax collections (METCALF, 2015). However, despite low 
prices and revenue, there is currently no plan to increase the tax rate over time, with the 
exception of adjusting fuel rates annually for general inflation. The low tax rate is 
estimated to reduce CO2e emissions by 1.6 million metric tonnes of CO2e, representing 
just 0.33% of Mexico’s total emissions per year (METCALF, 2015). 
The Mexican carbon tax is operating in parallel to a voluntary carbon exchange market 
called MexiCO2 that allows for the exchange of CER offsets with taxes. It became an 
official ETS, when the Mexican Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 
announced the market rules for the ETS and updated rules for the National Emissions 




phase (pilot phase) will last for three years until August 2021. Subsequently, the rules 
will be updated for the start of the second phase (formal phase), which will also be in line 
with the start of the first accounting period under the Paris Agreement in 2021. In this 
context, Mexico is also actively seeking to link its ETS to markets in North America. To 
this end, Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Québec and 
Ontario that includes cooperation on ETS. Additionally, in December 2017, Mexico, 
together with four countries (Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica and Chile) and seven 
subnational governments (Governors of California, Washington and the Premiers of 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Québec), issued the Paris 
Declaration on Carbon Pricing in the Americas for carbon pricing implementation (ICAP, 
2018). 
 
2.3.2.5. Comparative Analysis 
In terms of pricing setting, British Columbia’s carbon tax started with a flat economy-
wide $10 price per ton of CO2e and a $5 increase per year until reaching $30 per ton in 
2012 (MURRAY and RIVERS, 2015). The same happened to Australia: in the first year 
(2012–13), carbon units could be purchased for a fixed price of AUD23 per unit, and in 
2013–14, carbon units could be purchased for AUD24.15 per unit (FREEBAIRN, 2012). 
However, other carbon tax systems do not have a codified annual escalator to reach a 
desired carbon price. For instance, Mexico taxes fuels differentially ranging from $0.43 
to $3.44 per ton of CO2e emissions (METCALF, 2015). Similar to Mexico, Norway 
imposes a variable tax rate ranging from $3.5 to $64 per ton of CO2e on fossil fuels and 
greenhouse gases across different sectors, with the exception of a high rate of $432 per 
ton of CO2e for “natural gas emitted to air”. In both Australia and Mexico there was the 
conception to transition from a carbon tax to an ETS, facts that has been occurring 
recently. 
Carbon taxes vary widely in terms of sectorial coverage. To ensure economic efficiency, 
a carbon tax would ideally be economy-wide, covering all emitting sources at either the 
production (upstream) or consumption (downstream) stage. Looking at the experiences 
analyzed, the Norwegian carbon tax covers about 60% of its GHG emissions and 80% of 
the country’s emissions along with EU ETS (BRAGADÓTTIR et al., 2015). British 




GHG emissions from facilities that emit more than 10,000 metric tonnes of CO2e per 
year, including emissions from liquid fossil fuels, natural gas, coal, and other GHGs such 
as methane, nitrous oxide, and land-use change emissions (MURRAY and RIVERS 
2015). Other countries impose a tax on the fuel or the estimated carbon content of fossil 
fuels instead of GHG emissions. The carbon tax covered approximately 60% of 
Australia’s carbon emissions including from electricity generation, stationary energy, 
landfills, wastewater, industrial processes and fugitive emissions. Mexico levies an 
upstream tax on the sale and import of fossil fuels depending on the relative carbon 
content of a fuel with respect to natural gas as the baseline (i.e., zero tax for natural gas) 
(MEXICO IEPS LAW, 2015). The Mexican carbon tax covers about 40% of the country’s 
total GHG emissions. Norway imposes an upstream carbon tax on fuel sources such as 
oil and gas used for petroleum extraction activities in the continental shelf, HFC/PFC 
importers, and a midstream tax on oil, natural gas, and LPG fuel suppliers.  
Some carbon tax systems address carbon leakage by exempting energy-intensive and 
trade exposed (EITE) enterprises from paying the tax in order to reduce competitiveness 
impacts. Both Norway and British Columbia exempt the fuels exporting process out of 
the region and emissions from shipping and air travel. In addition, British Columbia 
exempts emissions from agricultural production and other non-fossil fuel GHG emissions 
such as methane leakage from landfills, forestry, agriculture, and natural gas production. 
EITE sectors such as the cement sector in British Columbia were even able to secure a 
one-time transition incentive of $22 million to buy in to the carbon tax system, essentially 
establishing precedent for targeted incentives to improve political acceptability 
(MURRAY and RIVERS, 2015). The Australian carbon pricing mechanism included 
systems for assessing liability for emissions, issuing free units to EITE industries, meeting 
liability for emissions through payment and surrender processes for eligible emissions 
units, and relinquishing units (CER, 2015). Mexico exempts the entire natural gas 
production and supply from the carbon tax. 
A crucial design consideration for carbon taxation is the carbon revenue management 
aiming at the allocation of revenue generated from the carbon tax. Norway’s carbon tax 
revenues are directed towards the general budget and the country uses the revenue to 
reduce income and capital taxes, labor taxes, and provide pension plans for low-income 
citizens. Similar to Norway, British Columbia, with the highest coverage adjusted carbon 




general budget. The British Columbia carbon tax generated about $7.3 billion in revenue 
between 2008 and 2015, with revenue allocated towards low-income tax credits, reducing 
the bottom two personal income tax brackets by 5%, issuing direct cash transfers to 
Northern and rural residents of the region, reducing corporate and small business tax rates, 
and industrial property tax credits (KOMANOFF and GORDON, 2015). Revenue 
generated by the carbon price in Australia was planned to ease costs for households and 
industry and for investment in renewable power, energy efficiency, and other low-carbon 
alternatives (C2ES, 2011). Mexico also reinvests its carbon tax revenues towards public 
spending in different ways. However, the country has not mentioned specific earmarking 
towards renewable energy investments. In Mexico, the revenue collection agency (SAT, 
by its Spanish acronym) secures the revenue and directs it to the general funds and does 
not use it either for green spending or revenue recycling (MUÑOZ PIÑA, 2015; CARL 
and FEDOR, 2016). Additionally, eligible Mexican projects can offset their carbon tax 
with CER credits through the MexiCO2 carbon exchange market. 




Table 4 – Carbon Taxes’ Features and Comparisons  
Source: Own elaboration based on PMR (2017), ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE (1990), BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW (2008), WALTERS and 
MARTIN (2012), MEXICO IEPS LAW (2015). 
Feature Norway’s Carbon Tax British Columbia’s Carbon Tax Australia CPM Mexico Carbon Tax 
General Information 
Jurisdiction National Subnational National National 





Phase 1: 2008-2012 
Phase 2: 2013-2018 (tax freeze)  
1st period: 2012-2014 
2nd: 2015-2018 
3rd: 2018- … (switch to an ETS) 
1st period: 2014-2018 
2nd period: 2018-… (switch to an ETS) 
Regulating 
Authority 
Norwegian Tax Administration, Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate 
Ministry of Finance 
The Clean Energy Regulator, the Climate 
Change Authority, and the Productivity 
Commission 
Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources and Ministry of 
Finance 
Offset Norway is also included in the EU ETS 
Offset is possible from the 
Forest Carbon Emission Offsets 
Project & Atmospheric Benefit 
Sharing Policy 
 
Offsets from the Carbon Farming Initiative 
(CFI) can be used for compliance under the 
CPM, subject to a 5% limit during the fixed-
price period 
Allows for use of CER offsets. ETS 
launched in 2018 
Pricing Setting 





Yes ($5 per year 
until max tax rate 
of $29.35, 2012) 
Yes  
(5% per year) 
None 
Current Tax 
Rate per ton of 
CO2e (USD 
nom) 
$4-$54 (2016) $21.61 $21.34 (2016) $3.50 (2016) 
Tax 
Compliance 
Failure to comply with the law 
is subject to fines and up to three months 
imprisonment 
The Ministry of Finance has been 
given significant inspection and 
audit powers, with the ability to 
assess interest and penalties 
(ranging from 10–100% of the tax 
amount owed) 
The Clean Energy Regulator 
Has the authority to enter and inspect the 
property of regulated entities (if he suspects 
efforts to violate the Act), besides having 
the authority to order an audit of the 
reporting of a regulated entity’s emissions 
The Federal Attorney General’s 
Office for the Protection of the 
Environment can impose a fine of 








Upstream and Midstream Downstream 
Electricity and gas were taxed Midstream. 
Other emissions were taxed Downstream 
Upstream 
Tax Type Carbon content of select fuels Emissions-based Emissions-based Carbon content of select fuels 
Sectorial 
Coverage 
Petroleum extraction, HFC/PFC importers, 
oil, natural gas and LPG suppliers 
Most economic sectors, with 
exemptions like wood/biomass, 
biomethane, fuel to be exported, 
emissions resulting from industrial 
processes (unrelated to fuel use), 
among others 
Power stations using nonrenewable energy 
sources, other stationary electricity 
generation sources, fugitive emissions, 
industrial processes, transportation, and 
landfills 
Fuel producers and importers 
Fuels Covered 
Heating oil, diesel, natural gas, gasoline, 
LPG 
23 fossil fuels, like coal, oil and 
natural gas 
Gasoline, diesel, natural gas, fuel oil, 
propane and coal 
All fossil fuels (sales and imports of 
propane, butane, gasoline, kerosene, fuel 
oil, petroleum coke, carbon coke, and 
coal), except natural gas 









Exemptions for international air and 
maritime transport, exported gas, freight and 
passenger transport within domestic 
shipping sector.  Industrial processes are 
exempt from the carbon tax but since 2005 
have been partly covered by the Norwegian 
ETS, which has been linked to the EU ETS 
since 2008. Since 2013, industrial processes 
have been fully covered by the EU ETS 
Exemptions for fuel exporters, 
International travel, non-fossil fuel 
GHG emissions from industrial 
processes, i.e., cement, landfills, 
forestry, and agriculture. A revenue-
neutral carbon tax design with broad-
based tax reductions for businesses 
helps address carbon leakage and 
promote cost containment 
Provisions of significant assistance to EITE 
entities through a system of free permit 
allocation known as the Jobs and 
Competitiveness Program. Some activities 
marked by very high carbon costs received 
very high levels of assistance (covering 
94.5% of the industry average carbon costs) 
Natural gas exempted 





$5.01 billion (2008–15) $6 billion (2013-2017) $1.22 billion (2014–16) 
Revenue 
Disbursement 
Revenue directed toward the Global 
Government Pension Fund and national 
budget 
Revenue neutral (business 
& personal income tax cuts, 
low-income tax credits, direct 
grants to rural and native 
communities) 
At least 50% of the revenues generated went 
toward a Household Assistance Package—
financial assistance for pensioners and low-
income households. Around 40% of the 
revenues were to be allocated toward a Jobs 
and Competitiveness Package—a number of 
assistance measures for the business 
community to make the transition to a clean 
energy future 





2.3.3. Lessons for Brazil 
From the four ETS designs reviewed (EU ETS, California Cap-and-Trade, NZ ETS, and China 
ETS), several design features that enable successful initiation and management of the ETS 
marketplace were identified. An ETS, rolled out with dynamically adjustable emission caps 
based on stakeholder feedback and new emissions data (e.g., Chinese pilots), has been shown 
to result in price stability and cost-effective emissions reductions. An ETS rolled out with 
ambitious coverage and free allowances seems to be initially more politically palatable, but 
transitioning to auctioning of allowances over time (e.g., California and EU ETS phase 3) 
ensures simultaneous revenue generation. 
Getting firms used to reporting data prior to the rollout of an ETS may help regulators avoid 
over-allocation for a given ETS period. Similarly, developing scenarios for future projections 
can also be useful to anticipate different types of events that could affect the system (e.g., the 
financial crisis affecting the estimates of EU ETS emissions). 
A price floor/ceiling (or “collar”) creates a more stable market with less price volatility (e.g., 
California Cap-and-Trade) and may lower compliance costs in the long run. Restricting banking 
of allowances or not allowing borrowing between phases (e.g., EU ETS) may lead to a collapse 
in allowance prices at the end of a commitment period if allowances are over-allocated. The 
presence of reserve allowances with an independent regulatory body enables the government to 
intervene quickly in the market if necessary (e.g., California’s CARB), to manage liquidity and 
or implement a price collar. 
International linkage benefits smaller markets by reducing abatement costs, increasing 
liquidity, and achieving cost effectiveness. Soft linkages to offset markets without a cap on such 
offsets can result in excess supply and price collapse (e.g., NZ ETS). 
Overall, managing the level of price caps, the percentage of banking and borrowing between 
phases, the amount of reserve allowances, and the ability to adjust these levers quickly in the 
market could ensure a predictable marketplace with stable prices and sufficient liquidity (PMR 
and ICAP, 2016). Finally, most countries that have implemented a carbon price have done so 
in the presence of complementary policies including renewable portfolio standards, fuel 
efficiency standards, feed-in-tariffs, and investments in innovation. The presence of 




overabundance of supply in the ETS market, which places downward pressure on the permit 
prices (SCHMALENSEE and STAVINS, 2015). 
From the four carbon tax systems (Norway’s Carbon Tax, British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, 
Australian CPM, and Mexico Carbon Tax) analyzed, some key design features necessary for 
the efficient operation of a carbon tax program were identified. Low tax rates per ton of CO2 
(e.g., Mexico) with no mechanisms to increase the future tax rate may reduce and eventually 
nullify the price effect of the tax on emission reductions over time. An ambitious or escalating 
tax rate per ton of CO2 (e.g., British Columbia and Norway) is necessary for substantial 
emission reductions outcomes, but may not be sufficient if many exemptions are provided 
and/or the structure of the economy poses inelastic demand for sectors/fuels taxed (e.g., the oil 
and gas sectors in Norway).  
In addition, a clear, stable, and steady tax rate increase is necessary to drive deeper emission 
reductions, as well as to send transparent market signals to private actors that climate policy is 
a long-term and economy-wide policy. Exempting emission-intensive trade competitive sectors 
(e.g., shipping in Norway and natural gas in Mexico, and industry in the four experiences) from 
carbon taxation undermines the purpose of a carbon tax. Exempting certain sectors may make 
the introduction of a carbon tax politically feasible though. In such cases, combining the price 
effects of carbon taxes with investments through the earmarking of funds in clean energy 
technologies could result in more progressive emissions reduction. Earmarking funds from 
carbon taxes towards energy efficiency or renewable energy investments are only effective if a 
sound complementary policy framework for using the earmarked revenue exists (e.g., green 
spending capital in Norway). 
Failure to define a consistent policy framework and adhere to it may result in carbon tax 
revenues not being dedicated to investments in either innovation or emissions reductions, even 
if they are being put towards other social goods (e.g., Mexico’s carbon tax). 
For systems that impose both a carbon tax and ETS across sectors (for instance, Norway and 
Mexico), it is important to identify whether there is an overlap of carbon tax and ETS on the 
same emissions base (e.g., the electricity and industrial sectors in Norway) and ensure that the 
overlap does not have distributional consequences or lead to increased, economically-
inefficient abatement costs. From the international experience, some CPI begin as carbon tax 




Finally, taxing upstream at the point of fuel extraction (e.g., Norway) or downstream at major 
emitting entities (e.g., British Columbia) reduces the complexity of a carbon tax design and 
enforcement, making it more feasible for low developed countries with less well-developed 
administrative states. 
 
2.3. Addressing Competitiveness Risks and Mitigation Policies for Carbon 
Leakage 
A series of impacts should be analyzed in order to reduce the competitiveness risks of the 
sectors. In this sense, mitigation policies must be considered as an alternative to those sectors 
most impacted by the implementation of a CPI. 
 
2.3.1. (Possible) Effects of Carbon Pricing and Competitiveness Risks 
The introduction of a CPI can have a number of effects and impacts on the economic sectors, 
especially on the more carbon intensive ones. Certainly, such impacts can influence the 
competitiveness of the sector, being directly associated with some possible risks, among them 
economic, environmental and political, which will be analyzed below. 
 
2.3.1.1. Economic Risks 
When a regulatory climate policy is introduced that affects only a subset of economic agents, 
two types of substitution effects take place in the market (JUERGENS, BARREIRO-HURLÉ 
and VASA, 2013). The first type of substitution effect occurs in the domestic market and is 
policy-driven, such that products with higher carbon intensities face higher production costs 
and thus become relatively more expensive than their low-carbon substitutes. Therefore, 
demand/cross-price elasticities will govern any potential demand change for a given (group of) 
product(s), leading towards a less carbon-intensive consumption bundle. 
The second type of substitution effect occurs in the international market and is known as 
‘carbon leakage’. It is an unintended by-product of policy that undermines the very objective 




therefore be avoided. Carbon leakage refers to emissions that are displaced rather than reduced, 
as a result of unilateral action on climate change in a region. It is a secondary or spillover effect 
of carbon pricing, and affects the environmental effectiveness of a unilateral carbon pricing 
policy (IPCC, 2007). Concerns around the potential for carbon leakage remain at the forefront 
of debate.  
Carbon leakage occurs when production shifts from a carbon-constrained region to those 
regions that do not have such constraints, so that formerly domestically produced products are 
substituted by relatively cheaper-imported products. This reduces economic activity, but does 
not change the consumption bundles. It remains a controversial issue according to the Climate 
Change Negotiation Conference given the emergence of a growing number of regional ETSs 
with a unilateral pricing mechanism for carbon emissions (SATO et al., 2015). 
The impact of a price on carbon will also differ across industries depending on the extent to 
which they use energy, and fossil fuel energy in particular, as a production input. ALDY and 
PIZER (2015) find that energy-intensive industries bear much larger adverse output impacts 
than non-energy-intensive industries under this climate policy, ranging from 3 percent to 5 
percent for steel, chemicals, aluminum, cement, bulk glass, and paper industries. The changes 
in production under the carbon price of $15 per ton carbon dioxide price are dwarfed by annual 
variation in output in energy-intensive industries. 
An explicit assessment of net imports could then shed light on the extent to which a carbon 
price would result in adverse competitiveness effects rather than simply a reduction in domestic 
consumption. ALDY and PIZER (2015) show that the increase in net imports is much smaller 
than the decline in production under a carbon price. Only about one-sixth of the fall in 
production – less than 1 percent – is associated with increasing net imports for the most energy-
intensive industries. When accounting for the change in net imports, the employment impacts 
amount to less than 4,000 jobs under a $15/tCO2 carbon price (ALDY and PIZER, 2014). 
These results have two important implications for the design of competitiveness policies. First, 
given that only the most energy-intensive industries bear statistically significant impacts from 
pricing carbon, cost-effective competitiveness policies would target those energy-intensive 
industries (ALDY, 2016). Second, the economically modest impacts of a carbon price on net 





These competitiveness effects have more than just economic consequences. According to 
JUERGENS, BARREIRO-HURLÉ and VASA, 2013, the potential for relocating emissions-
intensive activities to unregulated countries would result in higher emissions in these countries 
than they would have experienced otherwise. This “emissions leakage” would undermine the 
environmental benefits of the domestic climate policy and lower societal welfare. Moreover, 
implementing a public policy that results in both job loss and lower-than-expected 
environmental benefits could weaken public and political support for mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 
2.3.1.2. Environmental Risks 
Suppose that a domestic carbon price leads industry A to shut down in country 1, while a new 
industry A capacity comes in country 2, which does not impose a carbon price on its energy-
intensive manufacturers. Global industry A production would remain unchanged, but a larger 
fraction of its global capacity would operate in markets not subject to a carbon price. The 
emissions from country 1 associated with industry A would have shifted to country 2, resulting 
in no environmental benefit associated with job loss and production decline of closing that 
facility. 
This so-called emissions leakage undermines the environmental benefits of the domestic carbon 
pricing policy. The extent to which this form of leakage would offset domestic GHG abatement 
will depend in part on the fraction of an economy’s emissions subject to trade substitution. For 
example, ALDY (2016) points out that many sectors of the domestic economy have no foreign 
substitute – household heating and lighting, commuting to work, and services consumption such 
as entertainment, lodging, and dining, to name just a few. This form of emissions leakage will 
likely affect only tradables. 
It is important to distinguish emissions leakage resulting from competitiveness effects from 
emissions leakage that may occur through other channels. For example, a domestic carbon price 
would raise the price of energy. As consumers respond by conserving energy, reducing energy-
consuming activities, and investing in more energy-lean capital, domestic fossil fuel 
consumption declines relative to what it would have been in the absence of the policy 
(BRANGER and QUIRION, 2013). By lowering fossil fuel demand, the price for fossil fuels 




price would likely respond to the lower fossil fuel prices by increasing their consumption of 
these fossil fuels.  
In effect, the conservation and efficiency response to a carbon price in one market weakens the 
incentive for such conservation in markets without a carbon price as fuel prices in global energy 
markets respond to the behavioral change in the markets with carbon pricing. According to 
SATO et al. (2015), leakage through global energy markets dominates the leakage through 
competitiveness effects. As a result, policies to address competitiveness effects will mitigate 
only a fraction of the anticipated emissions leakage from a domestic carbon pricing policy8. 
 
2.3.1.3. Political Risks 
The competitiveness effects of domestic climate policy could pose political risks to the broader 
carbon pricing policy. If a climate change policy raises energy prices and drives the relocation 
of manufacturing capacity to developing countries, but does not meaningfully reduce GHG 
emissions due to leakage, then business stakeholders could criticize the policy for delivering 
high costs and causing job loss without environmental benefits (ALDY, 2016). Some 
environmental advocates who oppose carbon pricing policies may also use the prospect of such 
an outcome to criticize the domestic policy with the intent of refocusing mitigation efforts on 
command-and-control regulations.  
This illustrates the importance of empirical analysis in informing the political debate on carbon 
pricing. If the economic and environmental impacts of competitiveness are small, then that has 
different political implications than if they were quite large. Moreover, stakeholders may 
conflate, or at least not differentiate between, the competitiveness effects from the domestic 
consumption impacts. Finally, the political dimension of competitiveness suggests that 
stakeholders could be invited to contribute their own analyses of competitiveness to further 
enrich and inform the discussion of policy needs, policy design, and subsequent 
implementation. 
The costs of climate policies may negatively affect domestic firms if their competitors do not 
face comparable emissions regulation or taxation. In particular, energy-intensive manufacturing 
                                                          
8 The exception is in the case of policy efforts through multilateral negotiations to ensure that all trade partners 




industries have expressed concerns that domestic climate change policy could impose adverse 
competitiveness effects because it would raise their production costs relative to those of their 
foreign competitors (ALDY, 2016). To be more exact, the competitiveness effect reflects the 
impacts of the differential in carbon prices or the effective gap in the shadow price of carbon 
between two domestic climate programs on those countries’ net imports. Thus firms operating 
under the higher carbon price experience adverse competitiveness effects if their domestic or 
foreign market share declines. In turn, this could result in lower production, job loss, and 
relocation of factories and related operations to countries without a domestic climate policy 
(TRACHTMAN, 2015; JAFEE et al. 2009). 
 
2.3.2. Mitigation Policies for Carbon Leakage 
The primary benefit of a well-designed competitiveness policy is that it would mitigate and 
potentially eliminate the competitiveness risks. Nonetheless, competitiveness policies also 
carry risks, in terms of their potential impacts on the distribution of the benefits and costs of 
carbon pricing policy, the efficiency of pricing carbon, and international relations in multilateral 
trade and climate policy contexts.  
When addressing this challenge, there are two key (and interrelated) questions that policy 
makers need to consider (PMR, 2015): 
• Which sectors should be targeted (supported) by the leakage prevention mechanism? 
• What form should that leakage prevention mechanism take? 
As a matter of fact, most carbon pricing policies include provisions to compensate regulated 
sectors for the cost of compliance (SATO et al., 2015). They could impose tariffs reflecting the 
embedded carbon emissions in imports, such that domestically produced goods and their foreign 
competitors face a common carbon price (WEISBACH, 2015; AGAN et al. 2015). Climate policy 
could direct benefits to potentially vulnerable firms, such as through free allowance allocations in 
cap-and-trade programs or targeted tax credits (GRAY and METCALF, 2015). Some northern 
European carbon tax programs have explicitly exempted energy-intensive manufacturing from their 
carbon tax (ALDY and STAVINS, 2012). Policymakers could work through multilateral 
negotiations to ensure that major trade partners undertake comparable domestic emissions 




domestic mitigation programs among trade partners, which could then yield a common carbon price 
for businesses operating under all linked programs.  
These policy options, however, carry their own risks. They may run afoul of current obligations 
under the World Trade Organization – WTO (TRACHTMAN, 2015). The design of such policies 
may result in a loss in social welfare and limit the ability of the government to offset potentially 
regressive impacts of pricing carbon. Competitiveness policies may also have important 
implications for ongoing international climate negotiations. Finally, the choice and design of 
competitiveness policies may entail political risks that could also weaken support for the broader 
domestic climate change policy program. 
 
2.3.2.1. Free Allowance Allocations  
Industrial sectors at risk of carbon leakage have mainly been assessed via modelling analysis 
and the single-country assessment method (SIJM et al., 2004; BARKER et al., 2007; 
HOURCADE et al., 2007; DEMAILLY and QUIRION, 2008). These studies focus on the 
influence of ETS on the economic benefits and trade performance of industrial sectors. The 
results of modelling analyses can also be applied by policy makers to design appropriate 
allocation approaches that compensate vulnerable industrial sectors for their profit losses 
(WANG et al., 2017). 
With ETS, the favored approach is to exempt certain sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage 
from auctioning, and instead distribute the emission allowances to these sectors for free. 
Determining which businesses are at risk is difficult, however, not least because of the problem 
of asymmetric information on compliance costs between the regulator and the regulated (SATO 
et al., 2015). Free allocation can also imply very large rents; hence the allocation process is 
prone to rent-seeking behavior and large-scale lobbying by industry (GRUBB and NEUHOFF, 
2006). In addition, policy makers may also be motivated by concerns other than carbon leakage 
– e.g. employment and investment migration – to protect sectors from the impact of carbon 
prices. 
In general, free allocation for direct emissions is the main carbon leakage risk mitigation 
measure currently in place throughout the world (MARCU et al., 2014). The EU, Australia, 
California, Quebec and New Zealand all use varying forms of free allocation. While the 




to reduce emissions is still present. Any surplus permits resulting from actions to reduce 
emissions in a given installation can be sold in the market, and provide additional revenue. 
What needs to be kept in mind is that the goal is to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage arising 
from the need to purchase emissions permits in order to meet compliance obligations from 
direct emissions. 
Allocations can either vary quickly as firm output levels change or they can stay fixed in the 
short-to-medium term. At one extreme, allocations can increase or decrease in proportion to a 
firm’s output from one year to the next. At the other extreme, allocations are determined 
according to the firm’s output in a historical period and left unchanged for an extended period. 
In practice, most schemes either update allocations annually, as in California, New Zealand, 
Australia, and Kazakhstan, or after a period of three or more years, as in the first two phases of 
the EU ETS and most of the recent Chinese ETS pilots (ICAP, 2018). 
In addition, the amount of allowances a firm receives can either reflect its actual emissions or 
be linked to a predefined “benchmarked” emissions intensity. According to PMR (2016), the 
former approach is normally implemented through providing allowances that are some 
proportion of the firm’s total emissions. By contrast, a benchmarking approach severs the link 
between a firm’s own emissions and the allowances it receives. Instead, under this approach, a 
sector-wide assessment of “appropriate” emissions intensity is made for all firms in the sector, 
and firms receive allowances in some proportion to their output multiplied by this benchmark. 
Firms that have emissions intensity lower than the benchmark are advantaged and receive 
(proportionally) more allowances than firms that have an emissions intensity higher than the 
benchmark. 
According to PMR (2015), the main ETS designs for facing carbon leakage are: 
• provision of free allowances allocated on a grandfathering approach, where allocations 
are proportional to an individual firm’s historical emissions and there is no rapid 
adjustment if firms change their output; 
• fixed sector benchmarks (FSB), where allocations of free allowances are based on 
product-specific benchmarks (as with output-based allocation) but without rapid 




• output-based allocations (OBAs) of free allowances, where allocations are based on 
product-specific benchmarks and changes in output lead to rapid changes in allowance 
allocations; 
Grandfathering approach appears attractive as it should influence firm behavior and 
abatement incentives, and because of its relative ease of implementation. Under a pure 
grandfathering scheme, firms would receive assistance directly related to their historical 
emissions, and the amount would remain independent of future output decisions or decisions to 
reduce their carbon intensity. This means that grandfathering continues to provide firms with a 
strong incentive to reduce their emissions intensity. It can therefore sell the surplus allowances 
and use the profits to pay off its abatement investment (GRUBB and NEUHOFF, 2006). This 
feature, combined with the relative simplicity of working out how much assistance to provide 
each firm, has made it a popular method of providing assistance in the initial stages of many 
carbon pricing schemes (PMR, 2016). Prominent examples include the first two phases of the 
EU ETS and various Chinese ETS pilots. 
However, if this reduction in output is associated with an increase in output from uncovered 
firms then output leakage – and hence some degree of carbon leakage – is likely to occur. In 
turn, this means that grandfathering may not be the allocation method that minimizes the cost 
of meeting a given emissions reduction target in cases where carbon leakage risk is significant 
(FISHER and FOX, 2004). This is the reason why no carbon price scheme has involved a pure 
grandfathering allocation approach for the specific purpose of addressing carbon leakage. 
In order to address these concerns, of greatest importance is updating. Rather than maintain 
assistance levels indefinitely, schemes tend to revisit allocation decisions periodically (PMR, 
2016). This typically takes place every three years, including in the case of first phases of the 
EU ETS, as well as in the various Chinese pilot ETSs: Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, 
and Tianjin9. In addition, schemes have tended to implement closure rules. Whereas under pure 
grandfathering, firms would be entitled to retain assistance indefinitely, even if they closed 
down with closure rules, continued entitlement to free allowances is made contingent on 
maintaining a minimum level of production. 
                                                          
9 The Chinese ETS is structured in phases. It is plausible that the allocation approaches of each scheme will be 




The second approach, fixed sector benchmarks (FSB), combines two features: as with 
grandfathering, assistance levels do not vary quickly and smoothly as firms change their level 
of output and emissions; in contrast to grandfathering, the level of assistance is determined by 
reference to a product or sector-level benchmark emissions intensity rather than by reference to 
the current or historical emissions (intensity) of each individual firm. Crucially, by severing the 
link between the emissions intensity of the firm and the allowances the firm receives, 
benchmarking better preserves incentives for firms to improve their emissions intensity than 
grandfathering (GRUBB and NEUHOFF, 2006). 
In broad terms this is the approach adopted in Phase III of the EU ETS. A series of benchmarks 
were created for different activities under the cap, and the free allowances received by 
firms/installations in the sector were set by multiplying the firms’/installations’ historical output 
level by the benchmark (plus a further downward adjustment). However, once the level of free 
allowance was set, future changes in firm/ installation output had limited impact on the 
allowances received by each firm/installation (PMR, 2015, 2016). 
From an economic perspective, the stringency of a FSB benchmark will have a minimal effect 
on incentives to reduce emissions and is largely a distributional question. In principle, 
regardless of where the benchmark is set, firms should have the same marginal incentive to 
reduce their emissions intensity (FISHER and FOX, 2004). It should be immaterial whether a 
firm is more or less efficient than implied by the benchmark: if firms that are more emissions-
intensive than the benchmark reduce their emissions intensity they will face a reduced carbon 
emission cost net of allocations. If they are less emissions-intensive than the benchmark, a 
further reduction in their emissions intensity would result in an excess of allowances, which 
they could sell. This would imply that the level of the benchmark in the short run should not 
affect efficiency incentives, but does determine the allocation of resources between 
shareholders and taxpayers, who forgo revenue from auctioning allowances. 
The calculation of benchmarks is data-intensive and creates potential for lobbying around the 
allocation methodology, but is feasible. As with grandfathering, an FSB approach will be 
dependent on closure rules and updating to be very effective in addressing leakage and this 





The last approach, output-based allocations (OBA), has two key properties: assistance is 
allocated according to a predetermined benchmark of emissions intensity and when firms 
increase or decrease their output, the amount of assistance that they receive correspondingly 
rises or falls, according to the predefined benchmark level of intensity. 
This model is similar to the FSB approach in that the initial allowance allocation is determined 
by an emissions benchmark (which could be calculated in exactly the same way as the FSB 
approach) multiplied by the firm output level (PMR, 2016). However, in contrast to the FSB 
approach, if there are subsequent changes in firm output, with just a small lag there is an 
adjustment in the allowances that the firm receives. Variants on this basic model are used for 
providing assistance in California, New Zealand, previously in Australia, some sectors in 
Shenzhen, China. 
By using benchmarks OBA preserves incentives to reduce emissions intensity in a similar 
manner to FSB. However, in contrast to FSB and grandfathering, OBA targets leakage more 
strongly, since an extra unit of output will directly result in additional allocations. This can be 
contrasted with grandfathering and FSB schemes where extra output does not lead to additional 
assistance, other than where closure or other thresholds are applied. This works to maintain or 
increase output levels despite the pressure of competition from firms that do not face the carbon 
price. As such, it offers strong leakage protection. 
OBA approach could also involve higher administrative costs than benchmarking and FSB 
approaches, because output data must be regularly reported. In summary, OBA looks attractive 
where it is closely targeted at sectors genuinely at risk of carbon leakage, but it is particularly 
unattractive if applied too broadly. 
 
2.3.2.2. Border Tax Adjustments  
The easiest approach for a country determined to comply with high environmental standards 
and to apply these to imports is the introduction of a (unilateral) tax or tariff on goods from 
countries that have not “comparably offset” the GHG emissions associated with the goods 
production. Such a “penalty” can consist of a tariff or tax or in an obligation to purchase carbon 
credits in the country of sale, i.e. obtain emission allowances (KAUFMANN and WEBER, 
2011). While tariffs apply exclusively to imported goods, taxes and border tax adjustments 




and can apply to both imports and exports. A specific tax or flat tariff would have to be designed 
so as to compensate for the additional costs in connection with the application of the more 
stringent emissions standards, thus preserving the competitive equality between the compared 
products (WTO, 1997).  
In principle BTAs can successfully mimic economic and environmental outcomes under a 
widely harmonized carbon pricing regime, indicating its broad efficiency and effectiveness 
(PMR, 2016). Modeling of the potential effectiveness of BCAs generally suggests that they 
would be effective in reducing leakage. BRANGER and QUIRION (2013) examine 25 studies 
and find 310 estimates of carbon leakage ratios across the various scenarios and models used. 
Their meta-regression analysis indicates that BTAs reduce leakage rates by around 6 percentage 
points on average, holding all other parameters constant. This rate is substantial given that 
leakage rates studied range only from –5 to 15 percent in the BTA scenarios, and 5 to 25 percent 
without the policy. The potential effectiveness of BTAs was also supported by analysis utilizing 
harmonized parameters across a variety of models through the Energy Modeling Forum; this 
analysis found that BTAs on average reduced leakage rates from 12 percent to 8 percent relative 
to a reference scenario with no BTAs or allocations (BÖHIRINGER et al., 2012). 
A BTA can target imports, exports or both. By targeting both imports and exports, a BTA 
ensures that producers at risk of carbon leakage will not suffer a competitive disadvantage in 
their domestic market, or when exporting. A BTA for imports (from a less-or-not-carbon 
constrained jurisdiction) can be expressed as a tax, or the requirement to hold/purchase 
allowances. When we address exports, a rebate for the cost of carbon needs to be implemented 
(MARCU et al., 2014). 
BTAs are seen as having both positive and negative effects, and that debate will continue. But 
it is important to point out that BTAs will act as an alarm system for, but not only, developing 
countries, which will be suspicious of these measures as being ‘green protectionism’. Some 
countries, specially developing ones, may argue that a border tax adjustment imposes an unfair 
burden on their exports. This may lead to the threat – or even the start – of a trade war. For 
instance, the Chinese and Indian governments have raised that spectre in the context of the 
UNFCCC in the case of EU ETS and international aviation. As a result, BTAs may become 
entangled in a long, drawn-out WTO dispute, with the accompanying uncertainty (WORLD 




On the other hand, the prospect of a BTA could create the incentive for a country’s trade 
partners to step up and implement their own domestic emissions mitigation programs. ALDY 
(2016) points out the case of the US, in which Chinese government officials have been aware 
of the US concerns regarding competitiveness and climate policy for quite some time. With 
China's pilot cap-and-trade programs setting the foundation for nationwide expansions later this 
decade, China is pursuing a domestic carbon pricing policy that could exempt its exports from 
a BTA. The outstanding question is whether a BTA becomes the norm in countries with 
domestic carbon pricing policies, or whether it serves as the stick, rarely used, to encourage 
substantial emissions mitigation programs among trade partners. 
However, there are counterarguments based on the claim (i) that the implementation of BTA 
would be a prima facie violation of both the spirit and the letter of multilateral trade principles 
requiring equal treatment of like products, (ii) that the application of BTA is a disguised form 
of protectionism, and finally (iii) that BTA in practice undermines the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (KAUFMANN and WEBER, 2011). 
As TRACHTMAN (2015) explores in detail, there are potential legal risks under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) with several of the competitiveness policies that policymakers may 
consider, concerning the compatibility of carbon-related BTA with the Most Favoured Nation 
Principle and Non-Discrimination under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
Some trade policy experts have reservations about BTA – even if it can be crafted in a WTO-
consistent manner – because of the potential diplomatic and political ramifications for the 
relatively fragile ongoing trade negotiations. Some of the more contentious issues in the WTO 
fall along a developed-developing country divide, and some developing countries would 
perceive a BTA as targeting their export industries.  
Furthermore, the political challenges may be as great, or greater, than any legal constraints. The 
experience of the EU in seeking to establish a regime that bore some similar characteristics to 
a BTA in the civil aviation sector demonstrates that the political challenges of introducing BTAs 
may be as, or more, significant than the legal challenges. Experts interviewed as part of the 
PMR (2015) study claimed that it is possible that BTAs will become more feasible when (if) a 
sufficient proportion of major emitters are committed to such a regime. Border adjustment 
measures appear more feasible when introduced by a coalition of partners who account for a 




individual action by a number of major emitters, which might then seek to harmonize their 
regimes through a common BTA imposed on countries outside the grouping. 
In summary, BTAs perform strongly against both abatement and leakage objectives but may be 
politically and administratively challenging to implement. In principle they are likely to be an 
effective measure for preventing leakage but implementation challenges may limit their 
application to a relatively specific set of circumstances. 
 
2.3.2.3. Administrative Exemptions and Tax Free Thresholds 
Most carbon pricing regimes exempt some sectors or emitters through not defining the carbon 
price as applying to them or by setting much-reduced rates. Sometimes these exemptions are 
driven by practical difficulties in coverage or by broader political concerns about the sensitivity 
of imposing a cost on these sectors (PMR, 2015). This is often the case, for example, for small 
emitters, transport emissions, land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions, 
waste, and agriculture emissions. However, sometimes these are also justified on the basis of 
concerns about leakage. 
Exemptions are likely to be effective in addressing leakage and are administratively easy to 
implement, but fundamentally undermine the abatement incentives of carbon pricing. By 
reducing the effective carbon price that firms face, the risk of carbon leakage is directly reduced 
(BARKER et al., 2007). However, reducing the effective carbon price also means that 
abatement incentives are reduced in three important ways: firms have a reduced incentive to 
improve their emissions intensity; relatively carbon-intensive firms do not suffer a competitive 
disadvantage compared with firms with lower emissions intensities; and product prices of 
carbon-intensive goods will not rise in a way that stimulates demand-side abatement. 
A prominent example of the proposed use of administrative exemptions to address leakage is 
under the proposed South African carbon tax. While all entities under this regime are expected 
to receive a basic 60 percent exemption irrespective of their exposure to leakage, exemption 
rates can be increased by up to 10 percent for firms that have high trade exposure plus a further 
10 percent for organizations that have a high proportion of process emissions (considered 
difficult to reduce). Firms will also be entitled to use offsets for up to 5-10 percent of their 




exemptions will be gradually withdrawn. Policy makers anticipate that a withdrawal of 
exemptions may be an easier way to increase the marginal tax rate faced by firms than a 
straightforward increase in the nominal rate. 
All entities under this regime receive a basic 60 percent exemption. Of more relevance to 
leakage, this regime makes a modest adjustment of exemption rates of up to 10 percent on the 
basis of trade exposure, and of up to 10 percent where a sector has a large portion of process 
emissions. The former provision directly addresses the trade driver of leakage, while the latter 
provision works on the logic that these emissions are harder to abate, which is a potential driver 
of leakage. While these provisions may broadly target leakage, they do so at the cost of 
preserving abatement incentives. The proposal to adjust the core 60 percent leakage rate by up 
to 10 percentage points to reward more efficient producers may have some effect in retaining 
abatement incentives, but its effect on leakage is unclear (PMR, 2015). 
In general, exemptions for the purposes of leakage prevention are most likely to be necessary 
when establishing a carbon pricing regime and should be accompanied by in explicit plan to 
phase them out. This thinking underpins the South African carbon tax; the current policy 
proposal is to reduce the basic exemption rate from 2020, therefore increasing the carbon 
pricing signal. As any phase-out occurs it may be that further changes are required to ensure 
that South Africa’s leakage protection measures are effective and sufficient to address economic 
concerns about leakag and any consequential political concerns. 
 
2.3.2.4. Output Based Rebates 
Sometimes policymakers aim to reduce the leakage risks associated with carbon prices by 
reducing other taxes paid by industry, or providing other subsidies to industry, often by an 
equivalent amount. This is an approach most commonly adopted in countries pursuing a carbon 
tax regime. The intention is to discourage carbon emissions while not increasing the overall tax 
liability faced by industrial firms.  
Under a carbon tax regime, rebate mechanisms can be designed to emulate the properties seen 
under the free allowance benchmarking options. An output-based rebate, such as that used in 
the case of the Swedish NOx charge, provides very similar properties to OBA; alternatively, 




in corporate income taxes or employer social security contributions represent an alternative that 
may reduce the risk of leakage without reducing incentives to reduce emissions. Given these 
similarities to the free allowance alternatives, the trade-offs between the different approaches, 
and the circumstances in which any one approach might be preferred, are also similar. 
For instance, in the UK, the introduction of the Climate Change Levyv – a tax on industrial 
consumption of different fossil fuels – was intended to offset a reduction in national insurance 
contributions for those affected by the tax (SUMMER et al., 2009). In Denmark, increases in 
energy taxes during the 1990s were accompanied by a reduction in the required employers’ 
contributions to the additional labor market pension fund, as well as a reduction in employers’ 
national insurance contributions (IEEP, 2013). 
There is a wide diversity in the implementation of this approach. Options differ depending on 
the tax/subsidy base through which the revenues are recycled – for example, output in the case 
of the Swedish NOx tax, and employment in the case of the UK Climate Change Levy. It can 
also differ depending on whether the revenues from the carbon tax are first explicitly calculated 
and then the rebate provided (to guarantee revenue neutrality at the government level), or 
whether the offsetting tax/subsidy change is introduced simultaneously, based only on an 
estimate of the expected revenue effects of the different fiscal changes. 
For these reasons, the impact of reducing other tax rates on preventing leakage will depend very 
heavily on the specific design. As noted above, there are many different ways in which these 
schemes can be designed. The most important feature in the context of leakage prevention is 
the way in which revenues are subsequently recycled. 
 
2.3.2.5. Complementary Measures 
These measures include cash transfers to offset some of the carbon emission costs firms face, 
direct support for emissions-reduction projects, and energy efficiency measures. While these 
measures may be valuable in helping to deliver emission reductions, they typically have only 
an indirect impact on leakage and are unlikely to obviate the need for more integrated 
approaches (PMR, 2015). 
Moreover, there are other alternatives such as subsidies to affected sectors to improve 




2.3.2.6. Comparative Analysis 
From the above discussions, it can be concluded that policy makers must weigh the specific 
advantages and disadvantages of each leakage prevention measure in the context of their 
particular circumstances. 
Of the free allocation approaches, those that utilize benchmarking (either OBA or FSB) are 
generally preferable to providing free allowances on a grandfathered basis. The attraction of 
both approaches is that they sever the link, which exists under grandfathering, between a firm’s 
own historical emission levels and its free allowance allocation. 
BTAs arguably perform most strongly on grounds of abatement incentives, but face political, 
administrative (and, possibly, legal) challenges. They are particularly appealing in that they 
simultaneously offer the potential to remove the competitive distortion associated with 
asymmetric carbon pricing, while also ensuring that the firms with the lowest carbon intensities 
are at a competitive advantage, and also ensuring that demand-side abatement incentives are 
maintained. However, their application to carbon regulation remains largely untested. They 
appear more likely to be feasible when introduced by a coalition of partners who account for a 
significant share of world trade. 
At the other end of the spectrum, exemptions perform most weakly in terms of abatement 
incentives but will be the easiest to implement. They are likely to be appropriate only as an 
interim measure to ensure sufficient support for carbon pricing when a scheme is in its infancy. 
Under a carbon tax regime, rebate mechanisms can be designed to emulate the properties seen 
under the free allowance benchmarking options. An output-based rebate, such as that used in 
the case of the Swedish NOx tax, provides very similar properties to output-based allocation; 
alternatively, lumpsum rebates would resemble FSB approaches. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the different integrated policy measures that can be used to 




Table 5 – Summary of different mitigation policies 
Source: Own elaboration based on PMR (2015)  
Feature 
Free Allowance Allocation 
Exemptions Rebates 
Border Tax 






Weak, unless closure 
rules and updates 
included 
Weak, unless closure 
rules and updating 
included 
Strong Strong Depends on design Strong 
Incentives to improve 
emissions intensity 
In principle strong, 
but diluted when 
updates included 
Preserved Preserved Not preserved Preserved Preserved 
Administrative 
complexity 








and costs in 
collecting output 
data 




Risk of windfall profits Some risk Some risk No No No No 
Political and legal 
challenges 




3. Brazilian Climate Policy and the National Industry  
The Brazilian industry is a very strategic sector, considering its representativeness in 
terms of GDP, employment and income generation, as well as its impact on the national 
trade balance (HENRIQUES et al., 2010; BAJAY et al., 2010). In this context, 
discussions related to the implementation of CPI in the industrial subsectors always bring 
up the possibility of (negative) impacts on economic dynamics, especially in the most 
energy-intensive subsectors. Therefore, a deep evaluation of the industrial sector is 
necessary. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first seeks to present the main discussions 
that relate the industrial sector to the Brazilian climate policy. The second and third 
sections perform an economic characterization of the sector, besides their emissions 
profile. Finally, the fourth section maps and analysis the existing sectorial policies. 
 
3.1. Brazilian Climate Policy and National Discussions about CPI 
In Brazil, the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) promulgated through Law 
12,187 of December 29, 2009 is the regulatory framework that guides the government 
under the climate change institutional arrangement. Among others, it aims to reduce 
anthropogenic GHG emissions and strengthen carbon removal through national sinks and 
foster measures that promote adaptation to climate change. Article 12 of the NPCC 
specifically states that the country has adopted GHG mitigation targets from 36.1% to 
38.9% of its 2020 projected emissions as a voluntary commitment (BRAZIL, 2009). This 
objective is to be achieved through sectorial plans for adaptation and mitigation of climate 
change that take into account the specificities of each sector.  
Brazil is also implementing its NPCC through a broad range of integrated policies and 
programs, including command-and-control measures, economic incentives, and public 
and private investments. In addition to the expected engagement of the private sector, 
these policies and programs will require significant amounts of public resources by 2020 
(CEBDS, 2017, BRAZIL, 2015a). Changes in the emissions profile and potential new 





More recently, the Brazilian government presented its NDC at COP 21 in 2015, whose 
main result was the establishment of the Paris Agreement. Through this document, Brazil 
indicated the intention of reducing GHG emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025, 
with a subsequent indicative contribution to reduce emissions by 43% below 2005 levels 
by 2030. It is economy-wide, it covers the post-2020 period, and its implementation 
period corresponds to successive cycles of 5 years (BRAZIL, 2015b). This cycle – which 
will begin after 2020 – was proposed by the country during COP 20, held in Lima, Peru, 
in 2014, resulting in a mitigation commitment by 2025 and an indicative contribution by 
2030, aiming at the predictability of economic agents. The proposal was justified in 
providing greater flexibility in relation to estimates of intended contributions and possible 
future adjustment, considering that the new agreement would likely include processes for 
reviewing the overall mitigation effort already before 2025  (BRAZIL, 2015b). 
For the purposes of presentation of NDC at the international level, no sector commitments 
were reported. The national territory was covered in the Brazilian NDC, and it was up to 
the government to define, at the domestic level, which sectors it intends to prioritize, as 
well as the policies and actions to implement. However, for internal purposes, in the 
process of quantifying the national contribution, the level of effort expected to be obtained 
from each sector for planning and considering the feasibility of the mitigation 
contribution was indicated (BRAZIL, 2015a,b). 
The mitigation component of the Brazilian NDC was constructed based on national 
circumstances and took into account initiatives for the three sectors with the largest 
participation in the Brazilian emissions profile in 2012 (Land Use Change and Forestry, 
Energy and Agriculture). It took as a basis the total quantification of the national 
contribution for compliance by 2025 (and, as an indication, until 2030), but not limited 
to these initiatives. They are (BRAZIL, 2015b): 
i) increasing the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix to 
approximately 18% by 2030, by expanding biofuel consumption, increasing 
ethanol supply, including by increasing the share of advanced biofuels (second 
generation), and increasing the share of biodiesel in the diesel mix;  
ii) in land use change and forests:  
- strengthening and enforcing the implementation of the Forest Code, at 




- strengthening policies and measures with a view to achieve, in the Brazilian 
Amazonia, zero illegal deforestation by 2030 and compensating for 
greenhouse gas emissions from legal suppression of vegetation by 2030;  
- restoring and reforesting 12 million hectares of forests by 2030, for multiple 
purposes;  
- enhancing sustainable native forest management systems, through 
georeferencing and tracking systems applicable to native forest management, 
with a view to curbing illegal and unsustainable practices;  
iii) in the energy sector, achieving 45% of renewables in the energy mix by 2030, 
including: 
- expanding the use of renewable energy sources other than hydropower in the 
total energy mix to between 28% and 33% by 2030;  
- expanding the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources domestically, increasing 
the share of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply to at 
least 23% by 2030, including by raising the share of wind, biomass and solar;  
- achieving 10% efficiency gains in the electricity sector by 2030. 
In addition, Brazil also intends to:  
iv) in the agriculture sector, strengthen the Low Carbon Emission Agriculture 
Program (ABC) as the main strategy for sustainable agriculture development, 
including by restoring an additional 15 million hectares of degraded 
pasturelands by 2030 and enhancing 5 million hectares of integrated cropland-
livestock-forestry systems (ICLFS) by 2030;  
v) in the industry sector, promote new standards of clean technology and further 
enhance energy efficiency measures and low carbon infrastructure;  
vi) in the transportation sector, further promote efficiency measures, and improve 
infrastructure for transport and public transportation in urban areas. 
 
Table 6 below presents the emission estimates made for the years 1990, 2005, 2025 and 






Table 6 – Emissions per sector (millions tCO2e – GWP10 100) 
Source: Own elaboration based on BRAZIL (2015a)  
Sector 1990 2005 2025 2030 
Energy 194 14% 332 16% 598 44% 688 57% 
Livestock 356 25% 484 23% 470 35% 489 40% 
Forestry and 
LULUCF 
Emission 826 58% 1.398 66% 392 29% 143 12% 
Remotion - - 211 10% 274 20% 274 23% 
Liquid - - 1.187 56% 118 9% -131 -11% 
Industrial Process 48 3% 77 4% 98 7% 99 8% 
Waste Treatment 12 1% 54 3% 61 5% 63 5% 
Total 1,436 2,133 1,346 1,208 
Reduction in relation to 2005 - - 37% 43% 
 
As stated in the NDC document, regarding the industrial sector, there are neither details 
nor precise quantifications. Brazil’s NDC only mentions that the industrial sector should 
promote mitigation actions based on new clean technologies standards, energy efficiency 
measures and low carbon infrastructure. However, the NDC document also considers the 
use of economic mechanisms, but it is not clear about the configuration of the Brazilian 
climate policy in terms of economic instruments for carbon pricing.  
Therefore, an issue becomes relevant when looking at the Brazilian NDC: how will the 
national climate policy be shaped in terms of economic mechanisms and instruments for 
carbon pricing? As stated in the NDC document, "Brazil reserves its position regarding 
the possibility of using any market mechanisms that may be established under the Paris 
Agreement" (BRAZIL, 2015b). Furthermore, article 5 of the NPCC states that "the use of 
financial and economic mechanisms that are national in scope and referring to mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change" will be encouraged, and it is emphasized in article 6 
that such mechanisms are among those already existing within the framework of the 
                                                          




UNFCCC, which must present environmental standards and quantifiable and verifiable 
targets (BRAZIL, 2009). 
In the same article, more specifically in item VI, there is a reference to the possibility of 
adopting a tax. According to the paragraph, "fiscal and tax measures to encourage the 
reduction of emissions and removal of greenhouse gases, including differentiated rates, 
exemptions, compensations and incentives, to be established in a specific law" may be 
used. It should be highlighted that any attempt to tax emissions faces the resisteance, 
given the unpopularity of increasing the tax burden on citizens and companies (PEREIRA 
and BERTHOLINI, 2017). However, the country already has a legal framework 
developed regarding the use of economic instruments as mechanisms for environmental 
protection, besides having experiences on destining part of taxes collected for social and 
environmental purposes – for example, Ecological Tax on Circulation of Goods and 
Services (Ecological ICMS) and Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain – 
Fuel (CIDE Fuels). 
Nonetheless, in article 4, item VIII, it is affirmed that "the development of the Brazilian 
Emission Reduction Market (MBRE) will be fostered" (BRASIL, 2009). Another 
reference to the use of an ETS occurs throughout the document, specifically in article 9, 
which states that this market "will be operationalized in commodities and futures 
exchanges, stock exchanges and organized over-the-counter entities authorized by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), where it will be negotiated securities 
representing certified greenhouse gas emissions avoided". In addition, Decree 7,390, 
dated December 9, 2010, which regulates some articles of the NPCC and imposes targets 
for GHG emissions from economic sectors, states in its article 4, item V, caption 3 that 
"sectorial targets may be used as parameters for the establishment of the Brazilian 
Emission Reduction Market – MBRE". No reference to possible fiscal or tax measures of 
carbon is presented in this Decree (BRASIL, 2010). 
Therefore, from the analysis of the official documents essential to the design of the 
Brazilian climate policy, it is not clear how the national climate policy will be shaped in 
terms of economic mechanisms and instruments for carbon pricing to reach the goals 
taken on by the country. Nonetheless, the Brazilian Federal Government has shown an 
interest in analyzing CPI frameworks and assessing their potential impacts on the 




The World Bank has established the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) through a 
trust fund supported by capacity-building grants. This partnership aims to provide 
"implementing countries" with financial and technical support to build capacity to start 
structuring the main components of market readiness, such as data collection, monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) system and/or construct pilot market instruments to 
define the correct scale of their mitigation efforts. The PMR also creates and shares a 
body of knowledge about market instruments, such as how to prepare market instruments 
and lessons learned. 
In May 2012, the Partnership Assembly approved the allocation of funding for the 
preparation phase of Brazil based on what the country presented in its Organizing 
Framework for the Market Preparation Activities Scope. During the Brazilian market 
preparation proposal, the identified information gap began to be filled by studies 
commissioned by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance (MF) with the support of the PMR. 
The MF was tasked by the Executive Group of the Interministerial Commission on 
Climate Change to coordinate the assessment of the suitability and feasibility of CPI and 
their impacts on the Brazilian economy (MF, 2014). In a first phase, starting in 2012, a 
multi-institutional working group (with participation of seven ministries and 
representatives of the various MF technical units) recommended further analysis to 
improve information on emissions at the level of individual facilities and effects of carbon 
prices through an ETS or a carbon tax. 
Regarding the improvement of information on emissions at the facilities level, the 
objectives are: (i) to consolidate and disseminate knowledge related to the international 
experience in collecting and managing data for GHG emissions at the installation level 
and (ii) generate recommendations for the development of such a system in Brazil. Based 
on the analysis of various problems and experiences on the implementation of MRV 
systems, a working group coordinated by MF, and integrated by the Federal and State 
governments, delivered in February 2014 a report with an evaluation of the policy options 
for the establishment of a National GHG Emission Reporting Program. 
Another relevant initiative is a partnership with the British Embassy in Brazil. In its first 
phase (2012/2013), the "Green Fiscal Policy in Brazil" project compiled existing 
analytical tools to assess the economic impacts of GHG emission reductions (GVCES, 




the impacts of a tax reform in terms of GHG emissions, economic performance and job 
creation. The objective of this project was to explore the possibilities of a "green tax 
reform" in Brazil, with a more detailed breakdown of taxes. 
The activities carried out during the preparation phase of the PMR in Brazil aimed to 
explore approaches to consider the economic effects of carbon pricing through an ETS or 
a carbon tax. Two studies were developed: (i) economic modeling of carbon pricing 
instruments and (ii) review of experience and recommendations for the design and 
implementation of a carbon tax in the country. 
The first work was based on the adaptation of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for the Brazilian economy, called "BeGreen"; and the simulation of three policy 
scenarios to achieve mitigation targets in specific sectors by 2030: command-and-control; 
carbon prices through tradable allowances; and the carbon price through a simplified 
carbon tax (POLLITT, 2015). The second study provided an up-to-date review of the 
economic literature and lessons learned from the international carbon tax experience. The 
study also explored legal possibilities and design options for a carbon tax in Brazil 
(GVCES, 2013). 
The analysis so far has been important for the MF to launch an internal process to (i) 
assess the possible implications of adopting carbon pricing instruments, (ii) map possible 
design options and apply modeling tools for economic instruments by MF staff. However, 
since it was still a preparatory phase, the work was mainly focused on internal 
discussions, with limited interfaces to other stakeholders outside the MF. As indicated by 
the initial studies, a more detailed modeling work would be necessary to obtain more 
robust results, based on policy options suitable to the Brazilian context (MF, 2014). In 
addition, the need for more specific analyses was emphasized, for example, in order to 
understanding the interaction between CPI and other sectorial policies and instruments. 
In September 2014, the Partnership Assembly allocated an additional fund to Brazil for 
the Implementation Phase, to be used in the activities proposed in the MRP. The MRP is 
currently being developed, divided into three components. Component 1 consists of 
studies to guide the formulation of policies through two activities: (i) conducting sector 
studies and (ii) proposing different instrument designs. This Component is investigating 
the main issues involved in implementing CPI in the economics sectors/subsectors, as 




The results of these studies will guide the activities carried out in Component 2 of the 
MRP, which will evaluate the impacts of the instruments proposed using a CGE model. 
A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) will also be performed in this component. Finally, 
Component 3 will focus on sharing the results of the studies conducted in Components 1 
and 2, as well as on consulting and attracting stakeholders, which should include seminars 
open to the public. 
In the context of implementing the Brazilian MRP, the PMR Project is currently assisting 
the General Coordination of Environment and Climate Change of the MF’s Secretariat of 
Economic Policy in the implementation of Component 1 of the Brazilian MRP. This 
includes conducting sectorial studies focusing on the electricity, fuel, industry and 
agriculture sectors/subsectors, as well as drawing up proposals for different CPI designs 
- the main instruments considered are ETS and/or carbon tax - aiming at helping assess 
the potential impacts of different design options. This thesis itself also wants to support 
this goal. 
 
3.2. Economic Characterization 
Brazilian industrialization began in the period between the two Great Wars, but it was 
only after the 1950s, through the Plan of Goals (Plano de Metas), that industrial 
development finally entered the political and economic agenda of the country. Subdivided 
into sectors (energy, transportation, food, basic industry, and education), the plan was 
marked by investments in roads, iron and steel, extraction and production of oil, 
hydroelectric power plants, among others. Among the exponents of the plan are the 
creation of Petrobras and National Steel Company (Compania Siderúrgica Nacional – 
CSN), which allowed the country, in less than 10 years, to significantly increase the 
production of oil, pig iron, and steel (SUZIGAN, 1992, SUZIGAN and FURTADO, 
2006). 
As a result, there was a major push in the manufacturing industry, which contributed to a 
phase of vigorous economic growth that lasted until the late 1970s, accompanied by 
growth in the agricultural and mineral extractive sectors. From 1950 to 1980, industrial 
output grew at a high average annual rate (8.5%), 20% higher than that of the economy, 




(PINTO et al., 2008). This was supported by the expansion of the domestic market and 
utilization of remaining import substitution investment opportunities. 
The world crisis that began after the second oil shock in 1979 closed markets and 
significantly affected the emerging Brazilian industry. In order to balance the public 
accounts, it was necessary to adopt policies of fiscal and monetary adjustment, which led 
production, employment and productivity in the country to fall. The level of investments 
was contracted and the effort to incorporate technical progress was reduced. 
The effects of this crisis remained until the early 1990s, when the opening of national 
industry to international competition by the facilitation of imported products deepened 
the industrial crisis. As a result, according to SUZIGAN and FURTADO (2006), 
companies had to adapt and modernize. Most industrial segments ended up adopting 
survival strategies that basically followed three phases: (i) equity adjustment, comprising 
reduction of indebtedness and increase in revenues from investments in the financial 
market, (ii) redefinition of markets, through the search of sectors with high level of export 
coefficients, and (iii) modernization of the production process. 
From 2004 on, the Brazilian industrial production began to show signs of recovery. A 
combination of factors favored this scenario: (i) stabilization of the economy through 
reduction of the inflation rate through monetary policy, (ii) reduction of the interest rate, 
with the consequent increase in purchasing power and recovery of the domestic market, 
and (iii) increase in the flow of capital and investments (increasing inflow of direct 
foreign investments and capital) (ALMEIDA et al., 2007).  
However, in the last ten years, the competitiveness of domestic industry has fallen 
considerably in the global scenario, a trend evidenced by the deterioration of indicators 
such as the country's participation in the world exports of manufactured products, its share 
in the world value added of manufactured goods and the productivity of the effective 
work (CNI, 2015). Thus, the analysis of the economic sectors in the Brazilian GDP 
reveals that the industry as a whole has reduced its relative participation in economic 
production. The general fall recorded, however, does not mean that the industry has been 
producing less, but that other sectors are growing more rapidly (IEMA, 2016). 
It should be noted, however, that the Brazilian industrial sector has a high degree of 




(EPE, 2016; BARROS and GUILHOTO, 2014). In spite of the relative contraction of the 
sector, the industry maintains its relevance to the national economy: in 2015, industry 
accounted for 15.7% of jobs in the country and 38.1% of national exports (CNI, 2015). 
There is, however, no coherent framework of measures and policies to requalify and 
sustain a new growth cycle in the Brazilian industrial sector (CEBDS, 2016). Such a gap 
becomes more relevant in the context of the consolidation of the low carbon economy, in 
which new competitiveness variables, such as energy and carbon intensity, can create 
unprecedented pressures for the sector. 
In this thesis, information regarding seven Brazilian industrial subsectors (Aluminum, 
Cement, Lime and Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron and Steel, and Pulp and Paper) was 
collected11. The decision to divide the industry in these seven subsectors follows the 
characterization used by the Ministry of Finance (MF), within the scope of the PMR 
project. These sectors are also the same considered in the Industry Plan (MDIC, 2013), 
which is the Sectorial Climate Mitigation Plan for the Consolidation of a Low Carbon 
Economy in the Transformation Industry. Such subsectors are those that have process 
emissions. Also, according to the analysis carried out in the section 2.2, these are the main 
industrial sectors considered in the context of designing carbon pricing policies and their 
instruments.  
Based on the indicators calculated from the 2010 Input-Output Matrix (IBGE, 2015), this 
section briefly presents individual analyses of sectorial characteristics such as sales 
distribution, degree of concentration and structure of prices. After that, the section also 
provides a comparative analysis between the results of the selected industrial sectors, 
especially in terms of the importance of the sector, through its Gross Value of Production 
(GVP) and its Value Added (VA), in relation to the values of the manufacturing industry 
and the sectors analyzed. Then, the external vulnerability of the subsectors is evaluated 
by the Export Coefficient (EC). All these indicators will be detailed in the respective 
section. 
 
                                                          
11 Special thanks to the following fellows from CENERGIA/COPPE/UFRJ that supported me in this 





Regarding the distribution of sales of the sector, it is observed that most of the production 
of the aluminum sector serves as raw material for other segments and sectors 
(intermediate consumption), but is also destined for exports. In terms of production, 
primary aluminum production in Brazil in 2016 was 792 thousand metric tonnes, an 
increase of 2.7% compared to 2015. This growth pointed to a certain stabilization of the 
sector after the large production drops in 2014 (ABAL, 2017), which in turn can be 
explained by the greater competition against Chinese products and by the highwe cost of 
electricity, which is responsible for up to 60% of production costs. After a history of 
sustained production growth, Brazil has since 2009 presented successive reductions in its 
production of primary aluminum, after reaching its peak of 1661 thousand metric tonnes 
in 2008. 
On the other hand, the apparent consumption of this metal showed a growth trend since 
2009. While the national production of aluminum presented an average reduction of 11% 
per year between 2010 and 2014, apparent consumption grew 6% per year (IBGE, 2015). 
This consumption has been supplied by the increased use of recycled metal in the sector, 
as well as by imports. In this context, when compared to other countries, Brazil has a high 
ratio between recovered scrap and domestic consumption, reaching 38.5%, with a world 
average of 27.1% (DNPM, 2017). 
In 2015, according to NOVELIS (2017), Brazilian capacity for aluminum production was 
only 935 thousand metric tonnes/year, supplied by Albras (PA) and Companhia Brasileira 
de Alumínio (SP). In March, Alcoa had suspended the activities of its Alumar consortium 
plant, cutting 74,000 metric tonnes of capacity due to lower metal prices and high 
production costs (NOVELIS, 2017). 
Regarding the market analysis of the sector and the price formation of its products, large 
primary aluminum producers form the price of their alloys based on the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) according to the formula ‘LME + premium’, since imported aluminum 
incurs additional costs such as sea freight, insurance, port fees, and taxation, which 
become a premium for the domestic producer. In addition, aluminum recyclers follow the 
prices set by large companies, keeping their alloy prices below those determined. The 





In relation to the Brazilian aluminum market, also in 2015, the country reduced primary 
aluminum production and became an importer of this raw material, mainly due to the high 
costs of electricity, which, as previously mentioned, can account for up to 60% of 
production costs (ABAL, 2017). Despite this slowdown, in the year 2016 aluminum spot 
prices increased. At the same time, Brazilian industry reached positive numbers in that 
year, with a significant increase in primary metal exports. In addition, the strengthening 
of the US dollar against the Brazilian real provided an incentive for Brazilian producers 
to export. However, these factors lost strength at the end of 2016, although the 
perspectives of industry experts are that production will remain stable, but that exports 
will not grow again in the short term. 
Recently, the Brazilian Aluminum Association (ABAL) and the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIFT), through the Department 
of Industrial Development and Competitiveness, have established a technical cooperation 
agreement for the Strategic Route Project of the Brazilian Aluminum Chain 2030. The 
objective of the project is to conduct the sector in a process of creating knowledge 
regarding changes and trends in the economy, technology and society that occur at a 
global, national and local level, in order to anticipate the impact of these changes and 
trends for the aluminum chain in Brazil. 
 
3.2.2. Cement, Lime and Glass 
The majority of the production of the activities within the sector Cement, Lime and Glass 
serves as raw material for other segments and sectors (intermediate consumption). By 
conducting a market analysis and price formation of these sectors, in general, it can be 
said that they are intermediate segments, with a great part of their production being 
destined to other industrial segments. The lime and cement segments have a strong 
relationship with the civil construction industry, while the glass sector is dependent on 
purchases from the automobile industry. In addition, as a whole, the segment cement, 
lime and glass has low profit margin, which could hinder the absorption of a possible cost 
of carbon (RATHMANN, 2013). 
The Brazilian cement industry operates with low profit margins, having great difficulty 




very high, making the spread of new costs to the consumer more dispersed, with the 
marginal cost of all producers increasing. Despite the fact that there is no international 
competition, the effects of low margins combined with the low concentration of 
companies result in major barriers in the sector for the incorporation of new production 
costs, being therefore exposed to the effect of possible carbon pricing. 
In the lime sector, price formation can vary widely, depending on its application. It can 
be considered a sector that is not susceptible to external competition, since its apparent 
consumption accompanies the level of production, that is, lime produced in Brazil is 
almost completely absorbed by the domestic market, with no need for imports. Another 
characteristic of this sector is its heterogeneity of producing companies, with highly 
different behaviors. According to JMENDO (2009), large companies, often 
multinationals with large working capital, are more able to absorb market oscillations and 
invest in new technologies and opportunities, while small firms rely heavily on 
government intervention to ensure their competitiveness. 
In the glass sector, the oligopoly characteristic has been maintained and almost half of 
the production of flat glass and packaging belongs to one company, Saint Gobain. The 
glass market has had a favorable trade balance in the past, however, in recent years it has 
lost international competitiveness due to China's strong entry into this market and also 
due to high natural gas prices in Brazil. The glass segment in the country uses mainly 
natural gas (95%) in its furnaces (CNQ, 2015). Thus, prices have a great impact on the 
costs of the sector. It is estimated that the expenses with natural gas and electric energy 
correspond to about 25% of the final cost of production, and can reach 35% (CNQ, 2015). 
 
3.2.3. Chemicals 
Regarding the distribution of sales of the sector, it is observed that most of the production 
of the Chemical sector serves as raw material for other segments and sectors (intermediate 
consumption), but it is also destined to household consumption and exports. The chemical 
industry has a different characteristic from the other industrial activities, since it has a 
great interdependence in terms of raw materials (ABIQUIM, 2010). In addition, the 
demand for basic chemical inputs is highly dependent on several generations of the 




products. These, in turn, depend on industrial consumption and final consumption, and 
are therefore highly elastic to GDP growth (KUPFER et al., 2006). 
Another relevant feature of this industry is its heterogeneity, besides the fact that the 
chemical industry includes numerous products inserted in different categories 
(ABIQUIM, 2016). Thus, assessing the market and the impact of possible carbon pricing 
in each of the areas of this industry would require a level of analysis that calls for detailed 
information on each of the subsectors and products. Each product and each segment has 
its particularity concerning market and national or international competitiveness. Thus, 
in this context, some general aspects of the competitiveness of this industrial sector will 
be presented, focusing on some segments with relevant peculiarities. 
One of the categories included in the chemical sector is the manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals and pharmachemical products. Despite being a market for small 
consumers, these sectors has been suffering pressure coming from large institutions for a 
flexibilization of the prices given a certain purchasing power they have due to sale to 
large corporations associated with large volumes. Examples of such institutions are the 
State, hospitals and clinics. For the government, it is interesting that the population has 
access to a lower cost medication, which ultimately deprives public health spending. 
Also, health plans may be important in determining competitive prices, as they are 
interested in lowering drug prices in order to reduce coverage costs. These factors also 
weaken the pricing power of pharmaceutical oligopolies (MOREIRA and VARGAS, 
2009). 
In the case of the petrochemical industry (another category within the chemical sector), 
its competitiveness can be related to two main exogenous factors: the availability and 
price of raw materials and the high fixed cost of investment (CNI, 2010). As a highly 
capital intensive industry, petrochemicals have been configured over the years around 
vertical and horizontal integration, which guarantees, among other advantages, the 
possibility of operating with monopoly characteristics and economies of scope, with a 
large presence of companies. Its dynamics are related to international price cycles, which 
in turn are determined by the prices of raw materials and the balance between installed 
capacity and demand (BAIN and COMPANY, 2014). 
The market for basic and second-generation petrochemicals is highly dependent on oil 




to global macroeconomic factors. The profitability of the companies manufacturing these 
raw materials is established according to the spread, in which the cost of the raw material 
for production depends largely on the price of naphtha, an input price based on the price 
of crude oil. Thus, this market oscillates between moments with very narrow margin and 
high margin, due to the oil prices (BRASKEM, 2016). 
The apparent national consumption of the chemical industry has been declining in recent 
years, and Brazil has become increasingly dependent on the international market, either 
for the sale of products that are not being absorbed locally, or for import, making it 
vulnerable to the global macroeconomic situation (BRASKEM, 2016). In the 
international scenario, the price of oil, and consequently of petrochemical naphtha and 
natural gas, is reflected in the international price of several chemical products, 
interconnected with each other from basic raw materials linked to petroleum (CNI, 2010). 
The fertilizer segment, in addition to variations in the price of natural gas, is related to 
variations in the price and demand of international agricultural commodities. In the case 
of nitrogen fertilizers, the main raw material used is natural gas. About half of the national 
consumption is imported, and varies according to a basket of petroleum products. In 
addition, natural gas prices practiced in Brazil are significantly higher than those practiced 
in the USA (KUPFER et al., 2006). 
It is also worth noting that exchange rate variations also have an impact on the 
competitiveness of the national chemical industry, which is dependent on imports of basic 
products, and its investments are based on foreign currencies. Thus, the turnover of the 
chemical industry, which presents steady growth in the Brazilian currency, suffers strong 
oscillations when considering its turnover in dollars. 
 
3.2.4. Pig Iron and Steel 
The production of the Pig Iron and Steel sector presents important commodities destined 
to the foreign market, but also serves as raw material for other segments and national 
sectors (intermediate consumption). In terms of production, the Brazilian steel industry is 
operating with large idle capacity, directly associated with the country's economic 




of its capacity, ranging from an utilization of 87% in 2007, to an average utilization rate 
of 70% in 2014 (IAB, 2013, 2017). 
In addition, the industrial park has relatively new facilities (between 1990 and 2003, steel 
production in the country increased by 50%). This characteristic combined with the 
current high idleness points to a delay in the resumption of investments in installed 
capacity, even in a moment of resumption of economic growth in the country. 
By carrying out a market analysis of the sector, and its price formation, its high sensitivity 
to external competition is perceptible. Thus, if the values of the national products go up, 
they would be replaced by imports. In recent years, increased steel imports combined with 
reduced domestic demand have had a severe impact, greatly increasing the country's idle 
capacity. On the other hand, the good quality of Brazilian iron ore can be considered as a 
competitive advantage of the country in a market in which international competition is 
extremely relevant. 
Meanwhile, the country faces competitive asymmetries in the international market, 
resulting in difficulties for the domestic industry to compete with imported steel. 
According to the Brazil Steel Institute (IAB, 2017), the export would be an option to 
improve the degree of utilization of installed capacity. Today, with an approximate 60% 
idleness due to the Brazilian domestic market, the steel sector is living with international 
capacity surpluses that exceed 700 million metric tonnes, resulting in unfair trade 
practices and depreciated prices. 
 
3.2.5. Pulp and Paper 
For the Pulp and Paper sector, most of the products serve as raw material for other 
segments and sectors (intermediate consumption), and are destined for exports. Regarding 
the sector's price structure, Brazil is currently one of the world's leading producers of 
pulp, ranking second in exported volume of pulp and the first place in the export of 
bleached sulphate/kraft pulp (BRACELPA, 2015; BNDES, 2010). Its great differential 
consists in the use of eucalyptus in its short fiber production, which has a shorter time for 
cutting (seven years) and high productivity (44 m³/ha/year). With regard to the production 




the cost structure is made up of the costs of wood, chemicals, energy, labor, maintenance, 
freight and others. 
According to MONTEBELLO and BACHA (2013), Brazil is a price taker in the 
international market, due to the small size of its production and exports in relation to the 
volume sold worldwide. According to BNDES (2010), prices in the international pulp 
market are cyclical in nature, being sensitive to changes in industry capacity, inventories 
of producers, the exchange rate, production and freight costs, and, above all, to the 
oscillations of world economic activity. Another aspect that stands out is the fact that 
prices for both long-fiber and short-fiber pulp vary at about the same rate, reflecting the 
fine-tuning of the two products in the market and reduces arbitrage opportunities. Thus, 
companies with higher (lower) production costs work with lower (higher) margins, and 
are the first (last) to suffer downtime in downward cycles of commodity prices. 
In relation to the price of paper, these are determined by the supply and demand 
conditions in the regional markets, although with a more stable behavior than pulp prices. 
In addition, they suffer fluctuations as a direct result of several factors, including 
fluctuations in pulp prices and specific market characteristics. 
 
3.2.6. Comparative Analysis  
Considering the main purpose of this thesis, the comparative analysis focus on some 
specific economic indicators. The general economic characterization of the sector begins 
with the analysis of the importance of the sector, through its Gross Value of Production 
(GVP)12 and its Value Added (VA)13, in relation to the values of the manufacturing 
industry and the sectors analyzed. The methodological detail is found in Annex A. After 
that, the external vulnerability of the subsectors is evaluated by the Export Coefficient 
(EC)14 and its methodological detail is also found in Annex A.  
Figure 7 shows that in the 2010 the Chemical subsector had the highest participation 
(10.2%) in relation to the total VBP of the manufacturing industry, followed by Iron and 
                                                          
12 It corresponds to the sum of all goods and services produced, both final products and inputs used in 
production. 
13 It corresponds to the difference between the GVP and the intermediate consumption. 
14 It corresponds to the percentage of production that is exported, so the higher the EC, the greater the 




Steel (7.4%) and Cement, Lime and Glass (4%). These three sectors accounted for about 
20% of the VBP of the manufacturing industry, totaling R$ 430 billion. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Subsectors' GVP participation in the manufacturing industry, 2010 
Source: Own elaboration based on IBGE (2015) 
 
In Figure 8, the participation of the VA of the selected sectors in relation to the total VA 




Figure 8 – Subsectors' VA participation in the manufacturing industry, 2010 
Source: Own elaboration based on IBGE (2015) 
With regard to external vulnerability and with the purpose of verifying possible impacts 
on sector competitiveness, it is possible to observe, in Figure 9, the participation of 
exports in the production of the activities of the selected sectors. According to the concept 































including processing and agglomeration (Iron and Steel), was the most vulnerable 
segment among the sectors selected, with 89% of exports per unit of production. Then, 
we have the extraction of non-ferrous metal minerals, including beneficiation 
(Aluminum), which represented the second most vulnerable segment in relation to the 
selected sectors of the study, with 34% of exports per unit of production. Still within the 
Aluminum sector, non-ferrous metal metallurgy and metal casting appears as the third 
most vulnerable activity with 31%. Extraction of mineral coal and non-metallic minerals 
and manufacture of non-metallic mineral products (belonging to the subsector Cement, 
Lime and Glass) showed the lowest export coefficients, both with 6% of exports per unit 
of production, and therefore, less vulnerable than the others. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Subsectors' export participation in the activity production of the selected subsectors, 
2010 
Source: Own elaboration based on IBGE (2015) 
Note: 
Aluminum 1: Extraction of non-ferrous metal ores, including improvements; Aluminum 2: Metallurgy of 
non-ferrous metals and metal smelting; Cement, Lime and Glass 1: Extraction of coal and non-metallic 
minerals; Cement, Lime and Glass 2: Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products; Chemicals 1: 
Manufacture of other organic and inorganic chemicals, resins and elastomers; Chemicals 2: Manufacture 
of pesticides, disinfectants, paints and various chemicals; Chemicals 3: Manufacture of cleaning products, 
cosmetics/perfumery and personal hygiene; Chemicals 4: Manufacture of pharmaceutical and 
pharmachemical products; Pig Iron and Steel 1: Extraction of iron ore, including processing and 
improvements; Pig Iron and Steel 2: Production of pig iron/ferroalloys, steel industry, and seamless steel 


































Table 7 summarizes these indiactors per subsector in US$ millions. 
 
Table 7 – Economic characterization indicators of the analyzed industries (US$ millions, 2010) 










Aluminum 5,010 22,359 7,170 3,715 
Cement, Lime and Glass 10,487 30,092 1,731 1,679 
Chemicals 7,196 26,387 9,570 32,225 
Pig Iron and Steel 23,519 95,443 7,893 5,277 
Pulp and Paper 7,945 42,952 5,608 1,751 
 
 
3.3. Sectorial Emissions Profile 
Considering sectorial emissions, if in recent decades the Brazilian industry has lost its 
relative position in the national economy, its GHG emissions gained importance as 
deforestation decreased (participation in net CO2 emissions from land use, land use 
change, and forestry reduced from 83.4% in 2005 to 42% in 2010 – MCTI, 2015). In 
1990, the industrial sector accounted for 8.5% of the total GHG emissions (including fuel 
combustion and industrial processes), while in 2010 it reached 22.6% MCTI (2015). 
Figure 10 presents the total Brazilian GHG emissions in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 
and 2014 (the latest available year by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MCTI, 2016). The increase in both energy and industrial process emissions reflects the 
growth of the Brazilian economy (activity effect) throughout the period.  
Contrary to that evolution, there was a reduction in emissions from land use, land-use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF) after 2005, due to the decrease in deforestation 
(SANTOS et al., 2018). However, it remains to be seen whether this trend will reverse in 
the next decade due to governmental policies favoring land grabbing in Brazil 
implemented over the last three years (ROCHEDO et al., 2018). This deforestation 
emission reversal trend can certainly pose new challenges to Brazil’s industrial sector to 






Figure 10 – Brazilian GHG emissions by origin in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010, and 
2014 (values in Gg CO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCTI (2016) 
 
Figure 11 presents the total industrial GHG emissions by origin (energy or process) in 
2005, 2010, and 2014. There was an 11% increase in total emissions from 2005 to 2010 
(14% from fuel combustion – energy - emissions and 9% from industrial process 
emissions), while the comparison between 2014 and 2005 reveals a 21% increase in total 





















Figure 11 – Brazilian GHG emissions by origin in 2005, 2010, and 2014 (values 
in Gg CO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCTI (2016) 
 
There should be noted that there are several opportunities to reduce GHG emissions in 
Brazil (MCTI, 2016; WORLD BANK, 2010). More specifically, in the industrial sector, 
incentives for efficiency and processes innovations (R&D), new financing instruments, 
implementing specific regulatory instruments – such as a carbon pricing – and 
technological standards are key drivers for developing a low carbon industrial sector in 
Brazil (CEBDS, 2016, 2017). Nevertheless, challenges also exist in this sector, such as 
the high abatement costs for some mitigation options, and the incipient stage of some 
technologies (PINTO et al., 2018; HENRIQUES et al., 2010), the need for adaptability 
of those technologies to Brazilian plants, and the difficulty to obtain cheap loans and 
financing (CEBDS, 2017).   
From the context about the industry emissions profile, it is important to understand and 
analyze the history of emissions from the sector, in a subsectorial level, through national 
inventories. To do so, emissions data from the same seven major Brazilian industrial 
subsectors assessed in the economic characterization (Aluminum, Cement, Lime, and 
Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron and Steel, and Pulp and Paper) was collected and they are 
briefly presented and analyzed in the following subsections. After that, a subsectorial 























The aluminum industry in 2010 reached the total CO2 emissions 2.544 Gg, caused by the 
manufacturing process (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12 – GHG emissions from the Aluminum subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
 
3.3.2. Cement, Lime and Glass 
Cement production is an energy-intensive process, resulting in carbon dioxide emissions 
not only from fuel consumption, but also from the calcination of limestone. A comparison 
between the process emissions and the energy emissions of the cement subsector (Figure 
13) shows that there is a tendency for emissions to grow in recent years, so the application 
of energy efficiency measures is highly significant in order to reduce these emissions as 

























Figure 13 – GHG emissions from Cement subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
 
In general, the cement industrial park in Brazil presents high-energy efficiency values 
when compared to the world average, both in terms of electric and thermal energy 
consumption (CNI, 2010). This is due to the fact that the Brazilian cement park is new, 
not presenting much lag in relation to the most advanced technologies. 
In relation to the production of lime, many modifications were introduced in the 
processing of this product, seeking to improve its reactivity and reduce the specific energy 
consumption (kcal / t of lime for the product manufactured) (CNI, 2010). According to 
Figure 14 below, it is possible to see that the process emissions are more relevant in 
























Figure 14 – GHG emissions from Lime subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration by the author based on CNI (2010) 
 
Regarding the production of glass, according to the Third National Communication of 
Brazil to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (MCTI, 2015) 
emissions in glass production process reached only 114 GgCO2 in 2010. Energy emissions 
could not be obtained directly from the TCN nor indirectly through data from the National 
Energy Balance, where the glass production sector is not detailed. Therefore, a similar 
methodology used to the lime industry was applied: knowing the glass production of 
subsequent years (2007 to 2010) it was possible to extrapolate the consumption of energy 
by making use of the historical database. Finally, making use of each energy emission 


























Figure 15 – GHG emissions from the Glass subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration by the author based on CNI (2010) 
 
3.3.3. Chemicals 
Due to the fact that the chemicals sector is an intensive energy user and it has an important 
role in the economy by providing inputs to many other industries, the chemical industry 
is a targeted investment sector in terms of R&D of new technologies around the world. 
In fact, according to IEA (2014), the chemical and petrochemical sector accounts for 
about 10% of world final energy demand and for 7% of global emissions of GHG.  
The highest energy consumption and emission intensity is concentrated in the production 
of eighteen products15 that account for 80% of the energy demand of the chemical 
industry and 75% of the emissions (IEA, 2014). Figure 16 shows the relationship between 
energy emissions and process emissions, evidencing the discrepancy between these 
values and that the composition of the sector is mainly due to the emissions of energy. 
 
                                                          
15 Acrylonitrile, ammonia, benzene, caprolactam, cumene, ethylene, ethylene glycol, ethylene oxide, 
HDPE, LDPE, LLDPE, methanol, xylenes, phenols, PP, propylene, propylene oxide, p-xylene, styrene, 
























Figure 16 – GHG emissions of the Chemical subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
 
 
3.3.4. Pig Iron and Steel 
The Pig Iron and Steel industry accounts for 38% of total emissions of the sectors studied 
(MCTI, 2015). This subsector is also responsible for the higher process emissions indices 
of the subsectors analyzed reaching the value 38.360 GgCO2 in 2010 (Figure 17). 
As shown in the Figure 17, this sector has a relatively low energy emissions if compared 
to the process emissions. Pig iron and steel subsector reached the energy emissions of 
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Figure 17 – GHG emissions from the Pig Iron and Steel subsector (GgCO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration based on CNI (2010) 
 
3.3.5. Pulp and Paper 
According to the National Energy Balance 2013 (EPE, 2014), the Pulp and Paper industry 
was the third largest energy consumer in the Brazilian industrial sector, accounting for 
approximately 14% of total industry consumption. Also according to EPE (2014), the 
sector significantly increased its energy use in the last ten years, presenting in 2013 a 
consumption of approximately 10.5 million toe, which is an amount 45% higher than the 
published value for the year 2004. 
The main energy sources used by the industry were liquor, corresponding to 47.1% of the 
total energy used then electricity with 15.9% and 15.3% fired with natural gas at 7.6%. 
Thus, it is observed that although the sector is intensive in energy use, much of its 
generation comes from renewable sources. 
In addition, with respect to the process GHG emissions, they are low compared to other 
industries. The production of chemical pulp, in particular, performed primarily by the 
kraft process is indirect GHG emitting since during the preparation of pulp by the kraft 
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to energy emissions, these are considerably more significant. Figure 18 shows the 
process, energy and total emissions of this sector. 
 
 
Figure 18 – GHG emissions of the Pulp and Paper subsectors (GgCO2eq) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
 
 
3.3.6. Comparative Analysis  
The previous section presented information on the emissions profile of seven Brazilian 
industrial subsectors (Aluminum, Cement, Lime and Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron and 
Steel, and Pulp and Paper). The emissions were separated into "Process Emissions" and 
"Energy Emissions" according to the classification of the Third Brazilian Inventory of 
Anthropogenic Emissions and Removals of Greenhouse Gases (MCTI, 2015). 
The compilation of the results obtained is shown in Table 8, indicating a total of 121,493 
GgCO2 equivalent in 2010, being 61.4% of the value associated with industrial process 
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Table 8 – Emissions profile of the analyzed industries (Gg CO2eq, 2010) 










Aluminum 3,702 3,708 7,410 6.1% 
Cement 14,619 21,288 35,907 29.6% 
Chemicals 13,949 3,488 17,438 14.4% 
Glass 1,429 114 1,543 1.3% 
Pig Iron and Steel 5,557 39,794 45,351 37.3% 
Lime 2,148 5,950 8,098 6.7% 
Pulp and Paper 5,455 292 5,747 4.7% 
Total 46,859 74,634 121,493 100.0% 
 
Figure 19 shows the impact of each subsector analyzed in the total percentage of CO2 
equivalent emissions, with the Pig Iron and Steel sectors being the most significant, 
accounting for 37% of emissions, followed by the Cement and Chemical sectors, with 
about 30% and 14% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 19 – Emissions profile by subsectors (%) 



















Figure 20 shows the subsectorial relative percentage disaggregation by energy and 
process emissions. The Cement and Chemical sectors presented the two largest volumes 
of energy emissions, with around 30%, while the Pig Iron and Steel sector leads the 




Figure 20 – Breakdown of Energy Emissions and Industry Processes 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCTI (2015) 
 
3.4. Mapping of Sectorial Policies  
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze how carbon pricing policy impacts the 
industrial sector and its subsectors. In this context, it is important to understand how such 




































policies. Taking the tax policy as an example, it is important to assess the instruments that 
already exist in the tax legislation by redirecting its use in order to give the correct stimuli 
to a production with low carbon emission. At the same time, it is urgent to eliminate the 
subsidies paid to activities that are clearly intensive in GHG emissions. 
The analysis of these impacts and trade-offs of policies, and their respective instruments, 
needs to be evaluated in more detail, aiming not only to reduce GHG emissions in the 
sector, but also to understand its impacts on the competitiveness. It is also worth noting 
that the implementation of carbon pricing policies in each of the industry subsectors can 
generate impacts in other economic sectors indirectly, given the intersectorial 
connections. In this way, the scope of sectors can be expanded as a result of possible 
indirect interactions, as will be shown in Annex C. 
Having said that, in order to analyze specifically the Brazilian industrial sector, the 
analytical framework of this thesis is organized into five policy groups, which will be 
briefly analyzed from their respective instruments: (i) sectorial stimulus policies, (ii) 
rational use of resources policies, (iii) tax policies, (iv) climate policies, and (v) 
environmental policies with emphasis on atmospheric emission control, as detailed 
below. This analytical framework was developed in the context of the Component 1 of 
the Brazilian PMR Project and in this thesis a short presentation and analysis will be 
carried out considering the five policy groups. 
 
3.4.1. Sectorial Stimulus Policies 
The sectorial stimulus policies aim to stimulate the growth and development of industrial 
subsectors, with direct effects on the subsectors of Brazilian industry. Among them, we 
can highlight the policies and instruments already in place in Brazil that mainly aim to 
promote a specific subsector, for example, through policies to support R,D&I and 
industry financing, government procurement, local content, among others. It should be 
emphasized that the sectorial stimulus discussed here does not aim at environmental goals 
and/or rational use of resources, but rather goals per se to stimulate a given sector, which 
are justified in aspects such as international trade, income and employment generation, 




In terms of policy instruments, R,D&I activities aim to extend knowledge applied to new 
products or processes, as well as to improve existing products and processes. Usually, 
such activities are carried out by research centers, companies, universities or government 
agencies. Policies to stimulate R,D&I have direct and indirect intersectorial effects - in 
practice, bringing them closer to structuring industrial policies. In recent years, this policy 
has been primarily implemented with a focus on stimulating and investing basic 
infrastructure of research, technology and innovation, as well as indirect support, through 
fiscal incentives (ALVARENGA et al., 2012), with emphasis on the participation of the 
Financier of Studies and Projects (FINEP) and the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES). 
Another instrument is public investments, for example, through government procurement. 
Studies by IPEA (2010b) show that public investments have been extensively used by 
governments in several countries - with more intense use by developed nations - for the 
implementation of public policies. In general, these are directed to at least one of the 
following objectives: incentive to industry; increased investment in R&D, combined with 
stimulation of innovation; and improvement in the provision of public services. In Brazil, 
in particular, the current bidding process for public procurement is a policy that seeks to 
reflect and even suggest changes in the state's performance in the promotion of sectorial 
incentives, through public policies. 
Lastly, the Local Content (LC) regulation instrument is highlighted, which is part of a 
federal government policy to increase the participation of the national industry in the 
supply of goods and services, generating employment and income for the country stands 
out. According to ALMEIDA (2015), LC's policies are developed with the purpose of 
achieving specific economic and social objectives, mainly through the realization of 
national investments in a given good or service, corresponding to the share of national 
industry participation in its production. It is, therefore, an industrial policy. In Brazil, the 
policy is part, in particular, of the oil and gas, and wind energy sectors. Thus, when an oil 
platform or wind turbines, for example, have a high index of local content, it means that 
the goods and services used in their construction are, to a large extent, of national origin, 





3.4.2. Rational Use of Resources Policies 
The rational use of resources policies aims to stimulate the rational use of resources, such 
as energy, water and solid waste. Their instruments include the creation of government 
programs, whose initiatives seek to promote norms and standards of energy efficiency 
and have been developed since the early 1980s. Thus, discussions at the National Institute 
of Metrology, Quality and Technology (INMETRO), for example, lead to the creation of 
the Brazilian Labeling Program (PBE), in 1984, the National Electricity Conservation 
Program (Procel), in 1985, which is managed by Eletrobras, the National Program for the 
Rationalization of the Use of Oil and Natural Gas Derivatives (Conpet), under the 
responsibility of Petrobras in 1991, and the National Institute of Energy Efficiency 
(INEE) in 1992 (LEITE, 2013). 
Through the Interministerial Ordinance No. 1877 of the MME and the MDIC, the National 
Electricity Conservation Program (Procel) was instituted, with the objective of promoting 
the rationalization of electricity production and consumption in order to eliminate waste 
and reduce costs and sectorial investments, indirectly contributing to the reduction of 
environmental impacts resulting from avoided GHG emissions. The National Program 
for the Rationalization of the Use of Oil and Natural Gas Derivatives (Conpet) was 
instituted through a Presidential Decree with the objective of promoting the development 
of an anti-waste culture in the use of non-renewable natural resources in several sectors 
of Brazil, with emphasis on residences, transports, and industries. Contrary to Procel, 
Conpet does not have an action that directly refers to the industrial sector, but affects this 
sector by establishing an equipment-labeling program, both from the perspective of the 
producer of these equipment, and from the perspective of the industrial facility that will 
adopt certified equipment. 
In the context of the rational use of resources policy, it is notable the role of ISO 14040, 
which deals with the Life Cycle Analysis of Products, as well as Law No. 12305/10 of 
August 2, 2010 (BRASIL, 2010a), also known as the National Solid Waste Policy 
(PNRS), whose main objective is to create political mechanisms to curb the inadequate 
management of solid waste. Some instruments were instituted by the PNRS, such as 
reverse logistics and recycling, which have a direct impact on the rational use of 
resources. Also within the scope of government programs, the National Water Resources 




management and seeks to develop public policies that promote the improvement of water 
quality and quantity (BRASIL, 1997). 
Lastly, in terms of instruments for this policy, we can also highlight investments in R&D 
in the area of energy efficiency, in particular by concessionaires, licensees and authorized 
companies in the energy sector, as well as a series of financing from BNDES to promote 
the rational use of resources, among which BNDES Eficiência Energética (formerly 
PROESCO), which focuses on actions that reduce the final energy consumption, and 
BNDES Finem - Eficiência Energética, focused on actions for increasing energy 
efficiency and consequently decrease final energy consumption (SITAWI, 2016). 
 
3.4.3. Tax Policies 
The tax policies aim to meet the need for resources and financing of the State, and to 
direct the behavior of economic agents based on fiscal measures. It is important to 
emphasize initially that the Brazilian fiscal system is specific and complex. The nature of 
the tribute is determined by the fact that it generates it. This is called the "generating 
event", which is one of the sources of the fiscal obligation (BRASIL, 1966). It can be 
classified as progressive, regressive or neutral (if the ratio increases, decreases or remains 
constant, respectively, with income growth), according to the variation in the relationship 
between the tax burden and the taxpayer's income (CAVALCANTI, 2006). 
The tributes are instituted with the purpose of being collected. In the meantime, part of 
their collection may be waived for other purposes of State interest in order to encourage 
certain activities (e.g., industrial technological development) or development of certain 
regions. This fiscal renunciation has the technical name of "extrafiscality", which means 
its use for purposes other than the collection (AMARAL and OLENIKE, 2003). It should 
be noted that such fiscal waiver is an indirect form of executive power to finance the 
production or research of certain sectors of the economy. As a result, governments can, 
through development policies, create incentives for particular sectors of the economy, 




It should also be noted that taxes can take different forms in the national tax system: They 
are: taxes (imposto), charges (taxas) and improvement contribution16. The tax is the 
tribute whose obligation has, in fact, a situation that is independent of any specific state 
activity, characterized by not having its collection with specific destination, and is 
destined to meet the general needs of the public administration, without ensuring to the 
taxpayer any direct income in consideration to the portion paid (BRAZIL, 1966). In Brazil 
there are federal, state and municipal taxes. The charge, on the other hand, is intended to 
remunerate specific services, effectively rendered or made available to the taxpayer, 
having as a generator the regular exercise of police power, or the actual or potential use 
of a specific and divisible public service, provided to the taxpayer or made available to 
him/her (BRASIL, 1966). Therefore, it always corresponds to a direct consideration for 
the service received or made available, even if the taxpayer does not use it, as is the case 
of municipal water and sewage services, which, when existing and put into operation, 
always entail the requirement of the corresponding rate (AMARAL and OLENIKE, 
2003). Lastly, the improvement contribution has the effect of generating real estate 
valuation that results from public works, as long as there is a causal link between the 
improvement and the accomplishment of the public works. According to Art. 81 of the 
National Tax Code, the improvement contribution charged by the Federal Government, 
the States, the Federal District or the Municipalities, within the scope of their respective 
attributions, is instituted to cover the cost of public works of which real estate valuation 
takes place, having as a total limit the expense incurred and as an individual limit the 
increase of the value that the work results for each property benefited. 
Also, there are parafiscal contributions, which differ from the charges, since their 
generating facts are not activities of the State. Nor can they be characterized as taxes, 
since they have a specific destination (GIAMBIAGI and ALÉM, 2000). The Art. 149 of 
the Federal Constitution of 1988 establishes that it is solely the responsibility of the Union 
to institute social contributions, to intervene in the economic sphere and in the interests 
of the professional or economic categories, as an instrument for action in the respective 
areas, and Paragraph 1 of this article establishes that States, Federal District and 
Municipalities may impose a contribution, charged to its employees, for the costing of 
social security schemes of a contributory and solidarity nature, for the benefit thereof. 
                                                          
16 Due to translation issues, misunderstandings often occur with relationship to different types of tributes. 




In terms of the main instruments already in place, it is possible to highlight the Ecological 
ICMS, which is a fiscal mechanism that allows municipalities access to larger portions of 
the resources collected by the states through the Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services 
(ICMS) than those that they would already be entitled to, due to compliance with certain 
environmental criteria established by state laws (MCTI, 2016). Also, the Tax on 
Industrialized Products (IPI), regulated by Decree 7212, of June 15, 2010, consists of a 
tax on all industrialized products, national or imported, historically relevant as to the 
impact on the sale of vehicles, and consequently CO2 emissions from the transportation 
sector, as well as the Motor Vehicle Property Tax (IPVA), which is a state tax levied 
annually on any owner of motor vehicles.  
It is also worth mentioning the Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain 
(CIDE), which focuses on the importation and commercialization of gasoline and its 
chains, diesel and its chains, aviation kerosene and other kerosene, fuel oils, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) and ethyl alcohol. Its contributors are the producers, formulators 
and importers of these fuels (CAVALCANTI, 2006), and the resources can be directed to 
the promotion of environmental projects. Lastly, another instrument, established from the 
Kandir Law, whose main objective is to exempt the payment of ICMS on exports of 
primary and semi-finished products or services, in addition to the use of credit for the 
acquisition of property, plant and equipment use as well as electric power (LEITÃO et 
al., 2012). 
  
3.4.4. Climate Policies 
Climate policies aim to encourage development in less carbon-intensive solutions, based 
on sustainability criteria. Some of them were analyzed in subsection 3.1., so they will be 
briefly presented and evaluated here. In terms of instruments, in 2009 the National Policy 
on Climate Change (NPCC) officialized Brazil's voluntary commitment to the UNFCCC 
to reduce GHG emissions between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected emissions by 2020, 
with a baseline of 3,236 GtCO2eq of GHG emissions by 2020. On December 9, 2010, 
Decree No. 7,390 was issued, which regulates some articles of the PNMC and imposes 
targets for GHG emissions by economic sectors. Unlike the preliminary estimates made 
by PNMC, Decree No. 7,390 establishes the baselines, and the total emissions of the 




energy sector, as the government considered the Ten-Year Energy Plan (PDE) as a 
mitigation scenario, as it includes numerous efforts to increase energy efficiency, the 
share of renewable energy and nuclear energy in the energy matrix (EPE, 2010a). 
Regarding the mitigation measures for the other sectors, there is no further detail, only 
some measures being mentioned without presenting a quantitative value of emission 
reduction (SANTOS, 2014). One of the conclusions is that the main contribution to reduce 
GHG emissions from Brazil would come from efforts to reduce deforestation in the 
Amazon (WILLS, 2013). Regarding industry specifically, Article 5 of the Decree states 
that the projection of national GHG emissions for the year 2020 is 3,236 million tCO2eq, 
according to the methodological detail described in the Annex to this Decree (BRAZIL, 
2010b). 
As a result of these commitments, several sectorial plans were established under the 
NPCC, such as Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Sector Plan for the 
Consolidation of a Low Carbon Economy In the Manufacturing Industry (Industry Plan), 
with reduction target of 5% compared to the projected 2020 scenario (equivalent to 
308.16 MtCO2eq) of industrial process and energy use emissions (MDIC, 2013). The role 
of the goal is to stimulate the improvement of the efficiency of industrial processes and 
not to curb economic growth. In summary, the plan aims to ensure the continuity of 
Brazil's competitive development and prepare the sector to face the challenges of climate 
change. Also in the context of sectorial plans, there is the plan to reduce emissions from 
the steel industry (Steel Plan), which was based on technical and economic discussions 
on increasing the competitiveness of the steel industry in a sustainable way (MCTI, 
2016a). 
In 2015, by ratifying the Paris Agreement with Brazil's NDC, the country undertook to 
implement actions and measures to support a 37% reduction in GHG emissions in 2025 
(equivalent to the emission of 1,346 million tCO2eq), and 43% in 2030 (equivalent to the 
issuance of 1,208 million tCO2eq), based on the levels recorded in 2005 (MMA, 2017). 
The document took into account initiatives for the three sectors with the largest 
participation in the Brazilian emissions profile in 2012 (Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry – LULUCF, Energy and Agriculture). 
When analyzing the treatment of the industrial sector in the Brazilian NDC, it is observed 




clean technologies and to extend measures of energy efficiency and of low carbon 
infrastructure”. This creates opportunities, which are associated with the diversity of 
measures that can be implemented, especially when considering the heterogeneity of the 
productive processes of the key sectors of the Brazilian industry. Some examples are 
modernization of industrial plants, increase of productivity, optimization of the use of 
inputs, such as raw material, energy and fuel, reduction of operational and logistic costs, 
change of energy matrix and greater competitiveness in the international scenario, among 
others. On the other hand, such generalization makes it difficult to measure the emission 
efforts to be directed to the sector, as well as the potential results of the measures adopted 
(CEBDS, 2017).  
 
3.4.5. Environmental Policies with Emphasis on Atmospheric Emission 
Control 
The environmental policies with emphasis on atmospheric emission control aim to 
manage the emission of atmospheric pollutants from fixed sources17 with a local impact 
range (NOx, SOx, Particulate Matter - PM). In this case, different instruments could be 
used singly or in combination, such as standards associated with technologies (for both 
emission control and industrial process - often referred to as best available technologies 
– BAT), emission standards for pollutants (associated with a concentration in exhaust 
concerning a fixed source), emission markets, emission taxation, etc. Brazil uses the 
command-and-control instrument of fixed source emission standards, defined by the 
National Council for the Environment (CONAMA). 
Resolution No. 436/2011 defines emission limits established for some of the industrial 
segments comprehended in this thesis, among them: pulp, aluminum, chemicals, steel, 
cement and glass, and the generation of heat. 
 
                                                          
17 They are those that occupy a relatively limited area, allowing a direct evaluation in the source. The 
sources classified as fixed refer to the activities of the industry of transformation, mining and production 




3.4.6. Summary of Policies and Instruments for the Industrial Sector 
In order to systematize the main characteristics of the policies and instruments analyzed, 




Table 9 – Summary of Policies and Instruments for the Industrial Sector 
Source: Own elaboration  




To promote the growth of a 
specific industrial sub-
sector, through BNDES 
financing programs, 
government purchases, and 
Local Content policies 
Support Policies for R,D&I 
and Industry Financing 
Support R,D&I and industry financing with the aim of stimulating the growth of economic sectors. Focus in support 
of FINEP and BNDES. However, such instruments, in some cases, encourage carbon-intensive sectors.  
Public Investments 
The benefits can be summarized as the induction of a demand for products with more advanced technologies, less 
socio-environmental impact and the reduction of the risk inherent to R&D activities in the country. 
Local Content Policies 
It consists in directing the national investments applied in a particular good or service, aiming at the development of 
the participation of the national industry. Examples in Brazil: upstream oil and gas and wind turbines. 
Rational Use of 
Resources 
Policies 
To stimulate policies for the 
rational use of resources in 
the country, focusing on the 
industrial sector, based on 
incentives for government 
programs, investments in 
R&D for energy efficiency 
and BNDES financing 
programs 
Government Programs 
Brazil has, for at least three decades, programs of rational use of resources, among them: Procel, Conpet, PNRS, 
Reverse Logistics, ISO 14,040, PNRH, among others. 
Investment in R&D for 
Energy Efficiency 
Concessionaires and licensees of public electricity distribution services shall apply, on an annual basis, the minimum 
percentages of 0.5% for both research and development and for energy efficiency programs in the supply and final use 
of energy. 
BNDES Financing Programs Main lines of financing: BNDES Energy Efficiency (former PROESCO) and BNDES Finem - Energy Efficiency. 
Tax Policies 
To direct the behavior of 
the economic agents to the 
consumption/production of 
goods/services less carbon-
intensive, from tax 
measures 
Taxes for Mitigation of 
Climate Change 
Examples of tax measures: Ecological ICMS, IPI, IPVA, CIDE, among others. It is also worth noting that the Tax 
Reform process, currently under discussion in the National Congress, offers a unique opportunity to introduce tax 
instruments aimed at achieving environmental policy objectives. In this sense, it is necessary to evaluate the particular 
cases, but it is possible to highlight possible opportunities. For example, there is no specific tax regime for paper and 
cellulose, glass and lime. It is also worth mentioning the need for the tax policy to be aligned with the issue of pricing 
(for example, the reduction of IPI for automobiles, encouraging the purchase of cars). 
Kandir Law 
Exemption from ICMS payment on exports of primary and semi-finished products or services, in addition to the use 
of credit for the acquisition of both fixed assets for use and electric energy. 
Climate 
Policies 
To reduce GHG emissions 
in order to meet the 
commitments of PNMC 
and, more recently, 
Brazilian NDC 
National Policy on Climate 
Change (PNMC) 
Quantitative targets for reducing GHG emissions for: LULUCF, energy, agriculture and industrial processes and 
waste treatment. However, there is no breakdown at the subsector level of the industry. 
Industry Plan 
It aims to prepare the domestic industry for the future scenario in which carbon productivity will be as important as 
labor productivity and other factors to define the international competitiveness of the economy. However, it has a 





It seeks to subsidize the development of public policies to encourage the use of sustainable charcoal from planted 
forests for use in the steel industry to promote emissions reduction, avoid deforestation of native forests and increase 
the Brazilian competitiveness of the iron and steel industry in the context of the low carbon economy. 
Brazilian NDC  
Reduce by 37% in GHG emissions in 2025 (equivalent to the emission of 1,346 million tCO2eq), and 43% in 2030 
(equivalent to the emission of 1,208 million tCO2eq), based on the levels recorded in 2005. This instrument currently 







To control emissions of air 
pollutants from fixed 
sources with local impact 
coverage (NOx, SOx, MP) 
Pollutant emission standard 
CONAMA Resolutions define emission standards of NOx, MP, SOx for fixed sources (natural gas boilers, fuel oil and 




4. Assessing Domestic Vulnerability and International Trade Exposure of CPI 
Domestic carbon pricing policies may impose adverse competitiveness risks on energy-
intensive firms and industries competing against foreign firms that may bear a lower or 
zero price on carbon (ALDY, 2016). The risks of competitiveness effects include adverse 
economic outcomes, such as reduced production, lower employment, and higher net 
imports, besides adverse environmental outcomes, with the shifting of emissions-
intensive activities to unregulated foreign markets (carbon leakage). For these reasons, it 
is fundamental to understand and evaluate the impacts of creating a CPI on the 
competitiveness of the industrial sector. 
Thus, this chapter is divided into two sections, where the first one focus on a qualitative 
assessment while the second one focuses on the methodologies and quantitative 
assessment criteria from some jurisdictions, describing, evaluating and comparing their 
indicators. After that, these indicators are applied to the Brazilian industry sector, in order 
to assess the risk of carbon leakage in the subsector level. 
 
4.1. Qualitative Assessment  
Initially, the interaction analysis between existing sectorial polices and CPIs is carried 
out, following to the evaluation their different designs in terms of allocation methods 
(ETS case) and recycling ways (carbon tax case).  As in the section 3.4., this qualitative 
assessment was also developed in the context of the Component 1 of the Brazilian PMR 
Project, so the effects on sectorial policies and the impacts from different CPI designs 
will be discussed and analyzed. Details about each qualitative assessment, as well as the 
justifications for their development, are presented in the following subsections. 
 
4.1.1. Effects on Sectorial Policies 
In this subsection, a short qualitative discussion on the impact of carbon pricing on the 
goals set by existent sectorial policies. Such analysis is justified by the need of aligning 
selected policies with those linked to carbon pricing. Still within the qualitative 
framework, the following effects will be identified: (i) effects on the agents’ 




power; and (iii) effects on the national level of emissions of GHG. In this way, it is 
possible to build a matrix of political interaction and carbon pricing, where the 
interactions can be classified as positive, negative, neutral, or uncertain. 
 
4.1.1.1. Sectorial Stimulus Policies 
Policies to stimulate sectors, especially financing programs and R,D&I, use instruments 
that tend to push industrial competitiveness. However, whether this will lead to lower 
prices to the end consumer will depend on the sector capacity to absorb competitiveness 
gains into profits. This occurs, for instance, in sectors whose prices are formed in the 
international market. The effect in terms of emissions associated to this policy, on the 
other hand, is uncertain, as it depends on which sectors, processes and products that were 
favored.  
Investments in infrastructure, though, can have positive effects either on the 
competitiveness or purchasing power. This result is achieved by the reduction of logistic 
costs and improvement of market conditions for the industry. Industrial emissions, in this 
case, would not be directly impacted, although emissions in the transportation sector may 
be reduced. 
Concerning the local content (LC) policy, despite the possibility of spurring the 
development of new products and processes, which could enhance competitiveness and 
reduce prices, the observed results for this policy instrument in Brazil show that it was 
not successful as it should have been (ALMEIDA, 2015). Thus, although it secured a 
piece of the market for Brazilian industrial products, it did not boost competitiveness in 
these sectors per se. On the other hand, this led to higher production costs that were 
translated into higher cost pass-through. Finally, whereas the LC policy ended up 
encouraging energy-intensive sectors, its effect on the emission was negative, meaning 
that it caused an increase of emissions.  However, it is important to make clear that LC 
has not only impacts on sectors like oil and gas and wind power, but especially in sectors 
that demand products from these sectors. 
Carbon pricing could generate resources to support industrial sectors, causing positive 
outcomes for them through the identified instruments. Notwithstanding, the impacts on 




effects and subsectorial intensity, as well as on the allocation mechanisms – the usage of 
emission allowances can negatively affect sectorial stimulation, for instance – and tax 
recycling, the reason why this impact is rather seen as uncertain. 
 
4.1.1.2. Rational Use of Resources Policies 
Policies of rational resource use encompass instruments that seek to increase efficiency 
in the usage of energy and/or materials. This includes both the rational use of electricity 
and fuels, as well as the better use of water and waste recycling. Such efficiency gains are 
achieved through government programs, R&D investments, and special funding lines. By 
promoting the rational use of resources and raising the productivity of the factors of 
production, these instruments result in the competitiveness of industrial sectors by 
increasing efficiency and reducing costs. These competitiveness gains, in turn, can be 
passed on to product prices, having a positive effect on the purchasing power of the 
population. Finally, by promoting energy efficiency, such programs also help to reduce 
GHG emissions by the industrial sector. 
Carbon pricing has positive impacts for all analyzed subsectors, since this instrument is 
aligned to the policy of encouraging the rational use of resources, especially the non-
renewable ones. 
 
4.1.1.3. Tax Policies 
Tax policies seek to guide the behavior of economic agents through taxation measures 
that alter the relative prices of products. However, tax policy has been used in Brazil 
mainly as a stimulus policy through incentives and tax exemptions. Thus, despite the 
impacts on the government budget, these policies have had positive effects on the 
competitiveness of industrial sectors and on the purchasing power of the population. On 
the other hand, the effects on emissions have been negative, since such exemptions fall 





Although carbon pricing contributes to drive agents’ behavior, tax policies in Brazil, as 
mentioned before, have been focusing on tax exemption for energy-intensive sectors18. 
For this reason, it was estimated that carbon pricing has an uncertain effect on the policy 
goals, and it could have positive impacts on the government’s revenue, but also neutral 
or even negative, in the case of long-term tax exemptions. 
 
4.1.1.4. Climate Policies 
Climate policies encompass instruments that aim to reduce GHG emissions in Brazil. In 
theory, these policies and their instruments would have a positive effect on emissions, 
what is their primary objective. In general, however, it is not possible to assess the effects 
of some of these instruments on the competitiveness of industrial sectors and on the 
purchasing power of the population, as there is still no clear definition of the mechanisms 
to should be used to achieve the very goal of reducing emissions. Having said this, the 
effects on competitiveness and purchasing power are still uncertain. 
The exceptions would be the Industry and Steel Industry Plans, in which there is an 
explicit statement of looking forward to maintaining, or even increasing, the sectors 
competitiveness by reducing GHG emissions. Although these competitiveness gains 
could generally be passed on in form of lower prices (creating a positive effect on 
purchasing power), in the case of segments with prices formed in the international 
markets this would not occur. This is the case, for example, of the Steel Plan. 
Regarding the Brazilian NDC, although it has a positive effect on emissions, the impacts 
on competitiveness and purchasing power are not clear. On the one hand, NDC predicts 
an increase in energy efficiency, which could stimulate competitiveness, with possible 
price pass-through. On the other hand, mitigation options in the energy production and 
transformation sectors (such as exploration and production – E&P, refining, electricity 
generation and biofuels) can raise the price of energy for the industrial sector, having a 
negative effect on competitiveness and purchasing power. 
In this case, carbon pricing is one of the possible mechanisms to meet the established 
policy goals. Carbon pricing has also a positive impact on policies goals, considering the 
                                                          




commitments agreed upon by the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) and, more 
recently, by the Brazilian NDC in order to reduce GHG emissions, and the need to discuss 
goals and funding to achieve policies and plans.  
 
4.1.1.5. Environmental Policies with Emphasis on Atmospheric 
Emission Control 
Environmental policies to control atmospheric emissions of local pollutants aim to 
improve air quality, especially in urban centers. The effect of such policies is generally 
negative on competitiveness, purchasing power and emissions. This is due to the fact that 
most of the technologies to control local pollution generate costs for industrial plants, 
despite generating benefits in terms of better local air quality. This is the case with end-
of-pipe equipment to control pollution, as well as the specification of fuels. 
Similarly, as end-of-pipe equipment to control pollution entails energy penalties (energy 
consumption of such equipment), there would be a negative effect on GHG emissions 
since industrial plants would increase their energy consumption. Likewise, a policy of 
specifying fuels in refineries19 would increase both the cost of fuel and the GHG 
emissions associated with its production (SZKLO and SCHAEFFER, 2007). 
Interestingly, the opposite is not true. Emissions of local pollutants are largely associated 
with the combustion of fossil fuels, so policies to reduce GHG emissions would have a 
co-benefit in terms of reducing the emission of local pollutants. 
Exceptions have to be considered, though. In the case of controlling local air pollutants 
based on the control of combustion (as opposed to the specification of fuels and end-of-
pipe technologies), there could be a simultaneous reduction of local and global emissions. 
According to the project "Mitigation Options of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Key 
Sectors in Brazil", some measures of this type can be cost-effective, generating favorable 
effects for competitiveness and, eventually, purchasing power (MCTI, 2016). This is the 
example of low-NOx burners, where the NOx emission reduction is due to a more 
                                                          
19 Although the refining sector is not being analyzed among the other sectors in this thesis, it can pass on 
the costs of fuel specification to consumer sectors, including the industry, increasing its production costs 




efficient burning generated by the air-fuel ratio adjustment, which in turn increases the 
efficiency of the combustion leading to a lower fuel consumption. 
Carbon pricing has positive impacts for all subsectors, as it provides greater control of 
atmospheric emissions by air pollutants coming from fixed sources and with local impact 
coverage (NOx, SOx, MP) by the agents. 
 
4.1.1.6. Summary of CPI on Sectorial Policies 
Table 10 summarizes the impact of the five policy goals considering variables like 
competitiveness, end consumer’s purchasing power, and national GHG emission by using 





Table 10 – Summary of CPI impacts on sectorial policies 
Source: Own elaboration  
Policy 
Effects of Interactions 




Competitiveness Purchase Power GHG Emissions 
Sectorial 
Stimulus Policies 
Uncertain: Carbon pricing 
could provide resources to 
support sectors. Impact 
will depend on the 
relationship between 
subsector effects and 
intensity 
 
Support Policies for 




Positive: This is the prime goal of this 
policy 
Uncertain: It depends on the 
producer's ability to maintain 
margin (ensuring the generation 
of new products at lower cost, 
such as pharmaceuticals) 
 
 
Uncertain: Depends on the focus 
of the RD&I and funding 
Public Investments  
Positive: Investments in infrastructure 
(e.g., reduction of logistics costs) 
Positive: Infrastructure 
investments can reduce costs, 
leading to lower prices 
 
Neutral: Neutral impact on 
industry 
Local Content Policy 
Positive: Does not increase the 
competitiveness of sectors per se, but 
it guarantees market 
Negative: In the short term, 
negative. In the long term, it 
depends on the effect of the 
policy 
 
Negative: Tends to stimulate 
energy-intensive segments 
Rational Use of 
Resources 
Policies 
Positive: Positive impacts 
for all subsectors, as they 
encourage the rational use 




Positive: They can promote more 
efficient processes, improving 
efficiency and reducing costs 
 
 
Positive: Efficiency gains can be 




Positive: Synergistic effect 
between energy efficiency and 
combustion emissions 
 
Investment in RD&I 
and Energy Efficiency  Positive: stimulates the productivity 
of the factors of production Financing Programs 
of BNDES  
Tax Policies 
Uncertain: Carbon pricing 
helps drive agent 
behavior. However, tax 
policies have been 
focusing on exemption for 
energy-intensive sectors  
Taxes to Mitigate 
Climate Change 
 
Positive: Tax incentives 
 
Positive: Fiscal stimulus can 
reduce the price of the product to 
the consumer 
 
Negative: Focused on energy-
intensive sectors (e.g., Kandir 
Law) 
Climate Policies 
Positive: Carbon pricing 
is one of the possible 
mechanisms to meet the 
goals of this policy 
National Policy on 
Climate Change  
Uncertain: There are no instruments 
defined that can directly affect 
competitiveness 
Uncertain: There are no 
instruments defined that can 





 Industry Plan 
Positive: Explicitly, it seeks to reduce 





competitiveness (doable by 
increasing productivity of the factors 
of production) 
Positive: Explicitly, it seeks to 
avoid reduction of consumption 
due to higher prices 
 
 
Positive: This is the prime goal of 
this policy 
 Steel Plan 
Positive: Explicitly, it seeks to 
increase the competitiveness of the 
iron and steel industry 
Neutral: Prices formed in the 
international market 
Brazilian NDC  
Uncertain: Although it mentions 
energy efficiency, it can raise the cost 
of electricity 
Uncertain: Can raise the cost of 








Positive: Positive impacts 





Negative: Control costs (except by 




Negative: Costs can be passed on 
to the price 
 
 
Negative: Energy penalty for end-
of-pipe control equipment 







4.1.2. Effects from Different CPI Designs 
This subsection will also conduct a qualitative analysis on the impact of different CPI designs 
- considering variations in allocation methods (in the ETS case) and recycling forms (in the 
carbon tax case) - on the industrial subsectors in terms of (i) competitiveness of the sectors; (ii) 
social impacts, from the point of view of effects on consumers' purchasing power; and (iii) 
national GHG emission levels. The goal of this analysis is to construct a matrix that evaluates 
the effects of the different CPI designs on the industrial subsectors, being able to be classified 
as positive, negative, neutral or uncertain, in order to follow the same classification of the 
previous subsection. 
 
4.1.2.1. ETS: Allocation Methods  
The different forms of allowances allocation follow the CPLC (2016) pattern, aligned to the 
previous discussion presented in the “Mitigation Policies for Carbon Leakage” subsection 
(2.3.2). They are: auctioning; grandfathering, sectorial benchmark; and output based. The forms 
of allocation will be briefly discussed in light of the effects on industrial sectors 
competitiveness, purchasing power and GHG emissions, and finally, the interaction matrix will 
be presented, summarizing the analyzes. 
Regarding sectorial competitiveness, the impacts were analyzed based on the economic 
characterization carried out in section 3.2., which considers the export coefficients, as well as 
the Gross Value of Production (GVP) and the Value Added (VA) of the subsector. The 
allocation of permits can generate both losses of competitiveness for sectors with lower capacity 
to pass through costs, depending on the price formation in the international market, and 
opportunities for extraordinary profits, for sectors with a higher market concentration index.  
Having said that, such impacts on the competitiveness can affect consumers’ purchasing power, 
which is the second point assessed by the interaction matrix. Concentrated sectors and with low 
external vulnerability are better able to pass through prices of inelastic products, without market 





The third impact assessed is the national GHG emissions. In this case, unlike carbon taxation - 
which will be evaluated in the next subsection -, the impacts on GHG emissions may be 
uncertain or, possibly, neutral, according to the permit distribution criterion. 
Regarding the allocation of permits through an auction system, the impacts on competitiveness 
were evaluated as negative in all cases, since this allocation method represents an additional 
cost for subsectors being held down by external competition. As for the impacts on consumers' 
purchasing power, they were evaluated as neutral in most cases, because the price is formed in 
the international market. The exception is the case of the cement, lime and glass sectors, where 
the impact is negative since such sectors face low external competition. 
The assessment is positive for all subsectors considering national GHG emissions, in the case 
of the allocation mechanism of allowances by auction. It should be noted that in a market in 
equilibrium, as discussed in section 2.1., the price resulting from the auction reflects the 
marginal cost of the externality (GHG emissions), being equal the optimal level of a Pigouvian 
tax (t* = CMg), by incorporating the difference between the marginal social cost (which 
considers the external costs of production) and the marginal cost of the firm (i.e., its supply 
curve). In this sense, international experience highlights the need to include additional 
mechanisms to ensure price stability and market equilibrium. According to the discussion 
presented in section 2.2., in Europe, for example, EU ETS sought to reduce price volatility by 
including rules that automatically change the auctioned volumes when the volume of permits 
is exceeded, while California included lower limits and price signals to assure the correct price 
signal and maintain incentives for mitigation. 
International experience also shows that the equilibrium in the allowance market is also affected 
by free permit donations (grandfathering). Such donation does not generate revenues that 
would be priced in the allowance market (double dividend, similar to the carbon tax case), 
becoming a high social cost and not reflecting the heterogeneity among the polluting agents 
that participate in the market (GOULDER et al., 1996). Therefore, in terms of competitiveness, 
purchasing power and GHG emissions, the impacts are necessarily uncertain, except for the 
offsets that will be dealt with later, in particular in chapter 5. However, it is important to draw 
attention to the fact that, since donating the emission certificates rather than charging for them 
does not create an extra burden economic agents (auctioning), this policy design has been 
widely adopted at the beginning of the implementation of carbon markets, as shown in the 




impact on such sectors right at the beginning of the CPI operation, evolving over time towards 
the charging for the certificates (auctioning).  
Besides, the free allocation of permits requires attention. Free allowances should ensure 
flexibility for new agents to participate in the market. In the EU ETS, for example, there is a 
fund for financing clean technologies (NER 300) that is funded by emissions permits and it acts 
as a reserve fund for 300 million new permits (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017). 
Considering the method of permits allocation based on the past production of benchmark 
companies (sectorial benchmark), the impact on the competitiveness of the subsectors 
Cement, Lime and Glass, and Steel was assessed as positive, since the national average of this 
sector is below world average specific consumption. The evaluation is also positive for the 
subsector Paper and pulp, which shows a competitive advantage for its use of biomass as input. 
For the Aluminum subsector, the impact on competitiveness is neutral, since its specific 
consumption is equivalent to the international average. However, for the Chemical subsector, 
there is a negative impact due to the existing concentration of this subsector in segments with 
low added value and high-energy intensity. 
Still regarding the sectorial benchmark, the impacts on purchasing power were evaluated as 
neutral, due to price formation in the international market. However, for the Cement, Lime and 
Glass subsectors, the impact is uncertain since the benchmark permit allocation may generate 
(implicit) cost or subsidy, depending on the benchmark definition. Regarding national GHG 
emissions, the impacts are mostly uncertain, as they are definition-dependent. There are, 
however, positive impacts identified for the Chemical subsector, but neutral effects associated 
to the Pulp and Paper subsector. It is important to note, however, that a benchmark cap-and-
trade system should always seek to use benchmarks that generate some mitigation efforts by 
the sectors involved in order to achieve a reduction in total emissions. 
Considering the emissions intensity-based allocation method (output based), that is, sectorial 
or based on the company's historical values, assessed together with current production data, it 
is seen that the impact on competitiveness, purchasing power and the emissions, for all cases, 
is rather uncertain, since the criterion used to distribute the permits may generate costs or 
subsidy (implicit) to the subsectors. This result depends on the definition of the production 
criterion, for example, the period or year associated with it. If one defines a period of time (or 




to handle its current emissions; otherwise, it will show an emission credit that the sector can 
negotiate, what will represent an implicit subsidy. 
Table 11 presents a summary concerning the impacts, achieved by a qualitative assessment, of 
the permits allocation on the competitiveness of the industrial segments analyzed, on the final 




Table 11 – Impact of the allocation methods on the competitiveness, purchasing power and GHG emissions of the industrial segments analyzed 
Source: Own elaboration 
Allocation Methods Sector 
CPI Impacts 
Competitiveness Purchase Power GHG Emissions 
Auctioning20 
Aluminum 
Negative: Additional cost. External 
competition 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Positive: Reduction of GHG 
emissions  
Cement, Lime and Glass Negative: Low margins. Additional cost. 
Negative: Low margins. Pass-through 
of costs to prices (low external 
competition)  
Chemicals 
Negative: Additional cost. External 
competition 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Negative: Price formed in the 
international market 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Pulp and Paper 
Negative: Additional cost. External 
competition (Pulp) 
Negative: High Brazilian market share 




Uncertain: The permission distribution criteria can generate cost or subsidy (implicit) 
Cement, Lime and Glass 
Chemicals 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Pulp and Paper 
Sectorial Benchmark  Aluminum 
Neutral: Segment equivalent to the 
international average 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Uncertain: It depends on 
benchmark setting 
                                                          
20 The impacts of the auction on competitiveness were evaluated as negative, since at first there will be an additional cost related to the price of the allowances on economic 




Allocation Methods Sector 
CPI Impacts 
Competitiveness Purchase Power GHG Emissions 
Cement, Lime and Glass 
Positive: The national standard of the 
segment is below the world average 
specific consumption 
Uncertain: It can generate cost or 
(implicit) subsidy 
Uncertain: Some installations 
may not reduce emissions 
Chemicals 
Negative: Concentration in segments of 
low VA and high energy intensity21 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Positive: Reduction of GHG 
emissions 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Positive: The national standard of the 
segment is favored by the consumption of 
charcoal 
Neutral: Price formed in the 
international market 
Uncertain: It depends on 
benchmark setting 
Pulp and Paper 
Brazilian competitive advantage for the 
biomass input 
Neutral: Advantage absorbed as margin 
for the producer 




Uncertain: The permission distribution criteria can generate cost or subsidy (implicit) 
Cement, Lime and Glass 
Chemicals 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Pulp and Paper 
 
                                                          




4.1.2.2. Carbon Tax: Recycling Alternatives  
The different forms of recycling, that is, different destinations for tax revenues, also follow the 
pattern presented in CPLC (2016). These are: reduction of other taxes; support to families; 
support the industry; investment in climate funds; and the budget of the central government. 
Recycling methods will be briefly discussed in light of the effects on the competitiveness of 
industrial sectors, purchasing power and GHG emissions, considering the specific effects on 
the subsectors analyzed. 
Considering the sectorial competitiveness, the impacts were analyzed based on the economic 
characterization presented in section 3.2., which takes into account the sectorial export 
coefficients as well the Gross Value of Production (VBP) and the Added Value (VA) of the 
subsector. It is important to note that carbon taxation leads to additional risk of vulnerability 
due to the loss of the domestic market in import parity or loss of market for exporters in the 
export parity. 
In turn, the impacts of taxation on competitiveness may affect consumers' purchasing power, 
the second aspect evaluated in interaction matrix (Table 12). Therefore, a concentrated sector 
with low external vulnerability may impose higher prices onto a less elastic product to prices, 
without losing market share. That is, the company can impose a price markup, transferring the 
carbon cost to the consumer. 
The third impact evaluated is the national GHG emissions. In this case, because it is the first 
goal of carbon taxation, the impacts were seen as positive in all situations. Nevertheless, in the 
case of cap-and-trade, it is possible that the effects on GHG emissions could be uncertain or, 
possibly, neutral. 
Recycling carbon tax through the reduction of other taxes may reach tax revenue neutrality, 
i.e. the amount of money collected thorugh a carbon tax is equivalent to the exemption of other 
taxes. Compensation through the reduction of notably regressive taxes, such as ICMS, PIS and 
COFINS, has advantages such as reducing tax distortions related to the tax burden, improving 
the efficiency of the tax system, and encouraging economic activity (in line with the discussion 
on Tax Reform). The reduction of other taxes, however, could reduce the effectiveness of 
carbon taxation, generating distortions among agents, according to the policy design (CPLC, 





For carbon intensive sectors, such as Cement, Lime, Glass and Steel, it has been assessed that 
tax neutrality will hardly exist. Therefore, the impact of carbon taxation with recycling through 
the reduction of other taxes could have negative effects on the competitiveness of these 
subsectors. In low carbon intensive subsectors, such as Pulp and Paper, whose main energy 
source is derived from biomass, carbon pricing may have less impact than tax reductions, 
generating positive effects on its competitiveness. The effects on the competitiveness of the 
subsectors Pig Iron and Steel and Chemicals are uncertain and will depend, in addition to the 
carbon intensity, on the value of the tax. Also, in the case of the chemical industry, the 
heterogeneity of the sector shows that the effects on competitiveness vary according to the 
segment analyzed. In terms of purchasing power of consumers, the effects depend mainly on 
the ability of these subsectors to pass on costs to final consumers. Such a form of recycling has 
a neutral effect for most subsectors, as prices are formed internationally (with the exception of 
Cement, Lime and Glass). This effect is uncertain in the case of the chemical segment, since 
final consumption has a crucial role in some particular cases. 
Carbon taxation, when its revenue is intended to go to households, can be done through direct 
transfers, by reducing taxes on households (for example, individual income tax - IIT), through 
subsidies or welfare assistance programs, similar to Bolsa Família). It can reduce the impacts 
of the increased cost of carbon taxes on household purchasing power, for example by reducing 
the economic impact of electricity price and its primary sources, such as coal. 
Also, it can generate an increase in demand, having a positive effect on sectors whose 
proportion of sales of final goods is relevant. Regarding competitiveness, it was seen that 
subsectors with high intermediate consumption and export sales might suffer negative impacts, 
such as Cement, Lime, Glass, and Pig Iron and Steel. For the subsectors Pulp and Paper, and 
Chemicals, the impacts are uncertain, due to different weight distribution of intermediate and 
final consumption, and exports, respectively, in sales. Regarding purchasing power, the impacts 
of carbon tax revenue transferred to households are, of course, always positive in all subsectors 
evaluated. A caveat about this type of revenue recycling is that it may generate indirect 
emissions increase through a rebound effect. This happens when the increased family income 
leads to higher consumption and, thus, higher emissions. 
Carbon tax revenue aimed at supporting the industry can be accomplished through 
production and investment financing, tax credits, support to R,D&I, or through energy 




carbon taxation is an advantage. However, it is necessary to ensure that tax recycling does not 
cause distortions and reduces the competitiveness of specific subsectors to the detriment of 
others. Due to the many available forms of support to the industry, it has been assessed that the 
impacts on competitiveness are uncertain in all cases. Although there are notably positive 
effects (such as innovation in more efficient products and processes), in the Brazilian case, this 
support has historically been associated with tax exemptions and tax credits (MACIEL, 2010). 
Therefore, we see that, the way in which the recycling carried out via support to the industry is 
made is of paramount importance for the competitiveness of the sectors. In any case, the impacts 
on the competitiveness of the sectors more intensive in carbon can be expected to be greater 
because of their greater exposure to carbon taxes. 
The impacts of the carbon tax to support the analyzed industrial subsectors on purchasing power 
vary from uncertain to neutral, according to each subsector. The uncertainty comes from the 
weight of final consumption on sales, for some subsectors, such as Chemical and Pulp and 
Paper. For the other subsectors, the impact on consumers' purchasing power, due to price 
formation taking place in the international market, was neutral. 
Revenue coming from carbon taxation can be channeled to investments in climate funds that 
target research and innovation in energy efficiency, infrastructure development or even by 
establishing international commitments (climate finance). 
Regarding competitiveness, the effects depend essentially on the destination of the fund, which 
is why its impacts are uncertain. Nevertheless, the impacts on the competitiveness of sectors 
more intense in carbon can be expected to be greater because of their greater exposure to carbon 
taxes. The impacts on purchasing power vary from uncertain to neutral, according to each 
subsector. As in the case of industry support, the uncertainty is also due to the weight of final 
consumption on sales, for some subsectors, such as Chemical and Pulp and Paper. For the other 
subsectors, the impact on consumers' purchasing power was assessed as neutral due to the price 
formation taking place in the international market. 
Finally, carbon tax revenue is allocated to the central government budget, and it can be 
allocated to several areas, according to the priority set for the public spending. Although this 
approach seeks flexibility in the tax revenue expenditure, the lack of transparency and control 




is destined to the central government budget, the environmental benefit of carbon pricing may 
not be clear (CPLC, 2016). 
Concerning competitiveness, the effects are negative for all subsectors analyzed, since tax 
revenue would hardly be used for improvements in the competitiveness of industrial subsectors. 
The impacts on purchasing power are neutral for most of the subsectors, given the price 
formation taking place in the international market. There are negative impacts identified in the 
case of Cement, Lime and Glass, since prices are formed domestically. There is some 
uncertainty regarding the impacts on purchasing power in Chemical, due to the heterogeneity 
of segments within the chemical industry. 
From the debate on the impacts on competitiveness, purchasing power and emissions due to the 
different forms of recycling, Table 12 summarizes now the effects of carbon taxation on the 





Table 12 – Impact of the recycling ways on the competitiveness, purchasing power and GHG emissions of the industrial segments analyzed 
Source: Own elaboration 
Recycling Ways Subsector 
CPI Impacts 
Competitiveness Purchase Power GHG Emissions 
Reduction of other 
taxes 
Aluminum 
Uncertain: It depends on the intensity of 
carbon and the tax value  
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Positive: Reduction 
of GHG emissions 
Cement, Lime and Glass 
Negative: Intensive carbon sector, so tax 
neutrality will hardly exist 
Negative: Cost can be passed through to the 
consumer 
Chemicals 
Uncertain: It depends on the intensity of 
carbon and the tax value 
Uncertain: High weight of final consumption in some 
specialty chemicals 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Uncertain: It depends on the intensity of 
carbon and the tax value 
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Pulp and Paper 
Positive: Main energetic derived from 
biomass (carbon pricing may have less 
impact than reduction of taxes) 
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Support to families 
Aluminum 
Negative: High weight of intermediate 
consumption and exports in sales 
Positive: The main objective of this recycling way is 
to positively impact the household purchasing power 
Positive: Reduction 
of GHG emissions 
 
Cement, Lime and Glass 
Negative: High weight of intermediate 
consumption in sales 
Chemicals 
Uncertain: High weight of final 
consumption in some specialty chemicals 
Pig Iron and Steel 
Negative: High weight of intermediate 




Recycling Ways Subsector 
CPI Impacts 
Competitiveness Purchase Power GHG Emissions 
Pulp and Paper 
Uncertain: Pulp: high weight of exports in 
sales; Paper: high weight in intermediate 
and final consumption in sales 
Support the Industry 
Aluminum Uncertain: Due to the plurality of forms of 
industry support, for example, production 
and investment financing, tax credits, PD & 
I support or through energy efficiency 
programs. It is also necessary to ensure that 
recycling ways of the tax does not cause 
distortions and reduces the competitiveness 
of specific subsectors to the detriment of 
other 
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Positive: Reduction 
of GHG emissions 
Cement, Lime and Glass Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Chemicals 
Uncertain: High weight of final consumption in some 
specialty chemicals  
Pig Iron and Steel Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Pulp and Paper 
Uncertain: High weight in intermediate and final 
consumption in sales 
Investment in climate 
funds 
Aluminum 
Uncertain: It depends on the destination of 
the fund  
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Positive: Reduction 
of GHG emissions 
Cement, Lime and Glass Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Chemicals 
Uncertain: High weight of final consumption in some 
specialty chemicals 
Pig Iron and Steel Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 




Negative: Negative effect, because tax 
revenue would hardly be reversed for 
improvements in the competitiveness of 
industrial sub-sectors 
Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 
Positive: Reduction 
of GHG emissions 
Cement, Lime and Glass Negative: Given that prices are formed domestically 
Chemicals 
Uncertain: Due to the heterogeneity of segments of 
this industry 
Pig Iron and Steel Neutral: Prices formed in the international market 






4.2. Quantitative Assessment  
This section analyses the methodologies and quantitative assessment criteria from some 
jurisdictions, describing, evaluating and comparing their indicators, especially focused on 
carbon cost, emissions intensity, and trade intensity. Subsequently, these indicators are applied 
to the Brazilian industry sector, in order to assess the risk of carbon leakage at the subsector 
level. 
 
4.2.1. Methodologies for Analyzing Carbon Leakage Exposure 
Both quantitative and qualitative tests can be used to assess the risk of carbon leakage for 
different sectors (MARCU et al., 2014). This section examines the quantitative options 
available to test whether the risk factors are in a range that would indicate a risk of carbon 
leakage.  
In general, quantitative tests use factors that can be quantified and result in a number that can 
be tested against benchmarks. Two main categories of quantitative tests are currently identified: 
 Carbon-related risk tests; 
 Trade exposure-related risk tests. 
Each of these two categories can be further divided into approaches with different 
characteristics as will be shown in the next subsections. 
These risk tests can be used alone or in a combination (i.e. multiple tests bundled together). 
Risk tests for carbon and trade intensity have often been used together to provide a better 
coverage and capture of the combined effects of carbon leakage risk factors. When risk tests 
are used in combinations, the thresholds are usually lower, as the tests are multidimensional 
and are intended to capture multiple conditions (MARCU et al., 2014). Also, quantitative and 
qualitative risk tests can be also combined. 
There are several design features of risk tests that must also be taken into account when 
assessing risk tests. One design feature is whether the carbon leakage risk test employs an in/out 
(i.e. a sector is either at risk, or not at all), or a tiered approach. An in/out approach determines 






if the sector falls under the threshold (WANG et al., 2017). With a tiered approach several risk 
levels are defined and compensation could be distributed in proportion to the risk level. 
Another design feature that needs to be considered is the flexibility of the mechanism to adapt 
to changes in key parameters, including how it is updated. In general, mechanisms can be 
reviewed periodically and/or be triggered by market participants. This must be balanced with 
the need for stability for investment purposes. 
Lastly, data availability and data aggregation are other important design features used in 
assessing risk tests. The underlying data for the risk tests may not always be publicly available, 
which creates problems with transparency. Moreover, data aggregation for sectors could be 
done at different levels and therefore sectors and risk tests may not be comparable across 
schemes (SATO et al., 2015). 
The remaining parts of this section will discuss the different risk tests that are used in some 
jurisdictions, and then a comparison among them will be carried out considering some features. 
The choice of these jurisdictions was due to (i) its usage by different CPIs in the industrial 
sector, (ii) the complexity of the methodology, and (iii) for being considered methodologies 
already established, often used as a basis and/or reference for new methodologies in 
development. 
 
4.2.1.1. European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
One of the central debates surrounding the design of the EU ETS was the approach to address 
carbon leakage concerns (SATO et al., 2015). Correctly identifying the economic activities 
exposed to the risk of carbon leakage represents the first step in mitigating the risk effectively. 
The revised version (2009/29/EC) of the EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) and the Carbon 
Leakage Decision (2010) established the assessment rules for Phase 3 (2013-2020). A sector’s 
leakage risk is established based on two quantitative criteria (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2009):  
 The additional production costs defined as the sum of direct and indirect carbon costs 






 The trade intensity of this sector with countries that are not part of the EU ETS, defined 
as the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports 
from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus 
total imports from third countries).  
They are used as a stand alone, but also combined with one another (BRUYN, NELISSEN and 
KOOPMAN, 2013a). 
Article 10a, pars.15-17 of the revised ETS Directive outline when a sector or subsector is 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Four criteria were given, if a 
sector would qualify for one of these, it would obtain free allocation of allowances 
(EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2009).  
1. Direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 5% of GVA and trade 
intensity is over 10%; 
2. Direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 30%; 
3. Trade intensity is over 30%; 
4. For sectors that would not qualify under one of the above situations, a provision has 
been made for more detailed analysis at a more disaggregated level (NACE22 6 and 
beyond) and/or a qualitative assessment23 if trade intensities and/or increase in 
production costs were close to the threshold levels in which the required investments, 
market characteristics and profit margins would flourish as alternative indicators.  
The revised EU ETS Directive states furthermore that every year sectors can be added to the 
list based on the fourth criteria (ZAKLAN and BAUER, 2015). A structural revision of the 
Carbon Leakage List (CLL) is foreseen for every five years by the European Commission 
(EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2009). During this structural 
revision, (sub)sectors can be added to or removed from the list. The first of such revisions was 
completed by the end 2014, and it was used for the allocation in the period 2015-2019 (BRUYN, 
NELISSEN and KOOPMAN, 2013a). 
                                                          
22 The Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community, abbreviated as NACE, is the 
classification of economic activities in the European Union (EU); the term NACE is derived from the French 
Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne. 
23 The qualitiative criteria includes: (i) emissions levels and electricity consumption reduction potential of 
individual installations in the sector; (ii) current and projected market characteristics and; (iii) profit margins as an 






4.2.1.1.1. Carbon Cost (CC) 
Carbon costs relative to value added is the approach currently used in the EU and which was 
also included in the proposed Waxman Markey Bill (American Clean Energy and Security Act), 
approved by the US House of Representatives in June 2009 but defeated by the Senate in the 
US. It consists: 
𝐶𝐶 =
(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝐶𝑂2+𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝐶𝑂2)∗𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝑡𝐶𝑂2
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
                            (Equation 1) 
As mentioned before, this test is currently used as a stand-alone, or in combination with another 
test. In the EU ETS, two thresholds are defined for this test. A carbon price of €30/tonne is used 
in calculating carbon costs (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2009). 
When used as a stand-alone test, the carbon cost threshold is 30%. This figure was adopted in 
order to include outlying sectors with high carbon costs that needed to be included. When used 
in conjuction with the other quantitative criteria (on trade intensity), the threshold is 5%. 
The carbon costs test provides a good indication of the impact of the carbon on the overall cost 
structure. Other approaches can be tried (e.g. costs over margins, or over EBIDTA). It is 
however clearer, more relevant and easier to understand than other financial-type tests used in 
other jurisdictions (e.g. carbon intensity over revenue). While other risk factors in the carbon-
cost risk category are not captured with this test (e.g. abatement potential and the cost of 
abatement), there is a sense that carbon costs provide credible coverage (MARCU et al., 2014). 
There are significant approximations associated with this carbon-cost risk test. An European 
Union Allowance (EUA) price forecast (€30/tonne) is used, which is being criticised for being 
far above the current (and forecast to 2020) market price. However, it must be considered that 
€30/tonne is a price that is put forward for an investment decision time frame, as the CLL 
addresses all channels of carbon leakage, including investment. From this point of view, a long-
term price of €30/tonne cannot be seen as unrealistic, and could in fact be considered 
conservative. However, this needs to be specified and clarified in the Directive itself. 
 
4.2.1.1.2. Trade Intensity (TI) 
Articles 10a, Pars 15 and 16 define the trade intensity criterion as “the intensity of trade with 






value of imports from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual 
turnover plus total imports from third countries)” (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and 




           (Equation 2) 
Sectors are considered to be exposed to carbon leakage risk if trade intensity is over 30% (as a 
stand-alone). A 10% threshold is used if the trade intensity test is combined with another test 
(carbon cost). 
So the ability to pass through additional costs from carbon pricing is captured with the surrogate 
test on trade intensity. While this clearly captures heavily-traded products, it does not capture 
all risk factors associated with pass-through ability, such as price setting power and market 
concentration (MARCU et al., 2014). 
However, this definition, although more clear than the additional carbon cost criterion, still 
lacks a proper definition of the concept of ‘third countries’. During the comitology process, 
without much discussion, third countries were defined as extra-EU 27 (all the countries that are 
not part of the EU 27) (BRUYN, NELISSEN and KOOPMAN, 2013b). However, this is not a 
logical definition in the context of EU ETS, as the EU ETS is larger than the EU 27 and includes 
installations from Norway, Iceland, Croatia, and Liechtenstein and planned linkages with 
Switzerland and Australia. 
The trade intensity criterion was established in the light of the discussion of potential carbon 
leakage. Therefore, the concept of third countries should be: ‘countries not included in the EU 
ETS’. Also the planned linkage with other ETS implies that prices will equalize on these 
markets, and one cannot speak about carbon leakage. As a result, all countries that are included 
in the ETS or linked to the ETS cannot be regarded as ‘third countries’ but are part of the ETS. 
According to BRUYN, NELISSEN and KOOPMAN (2013a), trade to those countries should 
not be included in the trade intensity criterion. 
 
4.2.1.1.3. Results and Analysis 
From the literature, as will be shown in this subsection, a total of 167 sectors, and in some cases 






than one criterion: 24 sectors meet criterion 1., 6 meet criterion 2., while 147 sectors meet 
criterion 3. 6 sectors were added based on the qualitative criteria (ZAKLAN and BAUER, 
2015). 
The emerging evidence from the EU ETS suggests that, on the one hand, such free allocation 
provisions have been successful in preventing carbon leakage (BRANGER and QUIRION, 
2013; SARTOR, 2012; COSTANTINI and MAZZANTI, 2012; QUIRION, 2011; 
ELLERMAN, CONVERY and DE PERTHUIS, 2010; REINAUD, 2008; LACOMBE, 2008).  
On the other hand, there is concern that excess free allocation has lead to over-compensation 
of sectors. During the first and second trading periods (2005–2007 and 2008–2012), billions of 
euros of windfall profits were accrued by heavy emitters who passed through the opportunity 
cost of allowances they received for free (MAXWELL, 2011; BRUYN, NELISSEN and 
KOOPMAN, 2013a, b; LISE et al. 2010; MARTIN, MUÛLS and WAGNER, 2010). The issue 
of windfall profits not only reduces the credibility of the scheme, but analysis has also shown 
that excess free allowance allocation can have drawbacks for economic efficiency, for example 
by discouraging the closure of less efficient plants (HEPBURN et al., 2006; NEUHOFF, 
KEATS and SATO, 2006), and by dampening incentives for emissions reductions (ABRELL, 
FAYE and ZACHMANN, 2011) as well as innovation and low carbon investments (MARTIN 
et al. 2013). 
The intention to progressively abandon free allocation in favour of auctioning was expressed 
by the European Commission under the revised ETS Directive (2009/29), and the free 
allocation provisions are subject to review at least every 5 years (SATO, 2015). In trading Phase 
III (2013-2020) allocations to installations in sectors not deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage 
are adjusted using an allocation factor such that they received 80% of their original gross 
allocation in 2013 for free, decreasing to 30% by 2020 (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2009). However, if a sector is on the CLL installations continue 
receiving 100% of the original gross allocation for free. The design of the provision for the 
period after 2020 is currently under discussion. 
There are different views on the adequacy of the current two categories leakage risk in the EU. 
According to a stakeholder consultation by the EUROPEAN COMISSION (2014), 56% of 
industry respondents are in favor of maintaining the current system with two categories of 






respondents believe that more differentiation through additional leakage risk categories should 
be introduced. However, the empirical evidence suggests that parts of industry may be 
overcompensated at the current level of free allocation (HEILMEYR and BRADBURY, 2011). 
MARTIN et al. (2014) found that a large number of sectors benefited from receiving free 
allowances in excess of what would be required to neutralize the risk of carbon leakage. 
In general, the outcome of the test for carbon leakage risk seems to be a very broad list, with 
almost everyone included. There are currently 167 sectors on the CLL, out of a total of 258 
industrial sectors, covering approximately 95% of total industrial emissions in EU ETS (DE 
BRUYN, NELISSEN and KOOPMAN, 2013b). 
The EU ETS has risk-mitigation provisions for those sectors found to be at risk, and thus 
included in the CLL. For direct emissions they receive free allocation (to the level of the 
benchmark) at the EU level, while compensation for indirect emissions is determined and 
awarded at the member state level (subject to EU state-aid rules) (MARCU et al., 2014). The 
amount of free allocation for sectors not on the CLL decreases until 2020, and it decreases at a 
higher rate than the free allocation for CLL sectors. 
Therefore the EU ETS model can be described as ex-ante and fixed with allocation based on 
benchmark methodology for all sectors. It may lead to a significant amount of costs not being 
covered, depending on the sector’s characteristics (spread around the benchmark). In addition, 
it does not compensate for any carbon costs related to increased production levels as it is based 
on historical levels of production and could be seen as not encouraging investment and/or 
increased production. 
Table 13 lists the top 10 sectors with respect to their size of verified emissions (expressed as 
the average of 2005 and 2006 compared to the total verified emissions of industrial installations 











Table 13 – Top 10 sectors and their allocation methods in 2013 
Source: DE BRUYN, NELISSEN and KOOPMAN (2013a)  




for allocation up 
to benchmark 
Criteria 
1 2320 Manufacture of refined petroleum 25% Free 1 
2 2651 Manufacure of cement 25% Free 2 
3 2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 14% Free 1/3 
4 2112 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 6% Free 1 
5 2652 Manufacture of lime 4% Free 2 
6 1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 2% Free 3 
7 2414 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals 2% Free 1/3 
8 2613 Manufacture of hollow glass 2% Free 1 
9 2310 Manufacture of coke oven products 1% Free 1/3 
10 1583 Manufacture of sugar 1% Free 1 
Note: Criteria 1. direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 5% of GVA and trade intensity is over 10%; 
criteria 2. direct and indirect costs increase production costs by at least 30%; and criteria 3. trade intensity is over 30%.  
 
There are two main costs associated with the EU ETS carbon leakage risk mitigation measures. 
The first one is the administrative cost associated with setting up the system and the ongoing 
administrative burden. Both of them are not significant, according to RENDA et al. (2013a,b). 
The second cost category relates to the opportunity cost of free allowances, which decrease 
auctioning revenue. While a purely political consideration, it must still be acknowledged. 
Finally, data acquisition and provision in the EU ETS in general, and in addressing carbon 
leakage in particular, are problematic. As discussed above, data on the information to address 
carbon leakage are aggregated according to NACE 4 or 6 – which represents the level of 
aggregation of the European Union economic activity –, while emissions data are aggregated 
by sectors that have a different definition (ZAKLAN and BAUER, 2015). This constitutes a 
real barrier to cross-referencing and analysing the impacts of financial and emissions 
information. 
 
4.2.1.2. California Cap-and-Trade 
One way of addressing overcompensation of some sectors while maintaining the CLL 






currently used in the EU ETS. The Californian Cap-and-Trade system provides an example of 
greater differentiation. 
This system uses only quantitative risk tests to determine if sectors are at risk of carbon leakage 
(CARB, 2006). The test used is a combination of emissions intensity and trade intensity. This 
combined test covers both risk factors – carbon costs and ability to pass through, and it leads to 
a division of installations into three carbon leakage risk categories: high, medium or low, as 
can be seen in Table 14.  
 
Table 14 – Emissions Intensity, Trade Exposure and Leakage Risk in the California Cap-and-Trade 


























Note: The number in between brackets states the total number 
 
This analysis can also be explained by the following matrix (Figure 21), which represents the 








Figure 21 – Californian Assessment of Carbon Leakage Risk 
Source: Adapted from CARB (2006, 2012) 
 
All sectors are classified as low, medium or high, and there is no “no risk” category. This tiered 
approach provides a flexible way of recognising that carbon leakage risk is almost impossible 
to define with precision (MARCU et al., 2014). 
 
4.2.1.2.1. Emissions Intensity (EI) 
With respect to the impact of carbon costs, emissions intensity was chosen in order to avoid 
using carbon price forecasts (CARB, 2012). As in the case of Australia – that will be analyzed 
in the next subsection –, one could argue that this is a less representative way to capture risk 
factors related to carbon costs. It captures the importance of GHG emissions, but not, at least 




𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
           (Equation 3) 
This risk test is not used alone, but in conjunction with trade intensity (discussed below).  
 
4.2.1.2.2. Trade Intensity (TI) 
The ability to pass through additional costs from carbon pricing is captured through the trade-











           (Equation 4) 
This approach provides some information regarding the sectors’ ability to pass through costs, 
but many aspects are not covered. In contrast to other jurisdictions, there are no qualitative tests 
that would inject some flexibility and which could be useful to provide more information on 
the ability of the sector to pass costs through. 
 
4.2.1.2.3. Results and Analysis 
According to the literature, none of the tests is used on a stand-alone basis, which is usually 
used to capture outliers. The California risk-based approach reduces (possibly eliminates) the 
need to cover for outliers, as every sector is covered in some way. This risk-based approach 
seems to assign a higher value to emissions intensity compared to trade intensity (MARCU et 
al., 2014). 
There are two types of output-based allocation: product-based or energy-based (CALIFORNIA 
CODE OF REGULATIONS, 2011). Product-based benchmarks are preferred since it can 
recognize early action and enhance leakage protection. In some sectors, however, benchmarks 
can be difficult to develop due to high variation among facilities for example. If so, energy-
based benchmarks are applied. 
The benchmarks are generally set at close to 90% of average sectorial emissions or energy 
consumption. Initially all sectors received allowances at 100% of the benchmark, but while 
high-risk industries do not experience a decrease in free allocation, those at medium and low 
risk do (up to respectively 50% and 30% of the benchmark in 2020) (MARCU et al., 2014). 
In the California Cap-and-Trade system, Industry Assistance Factor (IAF) is different over three 
initial compliance periods and over high, medium and low leakage risk industries. As 
mentioned, allocation is determined via a sector-specific intensity benchmark and is output-
based. Initially the benchmarks are set at about 90% of average emissions. Free allocation is 






According to MARCU et al. (2014), the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) 
receives allowances every budget year and holds auction every quarter at pre-established prices. 
In budget years 2013 and 2014, 1% of the total number of allowances enters the APCR, 4% for 
budget years 2015-17 and 7% for budget years 2018-20. The allowances in the APCR are split 
into three equal segments. These three segments are made available for auction with respective 
price levels of $40, $45 and $50 (2013). These prices increase yearly by 5% plus inflation. The 
APCR is linked to a floor price ($10 in 2012, increasing yearly): allowances that remain unsold 
at government auctions (because the value of the allowance is deemed less than the floor price) 
enter the APCR. 




Table 15 – Emissions intensity of selected sectors in California (tonnes CO2eq/$ million value added) 








Lime manufacturing 29,398 
Cement manufacturing 13,744 
Medium  
(12) 
Iron and steel mill 4,148 
All other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing 2,636 
Low  
(7) 
Steel and aluminium processing 645 
Pesticide and other agricultural chemical mfg 232 
Very Low  
(3) 
Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 64 
Aircraft manufacturing 37 












Table 16 – Trade intensities of selected sectors in California (%) 
Source: Adapted from California Air Resource Board (2006) 
Trade-intensity 
classification 
Sector Trade share 
High, > 19%  
(2) 
Oil and gas extraction 65% 
Aircraft manufacturing 61% 
Flat glass manufacturing 46% 
Steel and aluminium processing 37% 
Pestice and other agricultural chemical manufacturing 20% 
Medium, 10-19% 
(12) 
Cement manufacturing 16% 
Petroleum products manufacturing 13% 
Low, < 10%  
(7) 
Lime manufacturing 3% 
Note: The number in between brackets states the total number of sectors in that classification 
 
This classification system achieves some differentiation of leakage risk, classifying 15 sectors 
in the high risk category, 14 as medium risk, and 3 as low risk (MARCU et al., 2014). Similar 
to the EU ETS, allocation factors depending on the overall risk level adjust the amount allocated 
for free. Installations in high-risk sectors receive 100% of their allocation for free during the 
entire period 2013-2020, while the allocation sinks from 100% in 2013-2014 to 75% in 2015-
2017 and 50% in 2018-2020 for the medium category. Free allocation sinks even faster in the 
low-risk group, from 100% in 2013-2014 to 50% in 2015-2017 and 30% in 2018-2020 
(CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, 2011).  
In the Californian Cap-and-Trade system, differentiating according to leakage risk leads to a 
greater number of allowances available for auctioning (ZAKLAN and BAUER, 2015). Also, it 
is a sub-national scheme and therefore its impact on international negotiations is perhaps 
limited. But as a member of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and more specifically through 
the link with the Quebec ETS it is showcasing how carbon-pricing mechanisms could work 
together. It is too soon, however, to evaluate the full link between California and Quebec as it 







4.2.1.3. Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (ACPM) 
Australia has both quantitative and qualitative carbon leakage risk tests. The quantitative test is 
a combination of trade exposure (for ability to pass through) and emissions intensity (carbon-
related). 
Sectors that do not pass the trade-intensity threshold can submit an application for a qualitative 
assessment in Australia. If the activity does not reach the trade-intensity threshold, there is a 
complementary qualitative test to determine pass-through ability. The basis for the qualitative 
assessments are described and justified for each activity that is eligible, which makes the 
Australian system flexible and transparent, and covers many of the risk factors associated with 
pass-through ability. 
 
4.2.1.3.1. Emissions Intensity in Revenues (EIR) and Emissions 
Intensity in Value Added (EIVA) 
In Australia, emissions intensity is divided into three levels: high, medium and not emissions-
intensive (DECCEE, 2011a, 2012).  
 Highly emissions-intensive: at least 2,000 tCO2eq emissions per million Australian 
dollar (AUD) revenue or 6,000 tCO2eq per million AUD value added; 
 Moderately emissions-intensive: 1,0000 tCO2e emissions per million AUD revenue or 




            (Equation 5) 
𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴 =
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑞
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑈𝐷 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
           (Equation 6) 
 
Prior to testing for emissions intensity, a trade intensity test is used to assess if the activity is 
trade exposed. If the emissions intensity is below the trade intensity threshold, the activity is 






With respect to carbon-related risk tests, the Australian emissions intensity approach is less 
direct than the carbon costs test, which is used in the EU ETS. It gives a measure of carbon 
intensity but does not cover carbon-related risk factors to the same extent. 
Intuitively, thresholds for emissions intensity over revenue and value added are not easy to 
capture. The thresholds are absolute numbers and as such are difficult to interpret. For example, 
the thresholds for highly emissions-intensive activities is 2,000 tonnes CO2eq over 1 million 
AUD of revenue, or 6,000 tonnes CO2eq over 1 million AUD of value added. As an observer, 
it is difficult to value the relevance of these thresholds. 
As a plus, emissions intensity uses historical data on emissions, and as such does not rely on 
carbon price forecasts the way the EU ETS does. The emissions-intensity test is flexible in the 
way that it recognizes different levels of risk. The graduated structure and its link to the level 
of assistance are also clear and straightforward. 
 
4.2.1.3.2. Trade Intensity (TI) 
Trade intensity is used as a proxy to test for the ability to pass-through carbon costs. This 
quantitative test captures heavily traded products, but not all risk factors associated with pass-
through ability. Moreover, the trade intensity criterion in Australia is calculated as imports and 
exports over domestic production, i.e. not over the sum of domestic production and imports (as 
in the EU and in California). This means that trade share could be overstated for activities with 
high levels of import. This risk test on trade intensity does not provide a threshold for outliers. 
𝑇𝐼 =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠+𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
           (Equation 7) 
A slight variation regarding EU ETS was employed in the Australian ETS where trade intensity 
is calculated as a ratio over domestic production. If the ratio is higher than 10% in any of the 
financial years 2004-05, 2005-06 or 2007-08, the sector is considered to be trade exposed 
(DECCEE, 2011a,b). This is then combined with a test on emissions intensity in order to 
determine the level of compensation.  
For those activities that meet the threshold of 10% trade exposure, the risk exposure is 






moderately emissions-intensive), creating a number of levels of compensation. Eligible 
emissions include direct emissions and electricity emissions (DECCEE, 2011b). 
So the trade exposure test is a quantitative in/out test and can, under certain circumstances, be 
complemented with a qualitative test (if there is a demonstrated lack of capacity to pass through 
costs). 
 
4.2.1.3.3. Results and Analysis 
Currently, 35 activities on the list are highly emissions-intense and 16 sectors are moderately 
emissions-intensive (MARCU et al., 2014). Table 17 illustrates a selection of activities in 
Australia and their emissions intensity. 
 
Table 17 – Emissions intensity of selected sectors in Australia (tonnes CO2eq/$ million revenue) 






Production of clinker 15,600-15,699 H 
Production of lime 12,100-12,199 H 
Aluminium smelting 5,700-5,799 H 
Integrated iron and steel manufacturing 3,200-3,299 H 
Production of bulk flas glass 2,100-2,199 H 
Production of ceramic floor and wall tiles 1,100-1,199 M 
Note: H = High emissions intensive; M = Moderately emissions intenstive. 
 
Four sectors in Australia qualified through the qualitative assessment. This qualitative test is 
meant to assess whether there is a demonstrated lack of capacity to pass through costs due to 
international competition. Such lack can be demonstrated using one of the following: 
 historical trade shares above 10%; 
 high correlation between the prices received by domestic producers and a transparent 






 existence of international producers who trade in the product that is a substitute for the 
domestically produced good. 
 
Regarding the coverage of the eligible activities in Australia, the study by SFS Economics 
(2011), concluded that all but one of the eligible activities in Australia would qualify for the 
EU CLL, while 126 of the EU ETS sectors (from the original CLL in 2009) would not receive 
assistance in Australia. This study also compares the economic implications of the risk tests in 
Australia with the situation in EU. While the sectors in the EU ETS that are on the CLL cover 
42% of employment, the corresponding figure for eligible activities in Australia is 9%. For 
turnover, the EU CLL covers 48%, while the number in Australia is 29%. As such, the risk tests 
in Australia seem to be more focused than in the EU – the study concludes with an appeal for 
broader Australian coverage. 
The Australian risk identification focuses on “manufacturing activities”, whose definition, in 
general, is similar to the sector definitions used in the EU and California, but not for all sectors 
(MARCU et al., 2014). For example, the different segments of the steel and paper/pulp sectors 
are kept separate in the EU while in Australia, the value chains, starting from raw material 
processing, are kept together when assessing leakage and providing compensation. 
Under the Australian Jobs and Competitiveness Programme, activities that demonstrated the 
potential to meet the carbon leakage criteria were initially assessed. The plan was to update the 
assessment in the third year of operation of the CPM (2014-15) and thereafter, at regular 
intervals (DECCEE, 2011b). Firms could also petition the Government to assess the carbon 
leakage risk of their activity. 
Australia uses free allocation as risk mitigation under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program. 
If the activity passes the trade exposure criteria, free allocation is provided in a graduated 
manner, based on the activities’ emissions intensity. Free allocation in Australia is done ex-
ante, and based on the entity’s previous year’s level of production, with a true up to account for 
actual production in the previous period. 
Moderately emissions-intensive activities receive 66% free allocation and highly emissions-
intensive activities receive 94.5% free allocation. Allocation for both categories declines by 






The existing provisions cover direct emissions and indirect emissions from electricity use. Also, 
ensuring that the playing field remains level for importers and exporters can be considered as 
addressed, as the trade-exposure test includes both imports and exports. 
The risk-based allocation in Australia is flexible as it addresses leakage risk differences between 
sectors in a more realistic way than an “in/out” approach (MARCU et al., 2014). Besides, with 
respect to market functioning, according to estimates by the Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency in Australia, around 63.5% of the permits would be offered in the first 
auctioning, while 28% are allocated to emission-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) activities 
(BETZ et al., 2010). As such, it does not seem that free allocation could hinder the good 
functioning of the carbon market. 
 
4.2.1.4. Assessment and Comparison of Methodologies 
From the methodologies discussed, two main risk tests are used: carbon-related risk test and 
trade-related risk tests. Carbon-related risk tests check for the impact of carbon cost, or carbon 
emissions, relative to a measure of financial performance. Currently two approaches can be 
identified: 
 Emissions intensity: carbon emissions intensity (tonnes) relative to revenue (monetary 
value); and 
 Carbon costs: impact of carbon costs (monetary value) relative to gross value added 
(monetary value). 
Emissions intensity tests are currently used in California and Australia and can be looked upon, 
in a more general way, as an indicator of carbon intensity relative to financial performance. 
This could also be extrapolated to the carbon intensity of GDP. While emissions-intensity tests 
can be seen as less targeted than carbon cost tests, it remains a relationship between emissions 
intensity of an installation and its compliance costs. 
For these tests, the approach used is that emissions intensity thresholds are defined, which then 
determine the risk level. It must be emphasised that the data used for these tests are historical, 






Carbon costs relative to value added, is the second approach, currently used in the EU, and 
which was also included in the proposed Waxman Markey Bill (American Clean Energy and 
Security Act), approved by the US House of Representatives in June 2009 but defeated by the 
Senate in the US. This test is currently used as a stand-alone, or in combination with another 
test.  
Regarding trade-related risk tests, trade intensity or trade exposure takes different forms 
depending on the jurisdictions.  They examine whether or not the sector can pass the additional 
carbon cost to downstream consumers by raising sale prices. Table 18 summarizes the 






Table 18 – Comparison between quantitative risk test 
Source: Own elaboration based on EUROPEAN COMISSION (2014), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL (2009), CARB (2012), CALIFORNIA CODE OF 
REGULATIONS (2011), DECCEE (2011a,b, 2012) 
Jurisdiction Quantitative Indicators 
Thresholds determining exposure to carbon leakage 




𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝐶𝑂2 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝐶𝑂2) ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝑡𝐶𝑂2
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
 





CC > 30% 
or 
TI > 30% 
CC > 5% 
and 
TI > 10% 
California Cap-and-
Trade 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐸𝐼) =
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑞
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
 
 





Emissions Intensity (EI) 
 High > 5,000 
 Medium: 1,000-
4,999 
 Low: 100-999 
 Very low: less 




Trade Intensity (TI) 
 High > 19% 
 Medium: 10%-
19% 
















𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 (𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴) =
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑞
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑈𝐷 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝐼) =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠





TI > 10% and EIR > 





TI > 10% and 1,000 < EIR < 
2,000 tCO2eq/AUDm or 3,000 




4.2.2. Evaluation of Impacts on the Brazilian Industry 
This section focuses on applying quantitative indicators of industrial vulnerability from 
the CPI implementation, considering the methodologies presented in the previous section. 
These indicators were built from the primary data from public institutions, such as the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME); Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MCTI); Ministry of Finance (MF); Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce 
(MDIC); the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); the National 
Development Bank (BNDES); and National Industry Confederation (CNI), among others 
(MME, 2017; MCTI, 2016, 2015; MF, 2014; MDIC, 2013; VIDAL and HORA, 
2012;CGEE, 2014; BASTOS and COSTA, 2011; ABM, 2009). Some of them were 
already presented in chapter 3, especially concerning the economic characterization and 
the sectorial emissions profile. When related to international experiences, other sources 
were also used (HEEDE, 2014; CARBO, 2011; IEA GHG, 2000), as detailed in the 
following subsections. 
The main objective of this section is to apply the indicators presented in the previous 
subsection to the Brazilian industry aiming at comparing the sectorial carbon leakage 
exposure. By using the different methodologies analyzed (EU ETS, California Cap-and-
Trade and Australian CPM), we will assess which sectors are more vulnerable (or not) to 
this risk. From the previous subsection, the indicators used are emission intensity (EI), 
carbon cost (CC), and trade intensity (TI). These results will be used in the next chapter, 
considering not only these quantitative analyses, but also the qualitative ones carried out 
in the beginning of this chapter, aiming at proposing institutional frameworks for CPI in 
the Brazilian industry. Thus, in terms of section structure, initially, those indicators will 
be calculated at the subsectorial level. Subsequently, a comparative table will summarize 
the carbon leakage risk by each industrial subsector considering the three different 
methodologies. 
 
4.2.2.1. Emissions Intensity  
The average emission intensity (sectorial or by product), or an index based on the most 
efficient companies, can be adopted as benchmark for establishing a CPI, as seen in the 
previous section. This benchmark can provide incentives for preventive actions and long-
term efficiency gains, but the method can be data-intensive, especially in the absence of 
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large data series. Thus, international benchmarks can be useful when public data is 
available, providing the analyst (regulator) with the information needed. Furthermore, 
most Brazilian industrial processes are based on mature processes following consolidated 
international technological portfolios. As such, the position of the Brazilian industry in 
terms of emissions intensity can provide relevant information about the vulnerability of 
the industrial sectors to a possible carbon pricing (SANTOS et al., 2018). 
Due to these reasons, this thesis analyzes emissions intensity under two different 
approaches: the first one is product-based, aiming at comparing the global and the 
national averages for emissions intensity, in metric tonnes of CO2 per tonnes of product; 
the second one is emission-based, focusing on carbon emissions intensity (tonnes) relative 
to revenue (monetary value). 
Concerning (inter)national emissions intensity, data were collected from the international 
literature (HEEDE, 2014; CARBO, 2011; IEA GHG, 2000) for the global average 
emissions intensity, while, for the Brazilian average emissions intensity, it was retrieved 
from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MCTI), National Development Bank (BNDES), as well as on some other sectorial 
industry reports (MME, 2017; MCTI, 2016, 2015; MF, 2014; MDIC, 2013; VIDAL and 
HORA, 2012; CGEE, 2014; BASTOS and COSTA, 2011; ABM, 2009). Table 19 shows 
the comparison between global and the Brazilian averages on emissions intensity, in 
metric tonnes of CO2 per tonnes of product. 
 
Table 19 – Emissions intensity – global average and Brazilian average – year 2005 (in 
tCO2/t product) 
Source: References for global average: HEEDE, 2014; CARBO, 2011; IEA GHG, 2000. 
References for Brazilian average: MME, 2017; MCTI, 2016, 2015; MF, 2014; MDIC, 2013; 






Aluminum 9.1 - 9.6 5.6 
Cement, Lime and Glass 0.6 - 0.8 0.7 
Pig Iron and Steel 1.6 - 2.2 1.3 
Pulp and Paper 0.8 - 0.9 0.2 
Chemicals n.a. 0.3 




Although the average values may show a large spread due to the different structures and 
processes, a national (or international) average can serve as a benchmark for comparing 
the country’s exposure to a carbon price, assuming a similar worldwide policy. For 
instance, when compared to the global average, the Brazilian Pulp and Paper sector shows 
lower emissions intensity (0.2 versus 0.8-0.9), and the same happens to the Aluminum 
sector (5.6 versus 9.1-9.6). Other sectors show average emissions intensity closer to the 
global average. For instance, Pig Iron and Steel (1.3 versus 1.6-2.2) and Cement, Lime 
and Glass (0.7 versus 0.6-0.8). The average emissions intensity of Chemicals is low (0.3) 
in Brazil, but there was not any information found for the global average due to the sector 
heterogeneity. 
Thus, it can be concluded that defining a metric for carbon pricing based on international 
benchmarks could not provide incentive to lower Brazil’s sectorial emissions. Moreover, 
the Brazilian industry is not homogeneous, especially regarding technology. Therefore, a 
national benchmark based on the most efficient plants could provide a better metric than 
an international benchmark. The difficulty relies on obtaining historical data. For some 
sectors, studies are not available, and research is required to establish national 
benchmarks (MDIC, 2013). 
The second emissions intensity analysis focuses on carbon emissions intensity relative to 







] =  
Emissionsi [tCO2]
Sectorial VAi [US$ millions]
                    (Equation 8) 
 
Note: i = industrial subsector. 
 
 
The results represent how much the carbon pricing could impact the return on the 
production factors (capital, labor) of these industries – under the conservative assumption 
that the sector does not abate any emissions. Table 20 presents the results for sectorial 




Table 20 – Sectorial emissions intensity – year 2010 (in tCO2/US$ millions) 
Source:  Own elaboration based on IBGE (2015) and MCTI (2015) 
Subsector 
Emissions 
(tCO2)           
[A] 
Sectorial VA 
(US$ millions)        
[B] 
Emissions / VA 
(tCO2/US$ 
millions)        
[C] = [A]/[B] 
Aluminum 7,410,000 5,010 1,479 
Cement, Lime and Glass 45,548,000 10,487 4,343 
Pig Iron and Steel 45,531,000 7,945 5,708 
Pulp and Paper 5,747,000 7,196 799 
Chemicals 17,438,000 23,519 741 
 
According to the results, the Pulp and Paper and Chemical sectors have the lower 
emissions intensity (under 1,000 tCO2/US$ millions), especially because of the use of 
biomass in the Pulp and Paper sector, besides the high VA of the Chemical sector. On the 
other hands, Pig Iron and Steel, and Cement, Lime and Glass sectors have the biggest 
emissions intensity since both sectors are strongly energy intensive. 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Carbon Cost  
The estimated impacts of the cost of carbon pricing on the VA express the relative weight 
of the cost of carbon on the rents of the production factors, namely, capital and labor. It 
is given by the ratio of the carbon cost to VA and it will be calculated for different carbon 
prices (US$10/tCO2, US$25/tCO2, and US$50/tCO2), reflecting a range typically found 
in the literature and in the carbon pricing international experiences put in place so far 
(ICAP, 2018; ALDY, 2016; CLARKE et al., 2014; NORDHAUS, 2007; STERN, 2007).  
The carbon cost to VA considers full emissions of the year 2010 and, thus, it is a 
conservative indicator that assumes that the cost is fully absorbed by the industry, i.e., 
without considering any mitigation measures. For the calculation of the carbon cost, 
primary data from the sectorial emissions reported in the Third National Communication 
(MCTI, 2016) and the VA reported by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE, 2015), expressed in US$ millions for the year 2010, is considered. 
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Figure 19 presents the impact of the cost of carbon pricing on the VA, given by the ratio 
of total tax expenditure to VA for different carbon prices (US$10/tCO2, US$25/tCO2, and 
US$50/tCO2). 
 
Figure 22 – Carbon cost in relation to the sectorial VA according to carbon prices (%) and 
sectorial VA (US$ millions) – 2010 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCTI (2016) and IBGE (2015) 
 
The results represent the cost of carbon in relation to the sectorial VA, i.e., how much the 
carbon pricing could impact the return on the production factors (capital, labor) of these 
industries, under the conservative assumption that the sector does not abate any 
emissions. For all sectors, the impact of a carbon price of US$10/tCO2 would be less than 
6% of the sectorial VA and would be less than 15% for values up to US$25/tCO2. Pulp 
and Paper and Chemicals would not face high impacts of carbon pricing even for a carbon 
price of US$50/tCO2, respectively 4% and 3.7%. 
Another possibility of interpreting the impacts on the VA is to simulate a carbon price 
according to different levels of reduction in absolute emissions. This alternative analysis 
shows the effects (in terms of % of the VA) of internalizing a carbon price for the year 
2010. The priced emissions are the total emissions minus the reduction of emissions 























Pulp and Paper Chemicals
US$ 10 / tCO2 US$ 25 / tCO2 US$ 50 / tCO2 VA (US$ millions)
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the study led by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI, 2016) and 
covers the abatement of emissions needed to reach Brazil’s NDC targets (37% and 43%). 
The indicator is calculated for different carbon prices, varying from US$10/tCO2 to 
US$50/tCO2. Table 21 shows the results. 
 
Table 21 – Carbon Cost (%) according to carbon price (in US$ millions/tCO2) and 
emissions reduction (% over total) – year 2010 




% Reduction in sectorial emissions 
0% 5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 
Aluminum 
10 1,5% 1,4% 1,3% 1,1% 1,0% 0,8% 
25 3,7% 3,5% 3,1% 2,8% 2,4% 2,0% 
50 7,4% 7,0% 6,3% 5,5% 4,8% 4,1% 
Cement, Lime 
and Glass 
10 4,3% 4,1% 3,7% 3,3% 2,8% 2,4% 
25 10,9% 10,3% 9,2% 8,1% 7,1% 6,0% 
50 21,7% 20,6% 18,5% 16,3% 14,1% 11,9% 
Pig Iron and 
Steel 
10 5,7% 5,4% 4,9% 4,3% 3,7% 3,1% 
25 14,3% 13,6% 12,1% 10,7% 9,3% 7,8% 
50 28,5% 27,1% 24,3% 21,4% 18,6% 15,7% 
Pulp and Paper 
10 0,8% 0,8% 0,7% 0,6% 0,5% 0,4% 
25 2,0% 1,9% 1,7% 1,5% 1,3% 1,1% 
50 4,0% 3,8% 3,4% 3,0% 2,6% 2,2% 
Chemicals 
10 0,7% 0,7% 0,6% 0,6% 0,5% 0,4% 
25 1,9% 1,8% 1,6% 1,4% 1,2% 1,0% 
50 3,7% 3,5% 3,2% 2,8% 2,4% 2,0% 
 
Note: - impact                                             + impact 
 
For a carbon price of US$10/tCO2, results show impacts below 5.4% for all sectors, with 
values ranging from 0.4% (Pulp and Paper, and Chemicals under a 45% emissions 
reduction scenario) to 5.4% (Pig Iron and Steel under a 5% emissions reduction scenario). 
These impacts grow for higher carbon prices and could reach 27.1% for Pig Iron and Steel 
under a 5% emissions reduction scenario with a US$50/tCO2 carbon price. Pulp and 
Paper, and Chemicals showed the lowest impacts on the sectorial VA, even with higher 
carbon prices (US$50/tCO2). For the former, this can be explained by the share of black-
liquor in final energy consumption, while for the latter it derives from the higher VA of 
chemical industry facilities.  
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If the carbon price were fully internalized by the industry (e.g., via an ETS with auction 
or a carbon tax), the results presented in Table 21 would reveal an upper limit for the 
mitigation cost as a share of VA. In other words, the difference between the emissions 
reduction levels (5–45%) and the case with no emission reduction (0%) expresses the 
maximum cost of a carbon pricing (as a share of VA), assuming the respective level of 
mitigation. For instance, by mitigating 45% of the Pulp and Paper emissions, considering 
a carbon price of US$10/tCO2, total expenditure of the sector would be 0.4% of its VA.  
The range of reduction from 35% to 45% covers the same range of the NDC target (for 
the year 2025 and 2030) and could express the upper limits for the mitigation cost in a 
scenario where the NDC target is divided homogeneously between all the sectors in the 
economy (LULUCF, industry, etc.)24. Again, considering a carbon pricing of 
US$10/tCO2, the cost of mitigation of reducing emissions from 35% to 45% could 
represent an impact of 0.3% to 2.6% on sectorial VA, depending on the sector assessed. 
Furthermore, considering a carbon price of US$10/tCO2, and the reduction target of 5% 
(the same as the Industry Plan) (MDIC, 2013), the total sectorial expenditure would be 
under 0.7%. 
 
4.2.2.3. Trade Intensity 
The ability to pass-through compliance costs also depends on the sectorial exposure to 
international trade. Since trade is dynamic, technical difficulties arise when developing 
precise price metrics (OECD, 2016). Thus, the international experience relies on trade 
share metrics to measure the cost pass-through ability (CARB, 2012). Trade exposure is 
an indicator that expresses, through the export and trade shares, sectorial dependence on 
the international trade. It also represents trade intensity and the exposure of the sectorial 
production to international trade. Equations 9 and 10 show the export share and the trade 
intensity indicators, respectively. 
Export Sharei[%X𝑖] =  
Exportsi[US$]
Exportsi[US$]+Importsi[US$] 
         (Equation 9) 
 
                                                          
24 Certainly, this result is conservative, since it is unlikely to be cost-effective. 
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Trade Intensityi[%TIi] =  
Exportsi[US$]+Importsi[US$] 
Gross Value Productioni[US$] 
       (Equation 10) 
The export share represents the sectorial export (or import) orientation, for which values 
above 50% indicate that a sector is export-oriented. The export share (%Xi) indicator is 
equal to the sectorial exports (Xi) divided by the sum of sectorial imports (Mi) and exports 
(Xi). Similarly, the trade intensity expresses sectorial trade orientation, that is, how much 
the trade activity is relevant for the sector in relation to its gross value production 
(depending on the denominator). In this analysis, the trade intensity (TIi) indicator is equal 
to the sum of Xi and Mi over the gross value of production (GVPi), for which values above 
50% represent propensity to trade. 
Table 22 presents the results for the export share and the trade intensity for each subsector. 
According to the results, the Pulp and Paper subsector is export-oriented (76% of export 
share), while the Chemicals sector is import-oriented (import share varies from 14% to 
31%, depending on the segment). Moreover, trade intensity is a metric that represents the 
exposure of the sectorial production to international trade – e.g., Cement, Lime and Glass 
sectors are less exposed to international trade (11%) while Aluminum is highly exposed 
(53%). 
 
Table 22 – Sectorial export share and trade intensity – year 2010 




Value - GVPi  
(US$ millions) 














Aluminum 22,359 7,170 4,761 60% 53% 
Cement, Lime 
and Glass 
30,092 1,731 1,679 51% 11% 
Pig Iron and 
Steel 
42,952 7,893 5,277 60% 31% 
Pulp and Paper 26,387 5,608 1,751 76% 28% 






4.2.2.4. Carbon Leakage Risk under Different Methodologies 
After evaluating the impacts on the Brazilian industry considering the indicators used in 
the three methodologies presented in the previous section – emission intensity (EI), 
carbon cost (CC), and trade intensity (TI) –, this subsection aims to assess the risk of 
carbon leakage per subsector considering the different methodologies discussed (EU 
ETS, California Cap-and-Trade and Australian CPM). As a result, subsectors that are 
more vulnerable to this risk will be highlighted, assisting in the design of CPI that will 
take into account the mitigation of such impacts. 
Table 18 summarizes the quantitative indicators and the thresholds that determine 
exposure to carbon leakage per methodologies, while Table 23 indicates the level of risk 
that each subsector would face. The importance of analyzing the risk of carbon leakage 
considering different methodologies is because their use results in different levels of risk 
per sector. For example, a sector can be considered as having a high risk of exposure to 
carbon leakage in a given methodology while presenting a medium risk in another. In this 
way, the main objective is to understand, from different approaches, which sectors are 
more risk-prone considering the different methodologies analyzed.
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Table 23 – Carbon leakage risk comparison considering different methodologies 







millions)             
[C] = [A]/[B] 
Carbon Cost (%) 
according to 




























Risk No risk 
M H H M H M 25 3,7% Risk No risk 







No risk No risk 
M M M M H M 25 10,9% No risk Risk 
50 21,7% No risk Risk 







H H H M H M 25 14,3% Risk Risk 
50 28,5% Risk Risk 





No risk No risk 
L H M M H M 25 2,0% No risk No risk 






Risk No risk 
L H M M H M 25 1,9% Risk No risk 
50 3,7% Risk No risk 
Note: H: high; M: medium; L: low
                                                          
25 EIVA was chosen as the emission intensity indicator in the Australian CPM methodology aiming at comparing itself with the other two methodologies, since EIVA considers 




From the use of different methodologies for assessing the risk of carbon leakage, an important 
conclusion emerges. The methodological definition for assigning the sectorial risk of exposure 
to carbon leakage into its different levels - no risk, low, medium and high, for example - is 
fundamental to the configuration of a CPI. Besides, there are several design features of risk 
tests that must also be taken into account when assessing risk criteria. As Table 23 shows, 
different results are found when using methodologies from EU ETS, California Cap-and-Trade 
and Australian CPM. 
Among the three methodologies, the EU ETS is the only one in which the carbon leakage risk 
test employs an in/out approach. This means that a sector is either at risk or not at all, 
characterizing a certain inflexibility and rigidity of the methodology. Nevertheless, the revised 
ETS Directive outlines four criteria for defining if a sector or subsector is deemed to be exposed 
to a significant risk of carbon leakage. In case a sector would qualify for one of these, it would 
obtain free allocation of allowances (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL, 2009), subjected to review at least every 5 years (SATO, 2015). Through these 
criteria, the methodology became more flexible. 
As SFS Economics (2011) concludes while comparing EU ETS and Australian CPM, the risk 
tests in the latter seem to be more focused than in the former. All subsectors analyzed were 
considered as medium carbon leakage risk under the Australian CPM. Instead, considering the 
EU ETS methodology in the stand-alone test approach two subsectors were considered no-risk 
subsectors. They are Cement, Lime and Glass and Pulp and Paper. This is due to the fact that, 
for a sector to have a risk of carbon leakage in the stand-alone test approach, it is necessary that 
either the carbon cost or the trade intensity has to be higher than 30%, which ends up including 
many sectors in EU ETS Carbon Leakage List (CLL). 
Still in the EU ETS methodology, but analyzing the combined test approach, under a 
US$10/tCO2 carbon price, only the Pig Iron and Steel subsector is considered at risk of carbon 
leakage. When the carbon price grows to US$25/tCO2, the Cement, Lime and Glass subsector 
became part of this list. Those subsectors considered under carbon leakage risk would receive 
an amount of free allowances, in case of an ETS implementation. Nevertheless, even under a 
US$50/tCO2 carbon price, Pulp and Paper, and Chemicals do not face carbon leakage risk, 
especially because of their lower emissions intensity. These results reinforce the feasibility of 
implementing a CPI in the industry sector. 
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Looking at the California Cap-and-Trade methodology, a different perspective comes to the 
table, because the exposure risk is leveled between low (L), medium (M) and high (H). In 
addition, another particular attribute is included in this methodology, due to the fact that none 
of the tests is used on a stand-alone basis. Thus, from the Californian approach, Aluminum and 
Pig Iron and Steel subsectors were classified as higher exposure to carbon leakage risk, while 
all the other subsectors were considered at a medium risk. No subsector was classified under 
low risk. 
Comparing these outcomes with the EU ETS methodology, the same result is achieved from 
the stand-alone test, i.e., these sectors (Aluminum and Pig Iron and Steel) were considered at 
risk of carbon leakage no matter the price of carbon. When considering the combined tests, Pig 
Iron and Steel is still considered under risk, however the Aluminum sector is only considered 
from US$50/tCO2, besides Cement, Lime and Glass subsector is included from US$25/tCO2. 
Similar to the EU ETS, in the California Cap-and-Trade, installations in high-risk sectors 
receive 100% of their allocation for free during a given period, while the allocation sinks from 
100% in 2013-2014 to 75% in 2015-2017 and 50% in 2018-2020 for the medium category. Free 
allocation sinks even faster in the low-risk group, from 100% in 2013-2014 to 50% in 2015-
2017 and 30% in 2018-2020 (CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, 2011). In the 
industrial Brazilian case, all subsectors would receive an amount of free allowances (in a ETS 
case)  
A criticism can be made to the California Cap-and-Trade and Australian CPM methodologies. 
Both use absolute number thresholds for emissions intensity indicators, which are difficult to 
interpret. For example, the thresholds for highly emissions-intensive activities in the California 
Cap-and-Trade is 5,000 tonnes of CO2eq per million USD value added, while in the Australian 
CPM it is 6,000 tonnes CO2eq over 1 million AUD of value added. As a matter of fact, it is 
difficult to value the relevance of these thresholds, which can be considered a vulnerability (or 
even a weak point) of the methodology. 
Finally, taking into account the specific results from the Australian CPM methodology, one can 
verify that all subsectors were considered under a medium carbon leakage risk, with no 
subsector classified as high or no risk. Under this mechanism, if the sector passes the trade 
exposure criteria, free allocation is provided in a graduated manner, based on the activities’ 
emissions intensity. Considering this perspective, all industrial subsectors should receive free 
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allocation, because they all were classified as under risk of trade exposure. Moderately 
emissions-intensive activities receive 66% free allocation in this methodology, declining by 
1.3% per year (DECCEE, 2011a), so in the Brazilian industrial case all subsectors should 
receive this amount, because they all were classified as moderately emissions-intensive. 
Summing up, it is possible to highlight some conclusions. Considering the three methodologies 
analyzed, all subsectors would face some carbon risk (medium to high), except the Pulp and 
Paper, in the specific case of using the EU ETS methodology. In all other scenarios, at least a 
medium carbon leakage exposure would become an expected but a not desired outcome of a 
CPI on the Brazilian industrial sector, as concluded by SANTOS et al. (2018). An average result 
would arise from using the Australian CPM methodology, when all subsectors would be 
classified as medium-risk. If the California Cap-and-Trade methodology is applied, all sectors 





5. Proposals of Institutional Frameworks for Carbon Pricing Instruments 
This chapter aims to define and compare possible institutional arrangements for carbon pricing 
in the Brazilian industrial sector, in addition to proposing a particular arrangement that is 
believed to be more appropriate. To do so, besides making use of the information analyzed in 
the previous chapters, especially chapters 2, 3 and 4, it is also evaluated possible interactions 
between a pricing instrument in the industry with instruments in other sectors that relate directly 
(or indirectly) with the industry, being such sectors outside the scope of this thesis. Such 
specific analysis can be found in Annex C. 
 
5.1. Defining Institutional Frameworks 
It is possible to define a large and diverse number of possible CPI arrangements for the Brazilian 
industry. This section seeks to present some possibilities that have been identified as viable 
alternatives to implement a pricing instrument in this sector. 
The definition of possible institutional arrangements contemplates the combination of the 
following elements: type of price instrument (carbon tax or ETS); scope of emissions (total 
or only process emissions); and characterization of the instrument (in the case of a carbon 
tax, the recycling ways, and, in the case of an ETS, the forms of allocation). 
Some elements of analysis should be highlighted when comparing different combinations of 
institutional arrangements. First of all, although from a (microeconomic) theoretical point of 
view a tax and an ETS are equivalent, in practice the definition of the type of instrument can 
have a significant impact on the results in terms of emissions, economic effects on the sectors 
and cost of implementation (WORLD BANK et al., 2018; CPLC, 2016; CEBDS, 2016). 
The result in terms of emissions depends, in the case of a carbon tax, on the reaction capacity 
of the industrial subsectors to the price signals and the ability to pass-through costs. In this case, 
it is difficult for the regulator to predict the final effect in terms of emission reductions due to 
information failures with respect to the costs of abatement of the agents. In the ETS case, 
emission reductions depend on the emission ceiling (cap) defined for the sectors, and its goal is 
guaranteed by the aggregate emission ceiling. However, also due to information failures, there 
is uncertainty in the trading price in an ETS. These uncertainties can have negative effects on 
the investment decisions of the agents, since there is no guarantee on the return on the abatement 
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investment. Therefore, a carbon pricing instrument through taxation generates greater 
incentives for dynamic efficiency26, although there is greater uncertainty regarding the amount 
of mitigation in the case of tribute versus market price uncertainties. 
As discussed in chapter 2, elements such as transaction costs, flexibility and acceptability by 
agents should also be considered. ETS has transaction costs that need to be measured, especially 
in the absence of revenues from carbon pricing (free allowance). The market, however, is more 
flexible than taxation, allowing for easier adjustment of inflation and costs, entry of new agents, 
banking and borrowing and interaction with other sectors (offsets). Finally, the 
acceptance/rejection of the instrument should be considered, with the tax (or ETS with auctions) 
being less accepted by the agents due to the additional tax burden (SANTOS et al., 2018; 
PEREIRA and BERTHOLINI, 2017). Moreover, from direct dialogues with the Brazilian 
industry, it was possible to ascertain the repulsion that the sector, in general, presents against 
the introduction of more taxes, fact that will be better explored in section 5.2. 
The second element to define the institutional arrangements for carbon pricing – emissions 
scope – influences the cost-effectiveness of the instrument and the interaction/necessity for 
complementary instruments. A pricing instrument will reduce emissions in a more cost effective 
manner as the number of participating sectors increases, allowing the use of mitigation options 
with lower abatement costs. A broader scope of emissions allows for a greater number of 
abatement options. Likewise, a broader scope (e.g. including energy emissions) reduces the 
need to formulate other specific instruments to deal with outside emissions of the original 
instrument scope. 
Third, in the case of a carbon tax, the income allocation (recycling way) must be analyzed, in 
order to avoid the loss of purchasing power of the families and/or the loss of competitiveness 
of the industrial subsectors. In the case of ETS, one must consider the allowance allocation 
strategy (free or auction), which can, in turn, influence several aspects of this instrument. In 
this case, the main distinction is made between instruments that generate revenue for the 
regulator or not. In case the revenue generation exists, they can be recycled for a particular 
purpose. However, the payment leads companies to incur an additional burden of payment, 
when compared to the free allocation case, which makes difficult to implement the instrument. 
                                                          
26 Dynamic efficiency refers to long-term incentives to reduce abatement costs based on the incentives provided 
by the pricing instrument. 
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As a result, two groups of alternatives are evaluated: carbon tax and ETS. Each group is 
subdivided by type of covered emissions (process or total). Finally, a third subdivision occurs 
regarding the characterization of the instrument: in the carbon tax case, two recycling options 
are evaluated, namely support to families and support to the industry, while in the ETS case, 
two allocation options are evaluated: for free or auction. Table 24 schematizes the analyzed 
alternatives. 
 
Table 24 – Institutional Frameworks – Alternatives 














Aimed at Families 
(1) 
A.a.1. 


































Finally, the evaluation of the proposed institutional arrangements will, in particular, consider 
the effects on purchasing power and competitiveness. In this way, the proposition of 
arrangements will try to seek as a key element of its formulation the attempt to minimize 
negative effects on these two aspects. In this sense, revenue recycling, when available, will play 
a key role in defining and implementing the CPI. 
 
5.1.1. Group 1 – Carbon Tax 
Among the tax typologies, discussed in section 3.4.3., a carbon tax would be better represented 
by a contribution, so that its recycling can be turned to a specific purpose. Therefore, if a 
possible “carbon tax” has a specific allocation to a carbon fund, for example, it should be treated 
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as a "CIDE carbon" and not as a "carbon charge". Thus, the fiscal instrument could be 
configured as a "carbon tax" or as a "carbon contribution" - depending on the existence (or not) 
of the allocation in a predetermined fund - but never as a "carbon charge". It is recalled that the 
contributions differ from the charges, since their generating facts are not activities of the State. 
Nor can they be characterized as taxes, since they have a specific destination (GIAMBIAGI 
and ALÉM, 2000). The proposal, then, would be that of a contribution, given the specific 
allocation of revenue. 
As far as the coverage of the tax is concerned, it can only refer to process emissions or total 
emissions. Certainly, this definition will have a strong impact on the CPI performance, since, 
according to the subsectorial emissions profile analyzed (section 3.3), some subsectors have 
very low process emissions - for example, Pulp and Paper. However, this same subsector have 
energy emissions almost 20 times higher than their process emissions, so the reality of the sector 
would change a lot in front of the introduction of a CPI that covered the total emissions. 
Regarding the revenue recycling ways discussed in section 4.1.2.2., whose objective is to 
mitigate the impacts of the implementation of the CPI in Brazilian industry, it is concluded that 
the following three cases do not need to be analyzed: recycling aimed at reducing other taxes, 
the general government budget and investment in climate funds. In the first one, it is identified 
a great difficulty of implementation due to the need of a broad Tax Reform, a reform that is 
currently under discussion in the National Congress, but without major advances. In the second 
case, it is observed some difficulties concerning the return of the revenues derived from carbon-
pricing, since such revenues could not be focused on reducing the loss of purchasing power 
and/or competitiveness given the fiscal constraints faced by Brazil. Therefore, these two 
recycling ways will not be considered, since the CPI is intended to ensure that such revenue is 
returned to actions aimed at climate change. 
In addition, there is no justification for analyzing the case of investments in climate funds, since 
there is no guarantee that this revenue recycling alternative will mitigate the impact on the 
industry, nor the impact on households' purchasing power. Thus, in order to reverse the revenue 
for a predetermined purpose, a carbon tax would come in the form of a contribution. Also, in 
order to avoid the loss of purchasing power of families and/or the loss of competitiveness of 
companies, the proposals for recycling are: support to families and support to industry. The 




5.1.1.1. Alternative A.a.1 
This alternative shows a carbon tax in the form of a contribution, covering only process 
emissions, whose revenue is aimed at reducing the negative effects on households' purchasing 
power. Recycling can be done through direct transfers, reducing taxes on families, subsidies or 
assistance programs. 
 
5.1.1.2. Alternative A.a.2  
In this alternative, the carbon tax would be implemented as a contribution, covering only the 
process emissions, and its revenues would provide support to the industry, with a view to 
reducing the effects on competitiveness. The contribution can be recycled through financing for 
production and investment, tax credits, support for RD&I, or energy efficiency programs. 
 
5.1.1.2. Alternative A.b.1  
This alternative is equivalent to alternative A.a.1., but total emissions are considered, not just 
process emissions. 
 
5.1.1.2. Alternative A.b.2  
This alternative is equivalent to alternative A.a.2., but total emissions are considered, not just 
process emissions. 
 
5.1.2. Group 2 – ETS 
This group provides for an emission allowance market focusing on two emissions coverage 
possibilities: only industrial process emissions or total emissions. In the first case, although 
industrial energy emissions would not be considered in the ETS, they could be priced through 
a carbon tax. In the case of total emissions being priced, there would be no need for 
complementary pricing mechanisms to cover energy emissions as in the previous case. 
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In general, the alternatives of permits allocation differ in this group due to the additional burden 
of transferring revenue to the regulator through the purchase of certificates at the initial 
moment. There are two possibilities: (i) donation, in which the certificates are allocated free of 
charge among the agents; (ii) through some type of charge for the initial allocation of the 
certificates, usually through an auction system. Within these two cases, the issue of certificates 
can be done in an absolute (through the total amount of emissions) or relative way (through a 
benchmark). Therefore, two alternatives of allocation based on (i) and (ii) above will be 
proposed, considering that the marketing of certificates between agents in the ETS may generate 
revenues or expenses, depending on the initial amount. 
 
5.1.2.1. Alternative B.a.1. 
Considering only the industrial process emissions, this alternative takes into account a market 
of permits with free initial allocation of certificates. In an ideal distribution, the only cost to be 
incurred by the agents, in aggregate form, is the cost of abatement (either by the agent himself 
or by another one who sold him the certificate). 
 
5.1.2.2. Alternative B.a.2. 
This alternative is equivalent to the previous alternative (B.a.1.), so only the process emissions 
are considered, but in this case the certificates for industrial process emissions are sold to the 
agents through an auction system, and no longer distributed free of charge. Thus, in addition to 
the expenses incurred with abatement costs, agents also incur the cost of certificates for the 
amount of emissions they could not afford to pay ("double burden"). 
It should be noted that in this alternative there is revenue generation by the regulator, which can 
be reversed to support the industry or families, as well as the revenues from a possible carbon 




5.1.2.2. Alternative B.b.1. 
This alternative is equivalent to the alternative B.a.1., but the energy emissions of the industry 
are incorporated, so the total emissions of the sector are covered. Similarly, this alternative 
offers a free initial allocation through an absolute or relative amount of certificates. 
 
5.1.3.2. Alternative B.b.2. 
This alternative is equivalent to alternative B.a.2, therefore it considers the total emissions, 
besides the initial allocation based on the auction of the permits, being able to be done in 
absolute or relative terms of certificates. Similarly, there is generation of revenue from the 
auctions, which can be reversed to support industry or families. 
 
 
5.2. Analytical Comparison of Proposals  
From the analyses carried out in the previous chapters and the presentation of possible 
institutional frameworks, it is possible to propose and compare the different arrangements of 
carbon pricing for the industrial sector. This comparison will be based on a SWOT Analysis 
(Table 25), whose main objective is to analyze the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the 
opportunities and the threats of each of the different climate policies. 
According to CHIAVENATO and SAPIRO (2003), this analysis’ function is to cross 
opportunities and threats (external/exogenous) with strengths and weaknesses 
(internal/endogenous). This evaluation, therefore, seeks to perform an environment analysis 
and serves to position or verify the situation of a company, a policy or a strategy. As SERRA, 
TORRES and TORRES (2004:28) conclude, "the primary function of SWOT Analysis is to 
enable an appropriate strategy to be chosen - to achieve certain objectives - from a critical 
assessment of internal and external environments." 
In this way, carbon pricing proposals for the Brazilian industry can be analyzed and compared 
in terms of strengths and opportunities in relation to weaknesses and threats, favoring the 
possibilities of aligning each of these proposals with the reality of the sector. After carring out 




Table 25 – SWOT analysis of proposed CPI alternatives for industrial subsectors 
Source: Own elaboration 




process emissions with 
recycling for families 
Stability of value for pricing 
Reducing the potential effect of loss of 
purchasing power by households 
Does not consider energy emissions, then it needs 
to resort to another mechanism 
Resistance by industry 
Possibility of harming CPI discussions in the 
sector 
Does not solve the potential loss of 
competitiveness of the export-oriented industrial 
subsectors 
Initial mechanism for wider taxation in 
the future 
Greater incentive to dynamic efficiency 
Possible positive effect for sectors of 
final consumer goods 
Opportunity to carry out distributive 
policy 
Favors discussions on Tax Reform 
Possible effects on the trade balance 
Possible inflationary effects 
Possible effects on international 
competitiveness 
Possible carbon leakage 




process emissions with 
recycling to support 
industry 
Stability of value for pricing 
Engagement of the industrial sector in 
the instrument formation process 
Resistance by industry 
Possibility of harming CPI discussions in the 
sector 
Transfer of income from the consumer to the 
producer, generating possible adverse 
distributional effects 
Possible paradoxical effect, raising emissions 
Recycling to gain productivity of the 
production factors  
Greater incentive to dynamic efficiency 
Favors discussions on Tax Reform 
It may not solve the loss of household 
purchasing power 
May not generate increased 
productivity and create dependency 
Possible carbon leakage 
A.b.1.: 
Carbon Tax 
(Contribution) on total 
emissions with 
recycling for families 
Stability of value for pricing 
Reducing the potential effect of loss of 
purchasing power by households 
Broader scope - cost effectiveness 
 
Greater resistance by industry 
Greater possibility of harming CPI discussions 
in the sector 
Does not solve the potential loss of 
competitiveness of the export-oriented industrial 
subsectors 
Possible positive effect for sectors of 
final consumer goods 
Opportunity to carry out distributive 
policy 
Greater incentive to dynamic efficiency 
Favors discussions on Tax Reform 
Greater possible effects on the trade 
balance 
Greater possible inflationary effects 
Greater possible effects on 
international competitiveness 
Greater possible carbon leakage 
Possible rebound effect 
A.b.2.: 
Carbon Tax 
(Contribution) on total 
emissions with 
recycling to support 
industry 
Stability of value for pricing o 
Broader scope - cost effectiveness 
Engagement of the industrial sector in 
the instrument formation process 
 
Greater resistance by industry 
Greater possibility of harming CPI discussions 
in the sector 
Transfer of income from the consumer to the 
producer, generating possible adverse 
distributional effects 
Possible paradoxical effect, raising emissions 
Recycling to gain productivity of the 
production factors  
Greater incentive to dynamic efficiency 
Favors discussions on Tax Reform 
It may not solve the loss of household 
purchasing power 
May not generate increased 
productivity and create dependency 





ETS on process 
emissions with free 
allocation 
Ease of implementation/acceptance 
Aggregate emission range assurance 
Does not consider energy emissions, then it needs 
to resort to another mechanism 
Uncertainty about carbon price 
Transaction Costs 
Political and legal challenges 
Donating facilitates transition to CPI 
Initial mechanism, targeting other forms 
of wider allocation in the future 
Extensive international and national 
experience (CDM) 
Future opportunity for integration with 
other international markets 
Interaction with offsets 
Windfall profits and/or implicit 
subsidies 
Collusive actions/market control with 
price impact 
B.a.2.:  
ETS on process 
emissions with auction 
allocation 
Generates revenue  
Knowledge of prices, does not distort 
incentives and reward previous actions 
Aggregate emission range assurance 
Does not consider energy emissions, then it needs 
to resort to another mechanism 
Uncertainty about carbon price 
Transaction Costs 
Double burden - low acceptance 
Recycling of revenue in the same way as 
recycling of carbon tax 
Incentive to dynamic efficiency 
Extensive international and national 
experience (CDM) 
Future opportunity for integration with 
other international markets 
Interaction with offsets 
Collusive actions/market control with 
price impact  
Injury to smaller companies 
Very efficient MRV system need 
B.b.1.: 
ETS on total emissions 
with free allocation  
Ease of implementation/acceptance 
Aggregate emission range assurance 
Broader scope - cost effectiveness 
Complexity in implementation and MRV  
Does not value previous actions 
Uncertainty about carbon price 
Transaction Costs 
Donating facilitates transition to CPI 
Initial mechanism, targeting other forms 
of wider allocation in the future 
It shows interdependence and reinforces 
the need for intersectorial cooperation 
(offsets) 
Extensive international and national 
experience (CDM) 
Future opportunity for integration with 
other international markets 
Windfall profits and/or implicit 
subsidies 
B.b.2.: 
ETS on total emissions 
with auction allocation  
Knowledge of prices, does not distort 
incentives and reward previous actions 
Generates revenue  
Aggregate emission range assurance 
Broader scope - cost effectiveness 
Complexity in implementation and MRV 
Uncertainty about carbon price 
Transaction Costs 
Double burden - low acceptance  
Political and legal challenges 
Recycling of revenue in the same way as 
recycling of carbon tax 
It shows interdependence and reinforces 
the need for intersectorial cooperation 
(offsets) 
Extensive international and national 
experience (CDM) 
Future opportunity for integration with 
other international markets 
Injury to smaller companies 






From the information in Table 25, it is possible to analyze the main strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats of the proposed alternatives. Given the specificity of the 
characterization of each alternative, it is observed that they have advantages and 
disadvantages, so that choosing one of them will be a direct function of their impacts, as 
well as political will and a possible sectorial lobby. 
Regarding the choice of the CPI, it is believed that an ETS in the Brazilian industry would 
be more receptive to the sector, as well as suffer less political and legal challenges. This 
conclusion is based on a series of arguments, which will be presented below. Initially, 
and as discussed in chapter 3, given the complexity of the Brazilian tax system and the 
high tax burden, any attempt on taxation will face resistance from the population and 
companies (SANTOS et al., 2018; PEREIRA and BERTHOLINI, 2017). In this context, 
despite the process of Tax Reform, currently under discussion in the National Congress, 
it offers an opportunity to introduce tax instruments aimed at achieving the objectives of 
climate policy, it is not possible to see the effective realization of such reform in the short 
or medium term, especially due to the constant changes of political conjuncture and the 
uncertainties regarding the process of this reform in the Congress. Therefore, there is no 
political environment conducive to tax discussions. The PMR workshops about the 
Component 1, with the participation of the government, academia and companies of the 
industrial sector, also concluded that ETS would be more interesting than carbon taxes. 
Despite the administrative simplicity of a tax, regulated entities generally prefer the 
emissions trading strategy. This preference is related to the desire to avoid an increase in 
the tax burden and to the possibility that fiscal revenues can be directed to investments 
that are not related to the climate transition (depending on the choice of the recycling 
way). In many cases, an ETS would provide regulated entities with greater flexibility and 
provide a fair basis for involvement in the climate change. This conclusion is also shared 
by the Brazilian Business Council for Sustainable Development (CEBDS) in a recent 
study on carbon pricing in the Brazilian industry, based on dialogues carried out directly 
with the sector (CEBDS, 2018). 
Still, from the international experience (as discussed in chapter 2), especially focusing on 
the neighbors of Latin America, one can observe the region has gradually developed a 






to fossil fuels. It should be noted, however, that the introduction of carbon taxes in 
countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, for example, was directly 
associated with and resulted from tax reforms in these countries (KONRAD 
ADENAUER STIFTUNG and GVCES, 2018). Despite this feature, transitions to an ETS 
from a carbon tax instrument, as already done by Mexico in 2018 and under consideration 
in the previous mentioned countries, suggest that carbon taxes have been used as 
transitional instruments for the development of ETS.  
In this scenario, the implementation of an ETS in the Brazilian industry would allow for 
possible market linkages. Such possibility becomes even more relevant in the context of 
the Carbon Pricing in the Americas (CPA)27, a cooperative framework launched in 
December 2017 by the government leaders of Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
México, the Governors of California and Washington in the US, and the Premiers of 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec in Canada. It vows to 
strengthen MRV schemes, develop common standards, share best practices, build 
capacities and engage stakeholders, whilst asserting CPIs’ role as a central feature in 
climate policies. These market linkages conclusions were strongly highlighted in the 
Latin America Carbon Pricing Forum 2018 that took place in Sao Paulo in 2018, whose 
main outcomes are summarized in the policy brief “Carbon pricing instruments in Latin 
America” (KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG and GVCES, 2018). CEBDS (2018) 
also reinforces such conclusions. 
Looking beyond the Latin America region, Brazil's strategic trading partners, such as 
China and the European Union (EU) already have a functioning ETS, and by participating 
in this movement, the Brazilian industry could take advantage of the lessons learned from 
such experiences - which were analyzed in chapter 2 - in addition to possibly expand their 
presence in these economic markets. However, Brazil can also take advantage of its own 
experience in the context of the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), as the country 
was one of the main participants in the creation and regulation of this flexible instrument 
under Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                          
27 Available at: 
<https://www.ieta.org/resources/News/Press_Releases/2017/Declaration%20on%20Carbon%20Pricing_F






Also, within the framework of the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) - as 
highlighted in chapter 3 -, the country established the Brazilian Emission Reduction 
Market (MBRE), which since 2009 aims to encourage the development of projects. 
Although CDM was a trade experience with Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol, 
MBRE transactions could enable the BM&FBOVESPA stock exchange to develop 
business instruments for the carbon market in an organized and transparent manner. Thus, 
the MBRE could provide input on how to develop an ETS in Brazilian industry. 
Another more recent and relevant experience for a future national market is the 
Businesses for Climate Platform, an initiative of the Center for Sustainability Studies 
(GVces) of the School of Business Administration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. This 
platform simulates a commercial emissions system, and it has 23 voluntary companies 
from various sectors of the Brazilian economy - not limited to the industrial sector 
(GVCES, 2017). This platform, which has been in operation since 2014, has its 
transactions made through the trading platform of the Rio’s Green Stock Exchange 
(BVRio), based on the rules of the EU ETS and California Cap-and-Trade - both analyzed 
in this thesis. Its regulations and parameters are reviewed annually, from the actual data 
of companies’ emissions, so that such experience can also offer insights on how to operate 
on an ETS. 
Still, some of the large Brazilian companies monitor, report and verify their GHG 
emissions on a voluntary basis on platforms such as the Brazilian GHG Protocol Program 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Climate Change, and there are also reports on 
the mandatory state systems managed. This experience with MRV can also be valuable 
in efforts to standardize accounting and reporting regulations in the Brazilian carbon 
market. 
Regarding emissions coverage, it should be emphasized that a CPI will be more cost 
effective as the number of emission sources/sectors participating increases, allowing the 
use of mitigation options with lower abatement costs, so a broader scope of emissions 
enables a greater number of abatement options. In this way, it is proposed the coverage 
of the total emissions and not only the process emissions. If only the process emissions 
are covered, there would be the need for the energy emissions to be priced by means of a 






considering the total emissions, there would be no need for complementary pricing 
mechanisms. Moreover, in the particular case of this thesis, considering total emissions 
becomes even more relevant in the context of which only the industrial subsectors with 
process emissions are considered (as highlighted in chapter 3), therefore other mitigation 
options (perhaps, with lower abatement costs) are no longer contemplated, due to the 
sectorial methodological cut28. Also, encompassing total emissions brings the opportunity 
to include other industrial sectors’ emissions, therefore increasing the competitiveness 
across the ETS and enabling gains in the system’s cost effectiveness. 
When considering an ETS, the scope also influences the atomization of the market. In 
order for the equilibrium price of a market to be efficient and adequately represent the 
marginal cost of abatement (that is, in order for the price of the permit to be equal to the 
marginal cost of the last abatement unit), it is necessary to have a competing market. 
When considering only the process emissions, a great concentration of emissions is 
observed in few agents, who could have market power to influence prices and to move 
away from the condition of allocative efficiency. 
Finally, regarding the characterization of the instrument (free allocation or auction), it can 
be concluded from chapter 4 that at least a medium carbon leakage exposure would 
become an expected but not a desired outcome of the CPI on the Brazilian industrial 
sector. From the international experience analyzed in chapter 2, the allocation method is 
crucial when designing an ETS, especially for the carbon leakage risk sectors. For this 
reason, free allocation is proposed for the subsectors analyzed, at least during the 
beginning of the ETS operation29. Such propose is also in line with the discussions held 
in the PMR workshops, as well as with the study developed by CEBDS (2018). As a best 
practice also discussed in chapter 2, especially from the EU ETS lessons, the proposed 
ETS should be phased in over five-year periods so that adjustments and corrections of 
possible market imperfections may occur. 
                                                          
28 It is noteworthy that such sectorial follows the characterization used by the Ministry of Finance (MF), 
within the scope of the PMR project, and the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services (MDIC) in 
the context of the Industry Plan (MDIC, 2013). 
29 An ETS with auction would be equal to a carbon tax, since, in addition to the costs incurred with 
abatement costs, the agents also incurred in the cost of certificates for the amount of emissions they could 






As the free allocation system was chosen as a proposal, it is necessary to determine the 
distribution criteria of these allowances. Historical emissions, production level or other 
pre-set standard can be used to define this distribution pattern (IEA, 2000). Traditionally, 
it has been the form adopted by the markets that begin their operations, as the international 
experience pointed out (discussed in chapter 2). This form of distribution reduces the 
costs of the program to the regulated sectors, since they receive an asset free of charge, 
besides eliminating the costs added to the firms, without any implication in the efficiency 
of the program and with clear political advantages (BAUMOL and OATES, 1988).  
The grandfathering (GF) option, in which past emissions are generally used to define 
future needs for certificates, is proposed as the free allocation method. It requires 
consistent emission data and a special attention should be given to the issue of 
reservations to incoming companies – they will need new allocation criteria – and how to 
deal with those who have closed their activities. Furthermore, such a system is a more 
politically feasible possibility for starting a CPI, while maintaining the possibility of 
gradually migrating towards auction systems. As a conclusion, the CPI design proposed 











This chapter summarizes this thesis and presents its main conclusions, besides evaluating 
the main limitations and possible future studies that can be carried out from these results 
(and limitations) found in this thesis. 
 
6.1. Main Conclusions 
After the COP 21 and the subsequent adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, 
the outlook for carbon pricing policies has been widened. While the Agreement does not 
directly make room for a global carbon price, the provisions set out in Article 6 have the 
potential to increase international cooperation in favor of mitigation through market 
mechanisms (CEBDS, 2016).  
During the conference, Brazil announced a target to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% if 
compared to 2005 levels by 2025 and the intention to reduce 43% of such emissions by 
2030. Several mitigation strategies were envisioned and quantitatively described in the 
Brazilian NDC to be achieved by 2030, such as reforestation and increase in the share of 
bioenergy in the Brazilian energy system (GURGEL and PALTSEV, 2017; MCTI, 
2016a). However, considering the industrial sector, there are neither details nor precise 
quantifications. Brazil’s NDC only mentions that “the industrial sector should promote 
mitigation actions based on new clean technologies standards, energy efficiency measures 
and low carbon infrastructure” (BRAZIL, 2015a, b).  
Thus, one can characterize as a vague and comprehensive the previsions of the Brazilian 
NDC regarding the industrial sector, which makes it difficult to measure the low emission 
efforts to be directed to the industrial sector, as well as potential results of the measures 
adopted. On the other hand, NDC’s generality makes it possible to consider the various 
mitigation opportunities, especially taking into account the fact that the Brazilian NDC 
also considers the possible use of market mechanisms, although there is no indication as 
to how these instruments would be used. According to the text, the country reserves its 
position on the possibility of using the mechanisms that may be established under the 






Although NDC does not describe how or whether carbon will be priced in Brazil, studies 
to evaluate possible CPI impacts in the country have been considered by the Federal 
Government at least since 2011 (MF, 2014). In addition, there are a number of studies 
that quantitatively analyze the economic impacts on the Brazilian industry given the 
implementation of CPIs, considering ETS, carbon tax or hybrid systems. Still, there is a 
gap with regard to more focused studies capable of analyzing these impacts considering 
different policy and instrument designs. At the same time, few national studies analyze 
the economic impacts of CPIs in both domestic and international perspectives, taking into 
account competitiveness indicators, international trade, and commercial balance. 
Additionally, such studies fail to investigate existing indirect impacts on other economic 
sectors, once intersectorial connections are also present. Theses aspects also configure a 
relevant void in the literature and this thesis aimed to fill it.  
In this context, the primary benefit of a well-designed competitiveness policy is that it 
would mitigate and potentially eliminate risks to competitiveness. It is widely recognized 
that the problem of carbon leakage poses a major challenge for designing effective 
unilateral policies aimed at mitigating global climate change, reason why this topic 
represents one of the major analysis of this thesis, whose general goal is to propose an 
institutional framework for CPI in the Brazilian industry directed to reduce its domestic 
vulnerability and international trade exposure. 
For that, the international experience was reviewed in chapter 2. When looking at the ETS 
experiences, four cases were analyzed: EU ETS, California Cap-and-Trade, NZ ETS, and 
China ETS. They were compared in terms of emissions cap, allowance allocation and 
distributional method, price control mechanisms, carbon leakage assessment, 
international linking possibilities, and carbon revenue management. Regarding carbon 
taxes experiences, the following practices were inspected: Norway’s Carbon Tax, British 
Columbia Carbon Tax, Australian CPM, and Mexico Carbon Tax. They were compared 
in terms of pricing settings, sectorial coverage, carbon leakage assessment, and carbon 
revenue management. 
Some lessons can be learnt from these international experiences. An ETS, rolled out with 
dynamically adjustable emission caps based on stakeholder feedback and new emissions 






emissions reductions. An ambitious coverage and free allowances seem to be initially 
more politically palatable, but transitioning to auctioning of allowances over time (e.g., 
California and EU ETS phase 3) ensures simultaneous revenue generation. Besides, a 
price floor/ceiling (or “collar”) creates a more stable market with less price volatility (e.g., 
California Cap-and-Trade) and may lower compliance costs in the long run. International 
linkage benefits smaller markets by reducing abatement costs, increasing liquidity, and 
achieving cost effectiveness, and soft linkages to offset markets without a cap on such 
offsets can result in excess supply and price collapse (e.g., NZ ETS). Finally, managing 
the level of price caps, the percentage of banking and borrowing between phases, the 
amount of reserve allowances, and the ability to adjust these levers quickly in the market 
could ensure a predictable marketplace with stable prices and sufficient liquidity. 
Relatively to carbon taxes lessons, four cases were analyzed: Norway’s Carbon Tax. 
British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, Australia CPM, and Mexico Carbon Tax. Conclusion 
highlight that low tax rates per ton of CO2 (e.g., Mexico) with no mechanisms to increase 
the future tax rate may reduce and eventually nullify the price effect of the tax on emission 
reductions over time. In addition, a clear, stable, and steady tax rate increase is necessary 
to drive deeper emission reductions, as well as to send transparent market signals to 
private actors that climate policy is a long-term and economy-wide policy. Exempting 
emission-intensive trade competitive sectors (e.g., shipping in Norway and natural gas in 
Mexico, and industry in the four experiences) from carbon taxation undermines the 
purpose of a carbon tax. Still, for systems that impose both a carbon tax and ETS across 
sectors (for instance, Norway and Mexico), it is important to identify whether there is an 
overlap of carbon tax and ETS on the same emissions base (e.g., the electricity and 
industrial sectors in Norway) and ensure that the overlap does not have distributional 
consequences or lead to increased, economically-inefficient abatement costs. From the 
international experience, some CPI begins as a carbon tax and then they become (or starts 
to interact) with an ETS (e.g., Mexico). 
It should be noted that the introduction of a CPI could have a number of effects and 
impacts on economic sectors, especially on the more carbon intensive ones. Certainly, 
such impacts can influence the competitiveness of a sector, being directly associated with 
some possible risks, among which economic, environmental and political risks, which 






interrelated) questions that policy makers need to consider: (i) which sectors should be 
targeted (supported) by the leakage prevention mechanism? and (ii) what form should 
that leakage prevention mechanism take? This thesis analyzed some mitigation policies, 
among them free allowance allocations, border taxes adjustments, administrative 
exemptions, tax free thresholds, and output based rebates. The main conclusion is that 
policy makers must weigh the specific advantages and disadvantages of each leakage 
prevention measure in the context of their particular circumstances, i.e., there is no 
general rule to be applied in all situations. 
The Brazilian industry, the target sector of this thesis, was deeply analyzed in terms of 
economic characterization and sectorial emissions profile. Information regarding seven 
Brazilian industrial subsectors (Aluminum, Cement, Lime and Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron 
and Steel, and Pulp and Paper) was collected. As defined in chapter 3, the decision to 
divide the industry in these seven subsectors follows the characterization used by the 
Ministry of Finance (MF), within the scope of the PMR project, and the Industry Plan. 
Such subsectors are those that have emissions process, and, according to the analysis 
carried out in chapter 2, these are the main industrial sectors considered in the context of 
designing carbon pricing policies and their instruments.  
From an economic perspective, based on the indicators calculated from the 2010 Input-
Output Matrix (IBGE, 2015), individual analyses of sectorial characteristics were carried 
out and subsequently a comparative analysis was executed, especially in terms of sector 
importance, through its Gross Value of Production (GVP) and its Value Added (VA), in 
relation to the values of the manufacturing industry and the sectors analyzed. Then, the 
external vulnerability of these subsectors is evaluated by the Export Coefficient (EC).  
With regard to the emissions profile, subsectorial details were presented, based on the 
Third National Communication of Brazil to the UNFCCC (MCTI, 2015), and also a 
comparative analysis was performed. The compilation of the results indicates a total of 
121,493 GgCO2 equivalent in 2010, being 61.4% of this value associated with industrial 
process emissions, while the rest (38.6%) relates to the consumption of energy. Pig Iron 
and Steel sectors are the most significant, accounting for 37% of emissions, also leading 






with about 30% and 14% respectively, that also presented the two largest volumes of 
energy emissions, with around 30%.  
The mapping of existing sectorial policies was also carried out in chapter 3, organized 
into five policy groups, as in the methodology carried out in the Brazilian PMR Project – 
Component 1 (industrial sector): (i) sectorial stimulus policies, (ii) rational use of 
resources policies, (iii) tax policies, (iv) climate policies and (v) environmental policies 
with emphasis on atmospheric emission control. Its qualitative analysis was developed in 
chapter 4, by identifying effect (i) on the agents’ competitiveness; (ii) social impacts 
focusing on the consumers’ purchasing power; and (iii) the national level of emissions of 
GHG. Another qualitative analysis related to the effects of different CPI designs (ETS: 
allocation methods; carbon tax: recycling ways) was carried out, looking at the same three 
impacts. The results from these qualitative assessments were used to support the CPI 
proposal in the chapter 5. 
Also, a quantitative evaluation helped to define this proposal. It was based on the 
methodologies used to analyze carbon leakage risk in three jurisdictions: EU ETS, 
California Cap-and-Trade and Australian CPM. After describing, evaluating and 
comparing their indicators, they were applied to the Brazilian industrial sector, in order 
to assess the risk of carbon leakage in the subsector level. The main conclusion obtained 
is that all subsectors would face some level of carbon risk (medium to high), except the 
Pulp and Paper in the specific case of using the EU ETS methodology. In all other 
scenarios considered, at least a medium carbon leakage exposure would become an 
expected but a not-desired outcome of a CPI on the Brazilian industrial sector, as 
concluded by SANTOS et al., (2018). An average result would arise from using the 
Australian CPM methodology, when all subsectors would be classified as medium risk. 
If the California Cap-and-Trade methodology is applied, all sectors are classified at least 
as medium-risk, being Aluminum and Pig Iron and Steel labeled as highly exposed. 
Lessons learned from the international experiences, besides the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, supported the definition of the institutional frameworks for CPI in 
the Brazilian industry. Three main points were studied: (i) analysis of the institutional 
arrangements for a CPI; (ii) evaluation and comparison of possible carbon pricing 






between the industrial sector and other sectors, such as fuels, the electricity sector and 
LULUCF. 
The results show that different instrument arrangements are better or worse depending on 
the impact to be minimized. Arrangements were evaluated with an emphasis on reducing 
effects on competitiveness and purchasing power. They are combinations of the following 
elements: type of price instrument (carbon tax or ETS); scope of emissions (total or only 
process emissions); and characterization of the instrument (in the case of a carbon tax, 
the recycling ways and, in the case of an ETS, the forms of allocation). 
Regarding the taxation options (group 1), in addition to assessing the coverage of the 
emissions necessary to guarantee the CPI, it was highlighted that the form of carbon 
recycling leads to quite different effects. If on the one hand the transference to families 
has distributive potential, it also takes a toll on the competitiveness of the industry. 
Conversely, recycling through industry support can reduce negative effects on 
competitiveness, however this approach may have perverse distributive effects 
(regressive taxation). 
It was concluded that carbon tax tends to face resistance from the industry, especially 
coming from those subsectors exposed to foreign trade, that is, that present a high risk of 
carbon leakage, reason why the biggest contribution of this thesis in terms of policy is 
that proposals related to the implementation of an ETS seem more interesting.  
In this context, considering the ETS-based arrangements (group 2), and with respect to 
the scope of emissions, it was concluded that an important element is the attempt to 
increase the atomization and competition of the carbon market, avoiding that agents with 
relatively large emissions volumes gain power and affect price formation. In this sense, 
considering the total emissions (energy and process) as well as possible interactions with 
other sectors via offset can be an interesting alternative. Thus, when considering the total 
emissions, the number of agents and the volume of permits traded increase. Furthermore, 
it eliminates the need for additional instruments to reduce energy emissions in the 
industry. 
The forms of allocation considered are basically distinguished from the initial cost of the 






of enabling the regulator to discover agent reserve prices, not distort incentives and 
reward prior actions. Also, there is the possibility of recycling the revenue just as it occurs 
in the carbon tax case. However, as evidenced by international experience, the auction 
will be refrained by the industry and possibly lead to carbon leakage. 
The donation of certificates is considered as the possibility with less resistance by the 
industry, since it reduces the burden of the instrument, at least during the beginning of 
the ETS operation. As the international experience shows, it is interesting to define a 
phased ETS in over five-year periods so that adjustments and corrections of possible 
market imperfections may occur. 
However, such free allocation must be made in such a way as to avoid extraordinary 
profits, and/or implicit subsidies. Thus, the definition of the quota distributed to each 
agent must be done in a careful way so that the mitigation effort is maintained. In this 
sense, relatively to the distribution criteria, a grandfathering (GF) option is proposed. It 
is focused on past emissions and traditionally it has been the form adopted by markets at 
the commencement of their operations, as pointed out by the international cases, since it 
reduces the costs of the program to the regulated sectors.  
Finally, also as shown by the international practices, there is a possibility of a transition 
in the allocation form (from donation to auction), as the subsectors adjust to the CPI. This 
possibility can be an alternative that gradually increases the cost for companies, giving 
them time to adapt, and it allows the generation of revenues in the long term, which can 
be reverted to distributive or supportive mechanisms for the industry. 
 
6.2. Main Limitations 
Two main limitations of this thesis can be highlighted. The first is focused on the coverage 
of the industrial subsectors analyzed, while the second is related to the interactions of 
industry with other sectors.  
As described in chapter 2, information regarding seven Brazilian industrial subsectors 
(Aluminum, Cement, Lime and Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron and Steel, and Pulp and Paper) 






follows the characterization used by the Ministry of Finance (MF), within the scope of 
the PMR project, and the Industry Plan. Such subsectors are those that have emissions 
process. Also, according to the analysis carried out in the section 2.2, these are the main 
industrial sectors considered in the context of designing carbon pricing policies and their 
instruments.  
Regarding emissions coverage, regardless the CPI adoption, it should be emphasized that 
the instrument will be more cost effective as the number of emission sources/sectors 
participation increases, allowing the use of mitigation options with lower abatement costs. 
Thus, a broader scope of emissions enables a greater number of abatement options, as 
discussed in chapter 5. In this way, perhaps it would be interesting to analyze all industrial 
subsectors (including those that only have energy emissions). This scope influences the 
atomization of the market, so having more subsectors covered could avoid market power 
to influence prices and to move away from the condition of allocative efficiency. 
Furthermore, it is understood that the definition of an arrangement for a CPI in the 
Brazilian industry will need to take into account the interaction with other sectors. Thus, 
it is possible that the institutional arrangement of a CPI is formulated, in an intersectorial 
way, including the sectors of fuels, electricity generation and AFOLU. As said above, 
that cost-effectiveness of a national mitigation policy depends on the number of 
participating sectors. The more comprehensive the pricing instrument, the greater the use 
of mitigation options with lower abatement costs. However, the interaction between 
sectors may not be trivial considering specific characteristics of Brazil in terms of its 
emissions profile and the peculiarities found in its energy sector (electricity and fuels) – 
it is valid to note this topic was not in the scope of this thesis. Either way, these 
interactions should be properly and carefully assessed. 
 
6.3. Recommendations for Future Studies 
After describing two limitations of this thesis, a list of recommendation for future studies 






 Analyze the CPI implementation in the Brazilian industry considering not only 
sectors that have process emissions, but also those that do not have this type of 
emissions, i.e., sectors with only energy emissions; 
 A deep analysis regarding CPI interactions among industry and other sectors like 
fuel, electricity and AFOLU, perhaps though the use of CGE models; 
 Also evaluate the chosen institutional design and framework, besides the role of 
major players involved in the industrial CPI implementation; 
 Study the possibilities and alternatives to MRV designs in order to support the 
management of the CPI; 
 Analyze the ETS linking possibilities in the context of Carbon Pricing in the 
Americas (CPA), which was launched in December 2017, placing special focus 
on Latin America; 
 Analyze climate policy in the context of legal proceedings and the actions of 
insurance companies regarding economic damages and the definition of property 
rights; 
 Provide a greater and better disaggregated sectorial database, especially in sectors 
with high heterogeneity, such as the Chemical sector; 
 Assess the feasibility of discussing and proposing a (Green) Tax Reform in the 
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Annex A – Methodology for Economic Characterization 
This annex presents a further breakdown of section 3.2, specifying the methodology of 
the indicators used in the characterization of the industrial sector and its subsectors. 
The input-output system integrated to the National Accounts gives rise to the Production 
Matrices, which informs what each sector of the economy produces of each product, and 
the Uses and Resources Matrices, which supplies the quantity of inputs that each sector 
uses to carry out its production. The combination of these two pieces of information 
results in the input-output matrix, which decomposes monetary flows between economic 
activities and primary factors, describing the internal structure of each productive sector 
and the economy as a whole. This structure is often used to analyze impacts on the sectors 
of a particular economy. Impacts can be calculated through economic indicators and 
multipliers, which allow, for example, the verification of the effects of a change in the 
final demand of a given sector on total production, income or employment (MILLER and 
BLAIR, 1984). The indicators used in the sectorial characterization are described in the 
following sections. 
 
A.1. General Characterization 
The aluminum sector, according to the new, very detailed series of the System of National 
Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 2010 (IBGE, 2015), falls within activities 0792 - 
Extraction of nonferrous metallic minerals, including processing, whose product 
corresponds to 07921 - Non-ferrous metal ores, and 2492 - Non-ferrous metal metallurgy 
and metal casting, whose products correspond to 24921 - Non-ferrous metal metallurgy 
products and 24922 - Castings, steel and non-ferrous metals.  
Regarding the data retrieved from the Annual Social Information Ratio (RAIS), available 
at the Central Business Register (IBGE, 2014), the aluminum sector is classified into 
activity 0700 - Extraction of metallic minerals, whose product corresponds to 07.2 - 
Extraction of non-ferrous metals, and 2400 - Metallurgy, whose product corresponds to 
24.4 - Metallurgy of nonferrous metals. In this sense, this thesis assumes that the 
classification of non-ferrous metals would be equivalent to the aluminum sector, in the 






The Cement, Lime and Glass sectors, according to the new, very detailed series of the 
System of National Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 2010 (IBGE, 2015), are framed 
within activities 0580 - Extraction of coal and non-metallic minerals and 2300 - 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, whose products correspond to 23001 - 
Cement and 23003 - Glass, ceramics and other products of non-metallic minerals (there 
is no specific product to characterize the lime subsector).  
Concerning the data retrieved from the Annual Social Information Ratio (RAIS), 
available at the Central Business Register (IBGE, 2014), the Cement, Lime and Glass 
sectors are classified within activity 2300 - Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products, 
whose products correspond to 23.2 - Manufacture of cement and 23.1 - Manufacture of 
glass and glass products (also there is no specific product to characterize the lime 
subsector). For certain indicators, it was necessary to group these activities forming the 
sector called Cement, Lime and Glass. 
The chemical sector, according to new, very detailed series of the System of National 
Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 2010 (IBGE, 2015), is falls within the following 
activities: 2091 - Manufacture of organic and inorganic chemicals, resins and 
elastomers, whose products correspond to 20911 - Inorganic chemicals, 20912 - 
Fertilizers and soil conditioners, 20913 - Organic chemicals and 20914 - Resins, 
elastomers and artificial and synthetic fibers, 2092 - Manufacture of pesticides, 
disinfectants, paints and various chemicals, whose products correspond to 20921 – 
Agricultural pesticides and household cleaning disinfectants, 20922 - Miscellaneous 
chemical products, 20923 - Paints, varnishes, enamels and lacquers, 2093 - Manufacture 
of cleaning products, cosmetics/perfumery, and personal hygiene products, whose 
product corresponds to 20931 - Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products and 2100 - 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical chemical products, whose product 
corresponds to 21001 - Pharmaceutical products. 
Regarding the data retrieved from the Annual Social Information Ratio (RAIS), available 
at the Central Business Register (IBGE, 2014), the Chemical sector is classified into the 
following activities: 2000 - Manufacture of chemical products, whose products 
correspond to 20.1 - Manufacture of inorganic chemicals, 20.2 - Manufacture of organic 






and synthetic fibers, 20.5 Manufacture of pesticides and disinfectants, 20.6 - Manufacture 
of soap, detergents, cleaning products, cosmetics, perfumery and personal hygiene 
products, 20.7 - Manufacture of paints, varnishes, enamels, lacquers and related 
products, 20.9 Manufacture of various chemical products and preparations, and 2100 - 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical chemical products, whose product 
corresponds to 21.1 Manufacture of pharmaceutical chemical products and 21.2 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical products. 
The Pig Iron and Steel sector, according to the new, very detailed series of the System of 
National Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 2010 (IBGE, 2015), falls within activities 
0791 - Extraction of iron ore, including processing and agglomeration, whose product 
corresponds to 07911 - Iron ore, and 2491 - Production of pig iron/ferroalloys, steel and 
seamless steel tubes, whose products correspond to 24911 - Pig iron and ferroalloys and 
24912 - Semi-finished products, rolled, flat and steel tubes. 
Regarding the data retrieved from the Annual Social Information Ratio (RAIS), available 
at the Central Business Register (IBGE, 2014), the Pig Iron and Steel sector falls within 
activities 0700 - Extraction of metallic minerals, whose product corresponds to 07.1 - 
Extraction of iron ore, and 2400 - Metallurgy, whose products correspond to 24.1 - 
Manufacture of pig iron and ferroalloys, 24.2 - Steel, 24.3 - Manufacture of steel tubes, 
other than seamless tubes, 24.5 - Casting. 
The Pulp and Paper sector, according to the new, very detailed series of the System of 
National Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 2010 (IBGE, 2015), falls within the 
activities of 1700 - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products, whose products 
correspond to 17001 - Pulp and 17002 - Paper, paperboard, packaging and paper 
articles. 
Regarding the data retrieved from the Annual Social Information Ratio (RAIS), available 
at the Central Business Register (IBGE, 2014), the Pulp and Paper sector is classified into 
activity 1700 - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products, whose products 
correspond to 17.1 - Manufacture of paper and paperboard, 17.2 - Manufacture of pulp 
and other paper pulp, 17.3 - Manufacture of paper products, paperboard, paper card and 
corrugated cardboard, and 17.4 - Manufacture of various paper products, paperboard, 






A.2. Sectorial Structure of the Gross Value of Production 
The distribution structure of the gross production value (GPV) of the sector indicates the 
most relevant sectors in terms of production value, allowing for a specific analysis on the 
importance (in terms of production value) of the target sectors, as carried out in this thesis, 
in relation to the total production of the economy. The indicators used in this study were 
calculated by the participation of the GPV of the subsectors in the sectorial GPV, GPV 
of the transformation industry, as well as in the GPV of the total economy. The data 





In which %𝐺𝑃𝑉𝑖  is the indicator of the sectorial structure of the production value; 𝐺𝑃𝑉𝑖 
is the gross production value of subsector i; and 𝐺𝑃𝑉 is the gross production value of 
selected sectors of this thesis/transformation industry/total economy. 
 
A.3. Sectorial Structure of the Value Added 
The distribution structure of the sectorial value added (VA) indicates the most relevant 
sectors in terms of value added, allowing for a specific analysis on the importance (in 
terms of value added) of the target sectors, as carried out in this thesis, in relation to the 
total production of the economy. The indicators used in this study were calculated by the 
participation of the VA of the subsectors in the sectorial VA, transformation industry VA, 
as well as in the total GDP of the economy. The data source is Table 1 – Production, 





In which %𝑉𝐴𝑖 is the indicator of the sector structure of the value added; 𝑉𝐴𝑖 is the value 
added of the subsector 𝑖; and 𝑉𝐴 is the value added of selected subsectors of this 







A.4. External Vunerability – Export Coefficient 
It is also interesting to identify, in order to verify the impact on sector competitiveness, 
both the participation of exports in production and the vulnerability to foreign trade of the 
different industrial subsectors of this thesis. These issues are analyzed on the basis of the 
export coefficient. Carbon pricing imposes additional risk of vulnerability due to loss of 
domestic market in import parity or loss of market for exporter in export parity. A 
domestically highly concentrated sector may be challenged by its external vulnerability 
(e.g., the national petrochemical sector). A sector with low external vulnerability, if 
concentrated, is more likely to impose higher prices without loss of market, in case its 
product is not elastic (price elasticity of demand). That is, the company can impose a price 
mark-up, transferring the carbon cost to the consumer. 
The export coefficient (EC) is the percentage of production that is exported, so that the 
higher the EC, the greater the importance of external sales to the industry. It is calculated 
by the ratio between the exports by subsector and the GVP of the subsector. The source 
of information is Table 1 – Production, belonging to the Resources Matrix (IBGE) and 





In which 𝐸𝐶𝑖 is the export coefficient; 𝐸𝑖 are the exports of the subsector 𝑖; and 𝐺𝑉𝑃𝑖 is 








Annex B – Methodology for Sectorial Emissions Profile  
This annex presents a further breakdown of section 3.3., specifying GHG emissions by 
industry subsector. Information regarding the emissions of the seven Brazilian industrial 
subsectors analyzed, namely Aluminum, Cement, Lime and Glass, Chemicals, Pig Iron 
and Steel, and Pulp and Paper, were collected30. The emissions were disaggregated in 
"Process Emissions" and "Energy Emissions" according to the classification of the Third 




The aluminum sector in 2010 reached a total of 2,544 Gg CO2, caused by the industrial 
process. Table 26 shows the industry's process emissions history, which highlights the 
prevalence of emissions from the Prebaked Anode process. 
In Brazil the type of technology used varies from plant to plant. In 2010, around 56% of 
the national primary aluminum production used the Prebake method, while the other 44% 








                                                          
30 As mentioned in chapter 3, I would like to thanks the following fellows from CENERGIA/COPPE/UFRJ 










Table 26 – CO2 emissions from process of the Brazilian aluminum sector (Gg CO2) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
CO2 Emissions (Gg CO2) 
Year Soderberg Process Prebaked Anode Process Total 
1990 672 902 1,574 
1991 726 1,175 1,901 
1992 756 1,256 2,012 
1993 698 1,248 1,946 
1994 692 1,264 1,956 
1995 707 1,258 1,965 
1996 722 1,259 1,981 
1997 720 1,255 1,975 
1998 741 1,266 2,007 
1999 773 1,306 2,079 
2000 791 1,325 2,116 
2001 701 1,178 1,879 
2002 771 1,405 2,176 
2003 818 1,380 2,198 
2004 957 1,451 2,408 
2005 1,002 1,471 2,473 
2006 1,072 1,574 2,646 
2007 1,154 1,585 2,739 
2008 1,173 1,580 2,753 
2009 1,122 1,423 2,545 
2010 1,143 1,401 2,544 
 
The process emissions of other GHGs in the production of Brazilian aluminum are 











Table 27 – Emissions of others GHGs from process of the Brazilian aluminum sector (ton) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
CF4 Emissions (ton) C2F6 Emissions (ton) 










1990 140.7 161.5 302.2 9.2 17.1 26.3 
1991 153.3 183.3 336.6 10.1 19.0 29.1 
1992 150.6 205.9 356.5 9.8 21.3 31.1 
1993 138.2 196.7 334.9 8.8 20.2 29.0 
1994 131.6 191.6 323.2 8.4 19.5 27.9 
1995 125.3 180.7 306.0 8.1 18.2 26.3 
1996 114.3 183.3 297.6 7.5 18.6 26.1 
1997 89.5 113.3 202.8 5.7 10.0 15.7 
1998 93.2 134.5 227.7 5.9 11.3 17.2 
1999 102.1 99.2 201.3 6.6 8.7 15.3 
2000 74.3 72.2 146.5 5.1 6.6 11.7 
2001 52.1 62.6 114.7 3.4 5.8 9.2 
2002 52.4 82.7 135.1 3.3 8.4 11.7 
2003 61.1 75.1 136.2 4.0 7.5 11.5 
2004 58.3 65.8 124.1 3.9 6.1 10.0 
2005 63.6 60.3 123.9 4.2 6.1 10.3 
2006 61.3 60.5 121.8 4.2 6.2 10.4 
2007 62.5 54.9 117.4 4.3 5.6 9.9 
2008 62.7 51.8 114.5 4.3 5.3 9.6 
2009 61.1 21.2 82.3 4.2 2.2 6.4 
2010 59.7 17.0 76.7 4.1 1.8 5.9 
 
From the Global Warming Potential (GWP) values of GHGs emitted in the aluminum 










Table 28 – Process emissions of the Brazilian aluminum sector (Gg CO2eq) 








Total Emissions  
(Gg CO2eq) 
1990 1,574 2,004 2,922 6,500 
1991 1,901 2,232 3,233 7,366 
1992 2,012 2,364 3,455 7,831 
1993 1,946 2,220 3,222 7,388 
1994 1,956 2,143 3,100 7,199 
1995 1,965 2,029 2,922 6,916 
1996 1,981 1,973 2,900 6,854 
1997 1,975 1,345 1,744 5,064 
1998 2,007 1,510 1,911 5,428 
1999 2,079 1,335 1,700 5,113 
2000 2,116 971 1,300 4,387 
2001 1,879 760 1,022 3,662 
2002 2,176 896 1,300 4,372 
2003 2,198 903 1,278 4,379 
2004 2,408 823 1,111 4,342 
2005 2,473 821 1,144 4,439 
2006 2,646 808 1,155 4,609 
2007 2,739 778 1,100 4,617 
2008 2,753 759 1,067 4,579 
2009 2,545 546 711 3,802 
2010 2,544 509 655 3,708 
 
Energy emissions were calculated from the energy consumption of the sector, as shown 
in the Table 29. Using the emission factors of electricity (14.2 GJ/t CO2) and fuel oil (77.1 











Table 29 – Energy consumption in the aluminum sector (GJ and %) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
  
Year 
Electricity Fuel Oil Total 
GJ % GJ % GJ 
2005 87,300 73.0 32,248 27.0 119,548 
2006 92,394 75.1 30,674 24.9 123,068 
2007 95,276 75.1 31,601 24.9 126,878 
2008 97,983 76.6 29,858 23.4 127,842 
2009 90,648 76.6 27,750 23.4 118,397 
2010 93,093 75.1 30,870 24.9 123,963 
Table 30 – Energy consumption in the aluminum sector (Gg CO2 and %) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
  
Year 
Electricity Fuel Oil Total 
Gg CO2 % Gg CO2 % Gg CO2 
2005 1,240 33.,3 2,486 66.7 3,726 
2006 1,312 35.7 2,365 64.3 3,677 
2007 1,353 35.7 2,436 64.3 3,789 
2008 1,391 37.7 2,302 62.3 3,693 
2009 1,287 37.6 2,139 62.4 3,427 
2010 1,322 35.7 2,380 64.3 3,702 
 
Thus, for 2010, a total of 7,410 Gg CO2 is obtained, in which 3,702 Gg CO2 are from the 







B.2. Cement, Lime and Glass 
The history of GHG process emissions from process in the cement industry is shown in 
Table 31, indicating a total of 21,288 Gg CO2 in 2010. The energy emissions are presented 
in the Table 32. The total emissions of the sector in the year 2010 were 35,907 GgCO2. 
 
 
Table 31 – Process emissions from the cement sector (Gg CO2) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
Year CO2 Emissions (Gg CO2) 
Process Emission Factor(t CO2/t product) 
Clinker CO2 Emissions 
1991 11,776 0.549 0.428 
1992 9,770 0.550 0.409 
1993 10,164 0.552 0.409 
1994 10,086 0.548 0.400 
1995 11,528 0.547 0.408 
1996 13,884 0.548 0.401 
1997 15,267 0.546 0.401 
1998 16,175 0.545 0.405 
1999 16,439 0.549 0.409 
2000 16,047 0.549 0.402 
2001 15,227 0.548 0.386 
2002 14,390 0.550 0.370 
2003 13,096 0.553 0.373 
2004 13,273 0.554 0.369 
2005 14,349 0.545 0.371 
2006 15,440 0.542 0.369 
2007 17,200 0.541 0.369 
2008 18,884 0.548 0.363 
2009 19,031 0.548 0.368 
















Table 32 – Energy emissions in the cement sector (Gg gas) 



















1991 6,585 2.3  0.12  49.3  18.1  2.2  
1992 5,149 1.9  0.09  38.7  13.2  1.6  
1993 5,131 2.1 0.09 41.5 12.9 1.6 
1994 5,060 2.3 0.10 46.9 13.0 1.7 
1995 6,073 2.6 0.11 51.4 14.7 1.8 
1996 7,184 3.3 0.13 65.9 16.9 2.2 
1997 8,635 2.3 0.12 47.1 18.8 1.9 
1998 9,389 2.0 0.12 56.3 19.3 3.2 
1999 10,152 2.0 0.11 91.5 20.3 6.6 
2000 10,512 2.3 0.12 114.2 20.9 8.3 
2001 11,031 2.1 0.12 123.1 21.6 9.6 
2002 10,278 2.1 0.11 118.7 20.0 9.3 
2003 8,886 2.4 0.11 110.1 17.8 8.0 
2004 8,129 2.7 0.11 115.6 16.3 8.4 
2005 8,951 2.4 0.11 118.6 17.8 9.2 
2006 9,901 2.6 0.12 127.6 19.9 10.1 
2007 11,115 2.3 0.13 132.0 22.4 11.1 
2008 12,328 2.6 0.14 147.2 24.8 12.4 
2009 13,639 0.9 0.09 118.4 25.4 10.7 







From converting the emissions of other GHGs into CO2 equivalent through the 
parameters presented in Chapter 7 of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 






Table 33 – Energy consumption emissions in the cement sector (Gg CO2eq) 

























1991 6,585 6 32 77 - 66 6,767 
1992 5,149 5 24 61 - 48 5,287 
1993 5,131 6 24 65 - 47 5,273 
1994 5,060 6 27 74 - 48 5,214 
1995 6,073 7 29 81 - 54 6,244 
1996 7,184 9 34 104 - 62 7,393 
1997 8,635 6 32 74 - 69 8,816 
1998 9,389 6 32 88 - 71 9,586 
1999 10,152 6 29 144 - 74 10,405 
2000 10,512 6 32 179 - 77 10,806 
2001 11,031 6 32 193 - 79 11,341 
2002 10,278 6 29 187 - 73 10,573 
2003 8,886 7 29 173 - 65 9,160 
2004 8,129 7 29 182 - 60 8,407 
2005 8,951 7 29 186 - 65 9,238 
2006 9,901 7 32 201 - 73 10,213 
2007 11,115 6 34 207 - 82 11,445 
2008 12,328 7 37 231 - 91 12,694 
2009 13,639 2 24 186 - 93 13,945 







A comparison between the process emissions and the energy emissions of the cement 
subsector shows that there is a tendency for emissions to grow in recent years. 
When analyzing the lime sector, its process emissions are shown Table 34, where the 




Table 34 – Process emissions from the lime sector in Brazil (Gg CO2) 
Source: MCTI (2015) 
Year 
Calcitic Lime 
Emissions (Gg CO2) 
Magnesium Lime 
Emissions (Gg CO2) 
Dolomite Lime 
Emissions (Gg CO2) 
Total Emissions 
(Gg CO2) 
1990 2,660 629 399 3,688 
1991 2,670 664 421 3,755 
1992 2,869 660 419 3,948 
1993 3,064 720 457 4,241 
1994 3,027 655 416 4,098 
1995 2,990 681 432 4,104 
1996 3,056 729 463 4,248 
1997 3,176 711 451 4,338 
1998 3,021 686 435 4,141 
1999 3,110 743 471 4,325 
2000 3,950 647 411 5,008 
2001 3,765 640 406 4,811 
2002 3,941 621 394 4,956 
2003 4,043 624 396 5,064 
2004 4,347 709 449 5,505 
2005 4,321 634 402 5,356 
2006 4,363 640 406 5,410 
2007 4,566 673 427 5,666 
2008 4,583 678 430 5,690 
2009 3,924 695 441 5,060 







For the analysis of the energy emissions of the lime sector, the detailed energy 
consumption based on CNI (2010) was used and it is shown in the Table 35. There is only 





Table 35 – Energy consumption and production in the lime sector (103 toe and 103 tonnes) 
Source: Own elaboration based on CNI (2010) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Production (103 tonnes) 6,300 6,500 6,600 6,500 6,987 7,057 
Electric power consumption (103 toe) 8.13 8.38 8.51 8.38 9.01 9.10 
Petroleum coke and fuel oil (103 toe) 323 333 338 333 358 362 
Natural gas (103 toe) 129 133 135 133 143 144 
Firewood and wood waste (103 toe) 129 133 135 133 143 144 
Mineral coal mill (103 toe) 64 66 67 66 71 72 
 
Based on the information in the previous table, it was estimated the average consumption 
per ton of lime produced for each of the energy sources. Thus, knowing that lime 
production in 2010 was 7,761 thousand tonnes, the energy consumption of each of the 
sources was calculated based on the average of the years shown in Table 35, resulting in 
the values presented in the Table 36. 
 
Table 36 – Calculated values for the energy consumption in the lime sector in 2010 (103 toe and 
103 tonnes) 







Production (103 tonnes) 7,761 
Electric power consumption (103 toe) 10 
Petroleum coke and fuel oil (103 toe) 398 
Natural gas (103 toe) 159 
Firewood and wood waste (103 toe) 159 
Mineral coal mill (103 toe) 79 
 
Finally, making use of the emission factors of each energy source, it is possible to 
determine their emissions Table 37. 
 
 
Table 37 – Calculated energy emissions for the lime sector (Gg CO2) 
Source: Own elaboration 
Ano 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Electric power consumption (Gg 
CO2) 
4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.4 6.0 
Petroleum coke and fuel oil (Gg 
CO2) 
1,182.8 1,219.5 1,237.8 1,219.5 1,311.0 1,325.7 1,456.5 
Natural gas (Gg CO2) 303.1 312.4 317.1 312.4 335.9 338.3 372.9 
Firewood and wood waste (Gg 
CO2) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mineral coal mill (Gg CO2) 253.5 261.5 265.4 261.5 281.3 285.2 312.5 
Total (Gg CO2) 1,744.3 1,798.4 1,825.4 1,798.4 1,933.6 1,954.6 2,147.9 
 
It is possible to observe that the process emissions are more relevant in relation to the 
total emissions of the sector. 
Finally, regarding the glass sector, its process emissions in 2010 reached a total of only 
114 GgCO2, according to the Third National Communication of Brazil to the UNFCCC 
(MCTI, 2015), as detailed in Table 38. 
 






Source: MCTI (2015) 
CO2 Emission by calcination in the 
glass production (GgCO2) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Calcination of limestone 55 53 74 95 93 
Calcination of dolomite 12 11 16 21 20 
Total 67 64 89 116 114 
 
Energy emissions could neither be obtained directly from the Third National 
Communication nor indirectly through data from the National Energy Balance (BEN), 
where the glass production sector is not detailed. Therefore, a methodology similar to that 
presented for the lime sector was applied. Table 39 shows the historical energy 
consumption of the glass sector and its production. Using these values, it was possible to 
determine an average consumption per source (toe/tonnes of glass). 
Knowing the glass production of the ensuing years (2007 to 2010), it was possible to 
extrapolate the consumption of energy using the historical database of the Table 39. 
 
Table 39 – Energy consumption and production in the glass sector (103 toe and 103 tonnes) 
Fonte: CNI (2010) 
Fuel 
Year, Energy Consumption (10³ toe) and Production (10³ tons) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Natural gas (103 toe) 295.4 380.5 423.1 465.3 469.9 481.9 
Fuel oil (103 toe) 124.6 114.8 71.9 70.3 64.2 53.4 
Liquefied petroleum gas 
(103 toe) 
18.2 15.1 11.0 8.7 8.3 7.9 
Electricity (103 toe) 99.2 116.0 114.4 122.8 122.8 122.8 
Total (103 toe) 537.4 626.5 620.3 667.1 665.2 665.9 
Production (103 tonnes) 2,071 2,412 2,389 2,571 2,561 2,566 
 
The results of the extrapolation of energy consumption by source in the glass sector are 







Table 40 – Projections of energy consumption and production for the glass sector (103 toe, 2007 
– 2010) 
Source: Own elaboration based on CNI (2010) 
Fuel 
Year, Energy Consumption (10³ toe) and Production (10³ tonnes) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Natural gas 
(103 toe) 
295.4 380.5 423.1 465.3 469.9 481.9 432 389 441 485 
Fuel oil (103 
toe) 




18.2 15.1 11.0 8.7 8.3 7.9 7 7 7 8 
Electricity 
(103 toe) 
99.2 116.0 114.4 122.8 122.8 122.8 112 101 114 125 
Total (103 toe) 537.4 626.5 620.3 667.1 665.2 665.9 604 544 617 678 
Production 
(103 tonnes) 
2,071 2,412 2,389 2,571 2,561 2,566 2,326 2,095 2,375 2,611 
Finally, by making use of the emission factors of each energy source, it is possible to 
determine the profile of energy emissions in the glass sector, shown in Table 41. 
 
Table 41 – Calculated energy emissions for the glass sector (GgCO2) 
Source: Own elaboration 
Fuel 
Year and Emissions (GgCO2) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Natural gas 694 894 994 1,093 1,104 1,132 1,014 913 1,036 1,138 
Fuel oil  404 372 233 228 208 173 173 156 176 194 
Liquefied 
petroleum gas  
48 40 29 23 22 21 19 17 20 22 
Electricity  59 69 68 73 73 73 66 60 68 75 




In 2010, the Brazilian chemical sector reached a total process emissions of 3,488 Gg CO2 















Table 42 – Process emissions in the chemicals sector (Gg CO2eq) 






Year CO2 CH4  N2O  CO  NOX  NMVOC Total  
1990 2,373 14.5 2,833 0.8 - 97.2 5,318 
1991 2,161 14.4 3,567 1.1 - 90.9 5,834 
1992 2,196 14.9 3,326 0.9 - 90.6 5,628 
1993 2,422 16.7 4,280 1.3 - 101.9 6,822 
1994 2,468 18.4 4,320 1.3 - 112.2 6,919 
1995 2,548 18.2 4,622 1.4 - 115.1 7,304 
1996 2,549 18.2 3,609 1.1 - 115.1 6,293 
1997 2,690 20.5 3,212 0.9 - 123.2 6,046 
1998 2,591 21.7 5,056 1.6 - 128.0 7,798 
1999 2,861 23.0 5,032 1.6 - 137.5 8,055 
2000 2,615 24.8 5,284 1.6 - 157.3 8,083 
2001 2,314 23.6 4,306 1.3 - 149.2 6,794 
2002 2,507 23.1 5,377 1.7 - 154.7 8,063 
2003 2,720 24.6 4,937 1.6 - 166.1 7,849 
2004 2,974 26.0 6,887 2.2 - 180.0 10,070 
2005 2,954 25.8 6,050 1.9 - 179.7 9,211 
2006 3,017 34.3 6,567 2.0 - 197.3 9,817 
2007 3,054 35.0 779 2.2 - 206.8 4,077 
2008 3,017 31.5 604 2.2 - 207.5 3,862 
2009 2,733 32.6 268 2.2 - 218.2 3,254 
2010 2,983 32.8 246 2.2 - 224.0 3,488 
 








Table 43 – Energy emissions in the chemical sector (Gg CO2eq) 






Year CO2 CH4  N2O  CO  NOX  NMVOC Total  
1990 8,606 2.2 31.8 46.4 - 9.2 8,696 
1991 8,811 2.2 31.8 44.6 - 8.8 8,898 
1992 9,080 1.9 26.5 37.4 - 8.1 9,154 
1993 8,578 1.9 29.2 39.3 - 8.4 8,657 
1994 9,114 2.2 31.8 43.2 - 10.3 9,201 
1995 10,057 2.2 29.2 39.4 - 10.6 10,138 
1996 11,493 2.2 29.2 32.1 - 8.4 11,565 
1997 13,352 2.5 31.8 29.2 - 8.8 13,424 
1998 12,343 2.8 29.2 28.1 - 8.8 12,412 
1999 13,551 3.0 34.5 31.7 - 11.0 13,631 
2000 13,942 3.6 34.5 32.1 - 12.1 14,024 
2001 13,930 3.9 37.1 29.1 - 11.7 14,012 
2002 14,161 4.7 39.8 28.0 - 12.1 14,245 
2003 13,508 5.5 39.8 31.9 - 11.7 13,597 
2004 14,353 6.3 45.1 32.8 - 12.5 14,450 
2005 14,624 6.6 47.7 33.8 - 12.5 14,725 
2006 14,880 6.9 47.7 34.7 - 12.5 14,982 
2007 15,598 7.2 50.4 36.5 - 13.9 15,706 
2008 14,283 7.2 47.7 34.4 - 12.1 14,384 
2009 14,446 6.9 47.7 33.9 - 12.5 14,547 
2010 13,847 6.9 47.7 35.4 - 12.5 13,949 
 
When analyzing the relationship between energy emissions and process emissions, it is 
observed the discrepancy between these values and that the composition of the sector is 
mainly due to the energy emissions. 
 
B.4. Pig Iron and Steel 
The Pig Iron and Steel industry has the highest process emissions indices of the subsectors 
analyzed, reaching in 2010 the value of 39,794 GgCO2eq, as detailed in the Table 44.  
 
Table 44 – Process emissions in the Pig Iron and Steel sector (Gg CO2eq) 






Year CO2 CH4  N2O  CO  NOX  NMVOC Total  
1990 21,601 101 270 1,218 - 79 23,270 
1991 26,118 86 257 1,052 - 71 27,583 
1992 26,417 80 246 987 - 67 27,798 
1993 28,206 87 268 1,078 - 74 29,713 
1994 29,392 90 276 1,113 - 76 30,947 
1995 30,130 83 265 1,031 - 72 31,581 
1996 30,866 72 246 908 - 65 32,157 
1997 32,521 75 260 948 - 69 33,873 
1998 33,319 69 249 877 - 65 34,580 
1999 31,680 79 265 980 - 71 33,075 
2000 35,552 85 289 1,062 - 77 37,066 
2001 34,845 80 276 1,002 - 73 36,276 
2002 37,516 83 292 1,040 - 77 39,008 
2003 38,683 95 318 1,171 - 85 40,352 
2004 39,805 114 360 1,396 - 99 41,775 
2005 37,509 112 347 1,363 - 96 39,427 
2006 36,051 108 334 1,314 - 93 37,900 
2007 39,422 111 352 1,360 - 97 41,342 
2008 39,825 109 350 1,335 - 96 41,714 
2009 31,690 64 233 799 - 61 32,846 
2010 38,360 79 286 995 - 74 39,794 
 
The energy emissions of this sector, recorded in CO2 equivalent, are shown in Table 45, 







Table 45 – Energy emissions in the Pig Iron and Steel sector (Gg CO2eq) 






Ano CO2 CH4  N2O  CO  NOx   NMVOC Total  
1990 4,373 0.6 5.3 3.9 - 4.0 4,387 
1991 4,565 0.6 8.0 4.2 - 4.4 4,582 
1992 4,850 0.6 8.0 4.4 - 4.4 4,867 
1993 5,070 0.6 8.0 4.6 - 4.8 5,088 
1994 5,318 0.6 8.0 4.9 - 4.8 5,336 
1995 5,387 0.6 8.0 5.0 - 4.8 5,405 
1996 5,352 0.6 5.3 5.0 - 4.4 5,367 
1997 5,201 0.6 5.3 5.0 - 4.4 5,216 
1998 4,560 0.3 5.3 4.6 - 4.4 4,575 
1999 4,268 0.3 5.3 4.6 - 4.0 4,282 
2000 4,620 0.3 5.3 5.0 - 4.0 4,635 
2001 4,470 0.3 5.3 4.9 - 4.0 4,484 
2002 4,722 0.3 5.3 5.2 - 4.0 4,737 
2003 4,796 0.3 5.3 5.2 - 4.4 4,811 
2004 4,839 0.3 5.3 5.3 - 4.4 4,854 
2005 5,297 0.3 5.3 5.8 - 4.4 5,313 
2006 5,279 0.3 5.3 5.8 - 4.4 5,295 
2007 5,733 0.3 5.3 6.0 - 4.4 5,749 
2008 5,590 0.3 5.3 5.8 - 4.4 5,606 
2009 4,322 0.3 2.7 4.6 - 4.0 4,334 
2010 5,540 0.6 5.3 5.8 - 5.1 5,557 
 
Thus, in 2010, the Pig Iron and Steel sector reached a total of 45,351 GgCO2 equivalent. 
 
B.5. Pulp and Paper 
GHG emissions related to the industrial process for Pulp and Paper production are low 
when compared to other industrial sectors. The production of the chemical pulp, carried 
out mainly by the Kraft process, is an indirect GHG emitter, since during the preparation 
of the cellulose by the Kraft process, chemical reactions are source of CO, NOx and 
NMVOC emissions, as shown in the Table 46 that presents the industry process emissions 







Table 46 – Process emissions in the Pulp and Paper sector (Gg CO2eq) 
Source: Own elaboration based on BRACELPA (2011) 
Year CO NOX NMVOC Total 
1990 31.6 - 48.8 80.4 
1994 45.1 - 69.7 114.8 
2000 58.5 - 90.2 148.7 
2005 82.7 - 127.6 210.3 
2010 114.7 - 177.1 291.8 
 














Table 47 – Energy emission in the Pulp and Paper sector (Gg CO2eq) 






Year CO2 CH4 N2O CO NOx NMVOC Total  
1990 2,464 2.8 103 400 - 29 2,999 
1991 2,725 2.8 101 420 - 29 3,277 
1992 3,120 3.3 114 493 - 33 3,763 
1993 2,909 3.3 119 559 - 32 3,622 
1994 2,954 3.3 130 599 - 33 3,719 
1995 3,384 3.3 130 580 - 33 4,130 
1996 4,013 3.3 122 609 - 30 4,778 
1997 3,715 3.3 122 623 - 29 4,492 
1998 3,956 3.9 146 696 - 35 4,836 
1999 4,264 3.9 151 740 - 34 5,193 
2000 4,320 4.1 159 760 - 37 5,,280 
2001 4,086 4.1 159 756 - 40 5,045 
2002 4,290 4.1 164 821 - 40 5,320 
2003 3,993 4.7 183 945 - 46 5,171 
2004 3,749 4.7 191 999 - 44 4,988 
2005 3,840 5.0 199 1,058 - 47 5,148 
2006 3,246 5.5 217 1,140 - 53 4,662 
2007 3,529 5.8 228 1,212 - 56 5,031 
2008 3,420 6.1 241 1,286 - 60 5,013 
2009 3,372 6.3 254 1,364 - 63 5,060 








Annex C – Interactions of Industry with Other Sectors 
This annex highlights the interactions between industry and other economic sectors in the 
context that institutional arrangements for carbon pricing in the industrial sector will 
necessarily interact with pricing instruments eventually applied to other sectors. In fact, 
a national mitigation policy would be more cost effective as more sectors get involved, 
which would allow the use of mitigation options with lower abatement costs. Thus, it is 
likely that the institutional arrangement of a carbon pricing system for the Brazilian 
industrial sector will be formulated, in an intersectorial way, including the sectors of fuels, 
electricity generation and agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Although the 
evaluation of other sectors is not in the scope of this thesis, this annex briefly seeks to 
qualitatively analyze the interactions that may occur between the mentioned sectors, in a 
context of implementing an industrial CPI at the national level. 
 
C.1. Interactions with Fuel Sector 
Emissions in the industry can occur through industrial processes, in which the emission 
of GHG occurs as a consequence of chemical reactions present in industrial production 
processes, or through the combustion of energy vectors from fossil origin or biomass from 
deforestation. Thus, the interaction between the industrial sector and the fuel sector is 
evident, since in 2014, 38.6% of the industrial sector emissions originated in fuel 
consumption (MCTIC, 2016b). 
The fuel sector encompasses oil exploration and production (E&P), oil refining and the 
production of biofuels. In the former case, pricing instruments are generally not used, as 
international experience shows, because of technical difficulties in doing so (ICAP, 
2018). In the E&P sector there is a great degree of geological heterogeneity of the oil 
reservoirs. The specific energy consumption is dynamic, varying according to the 
evolution of exploration of the reservoir. That is, the geological characteristics and the 
maturity of the reservoirs imply different energy needs and variations in fugitive gas 
emissions. Therefore, pricing the emissions of the E&P process can be extremely complex 
and difficult to monitor, which makes it very difficult to implement a carbon pricing 






and-control instruments that can obtain abatement results using a simpler regulatory 
framework. 
The refining sector can be regarded as an industrial plant, being actually treated as such 
by the National Accounts. The refining process consists of the conversion of petroleum 
into its derivatives, which are consumed by the industrial, transportation, building 
(residential, commercial, services and public sectors) and agricultural sectors. 
It should be noted that international experience indicates a difficulty in attributing to the 
refining industry the responsibility of combustion emissions by the sectors that demand 
fuels. Firstly, the refining sector has no interference with the consumption of fuels and 
with the measures to reduce emissions from combustion of sectors external to it. Second, 
as the American attempt has shown, competition from imported petroleum derivatives 
may become a hindrance to the pricing system (MARCU et al., 2014). Therefore, a carbon 
pricing in the refining sector should be tied to the emissions related to the oil refining 
process and not to the burning of the fuels sold by the sector. Emissions in the refining 
sector, in turn, can occur both by chemical processes and by combustion for energy 
purposes. 
Concerning the interaction of the refining sector with the industrial sector, the following 
possibilities are envisaged: (i) an ETS that includes the industrial and refining sectors, in 
which the total emissions related to the activities in each sector (process and combustion 
emissions); (ii) an ETS for industrial process emissions (including or not the refining 
sector), with combustion emissions being priced separately for a carbon tax. The 
advantage of the second option is that it can be aligned to a CPI in other sectors of 
consumption (transportation, buildings and agriculture) through the taxation of fuels, 
since these other sectors are too atomized to participate in a ETS. 
Finally, with regard to the biofuels sector, there is a clear interaction with the food and 
beverage industry, more specifically with sugar production. In Brazil, according to ANP 
(2017), 64% of the distilleries are annexed distilleries, in which there is relative flexibility 
to produce ethanol or sugar, depending on the market conditions. In addition, in some 
industrial subsectors, the use of biofuels may be an alternative to abatement as substitutes 






C.2. Interactions with Electric Power Sector 
Although industry is an electricity consumer, unlike fuel consumption emissions, 
emissions from electricity consumed in the industrial sector are indirect. In other words, 
electricity emissions do not occur in the industrial plant itself, but in the thermoelectric 
plant where the fuel is burned. This difference greatly influences how the industrial sector 
interacts with the electricity sector, since the pricing of electricity emissions could not 
occur in the industrial plant, but in the power generation plant, which in turn would pass-
through the costs on to industry (and other sectors) through higher electricity rates. It is 
clear, therefore, that a carbon pricing in the electric sector can affect the industry through 
higher electricity rates, regardless of the CPI used. 
In some international experiences, such as EU ETS, California Cap-and-Trade and 
Australian CPM, the electricity sector is part of the permitting market, generating 
interaction among sectors through transactions in that market (ICAP, 2018). This 
possibility is difficult given the peculiarities of the Brazilian electrical system, which is a 
hydrothermal system coupled spatially and temporally. That is, the Brazilian electricity 
sector is a nationally interconnected system that requires centralized operation planning 
so that complementarities between power plants and regions can be used. The system is 
temporarily coupled since the operation at an instant in time implies the depletion (or not) 
of the reservoirs of the hydroelectric plants, thus affecting the availability of energy and 
the operation in the future. Centralized coordination of the operation, therefore, reduces 
the interference of thermoelectric plants in choosing their level of production and, thus, 
emission, affecting the ability to negotiate emission permits in a market. 
However, other interactions between the electricity and industrial sectors in a context of 
carbon pricing can be glimpsed. Emissions linked to electricity generated in plants 
operating in the Free Contracting Environment (FCE), which is negotiated directly 
between agents, may eventually participate in an ETS together with the industrial sector. 
Finally, it is important to note that the industrial sector is also a producer of electricity, 
either through self-production or through cogeneration. To the extent that electricity is 
fully consumed by the agent of the industrial sector that generated it, the emissions are 






for the industry. However, once there is surplus electricity generation exported to the grid, 
it is necessary to integrate the pricing mechanisms of the two sectors. 
 
C.3. Interactions with AFOLU Sector 
Carbon offsets are investments in specific projects that reduce, avoid or hijack GHG 
emissions (WORLD BANK et al., 2018; CPLC, 2016). One of its main objectives is to 
create a flexible mechanism that allows a given sector to mitigate its emissions at a lower 
cost than it would have occurred through its own operations (for example, through 
transactions in an ETS or paying a tax on carbon emitted). 
In general, offsets encourage mitigation projects to be undertaken in sectors that are not 
directly covered by CPI or that benefit from other government incentives, such as 
transportation, waste and agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU). In other 
words, these activities constitute opportunities for mitigation, reduction or sequestration 
of emissions, and it can generate carbon credits. These credits are then used as offset to 
the GHG emissions of the emitting sectors that have carbon reduction obligations, for 
example the industry. This is, therefore, a clear example of the polluter pays principle. 
In Brazil, the agricultural sector is fundamental to the economy, not only for its economic 
role, but also socially and environmentally. It is important as a primary supplier of raw 
materials for the agribusiness sector, responsible for the marketing of its products. As 
PMR (2017) points out, when evaluating mitigation potentials in the agricultural sector, 
it is noted that some characteristics of agricultural and forestry activities show that the 
potential for reductions in emissions in this sector seems to be more in adjustments and 
changes in productive processes than, properly speaking, in the imposition of 
conventional policy instruments. 
Numerous studies indicate that changes in the AFOLU sector could produce 
economically attractive reductions in GHG (mitigation) that would compete favorably 
with reductions from other sectors (ROCHEDO et al., 2018, KONRAD ADENAUER 
STIFTUNG and GVCES, 2018; CEBDS, 2018, 2017; GVCES, 2017; EPE, 2016; 
INSTITUTO ESCOLHAS, 2015; BNDES, 2010). An example would be 






vegetation and soil. Such an alternative has significant potential in reforestation, tree 
cultivation on non-forest land (afforestation) and soil, especially in the rehabilitation of 
degraded soils. 
Other opportunities for reducing emissions in this sector are possible and are even more 
consistent and necessary when observing that the Brazilian NDC aims to strengthen the 
ABC Plan, whose main goal is to promote the mitigation of GHG emissions in agriculture, 
proposing additionally the recovery of 15 million hectares of pasture degraded by 2030 
and the increase of 5 million hectares of integrated crop-livestock-forest systems by 2030. 
According to PMR (2017), the total mitigation potential, considering the goals of the 
ABC Plan and the additional NDC commitments, is estimated between 239.4 and 294.4 
million tCO2eq. 
With regard to the interactions between the industrial sector and the AFOLU sector, it is 
worth mentioning that the industry is a consumer of woody biomass, especially the Pulp 
and Paper and Steel sectors. Therefore, there is a clear interaction between the industrial 
sector and AFOLU. Mitigation measures that are based on reducing emissions through 
the replacement of fossil fuels by biomass should consider interactions with land use and 
forest policies. Thus, there are interesting opportunities for offset in this sector, in relation 
to the industry-AFOLU interaction, not only through planted forests (in relation to the 
Steel industry and Pulp and Paper), but also from the energy consumption in the AFOLU 
sector. The trade of carbon credits through offset would require special attention to the 
operational and methodological procedures - which is beyond the scope of this thesis -, 
but it is worth noting the wide international experience, including the Brazilian 
experience, within the scope of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), whose 
lessons would certainly support the development of offsets. 
